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New Case Filed - Other Claims 
Complaint Filed 
(3)Summons Filed 
Answer (White for SARMC and Fox) 
Answer (White for Zimmerman) 
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference 
10107/200903:30 PM) 
Notice of Status Conference 
Motion for Limited Admission of Robert G 
Homchick 
Notice Of Service 
Affidavit Of Service 6/25/09 
Affidavit Of Service 6/28/09 
Acceptance Of Service 6/30109 
Order Granting Limited Admission of Robert 
Homchick 
Notice Of Service 
Motion for Limited Admission of Brad Fisher 


















Hearing result for Scheduling Conference held on Deborah Bail 
10107/200903:30 PM: Conference Held 
Order Granting Limited Admission of Brad Fisher Deborah Bail 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/01/2011 09:30 Deborah Bail 
AM) 3-4 WEEKS 
Notice of Trial Setting and Order Governing 
Further Proceedings (2/1111 @ 9:30) 
Motion to Disqualify Alternate Judge 
Order Disqualifying Alternate Judge (McKee) 
Notice Of Service 
Notice Of Service 
Notice of Change of Firm Name 
Notice Of Service 
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Production of 
Information Related to SARMCs Wrongful Denial 
of Dr Verskas Reappointment 
Appendix in Support of Plaintiffs Motion 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion 
Plaintiffs Motion to Exceed Page Limit on Their 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion 
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Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 
02/03/201002:30 PM) Motion to Compel 
Judge 
Deborah Bail 
Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint Deborah Bail 
and Demand for Jury Trial 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to Deborah Bail 
File First Amended Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial 
Notice Of Hearing re Motion for Leave to File First Deborah Bail 
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
(02/10/10 @ 2 pm) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/10/201002:00 Deborah Bail 
PM) 
Stipulation for Entry of Protective Order Deborah Bail 
Motion for Protective Order Deborah Bail 
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Deborah Bail 
Compel and Cross-Motions for (i) Protective 
Order on Peer Review, and (ii) Order Striking 
Privileged Peer Review Records 
Notice Of Hearing re Defendants' Opposition to Deborah Bail 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and Cross-Motions 
for (i) Protective Order on Peer Review, and (ii) 
Order Striking Privileged Peer Review Records 
(02/03/10 @ 2:30 pm) 
Reply in Support of Motion to Compel and Deborah Bail 
Response to Cross-Motions for Protective Order 
on Peer Review, and (ii) Order Striking Privileged 
Peer Review Records 
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Exceed Page Deborah Bail 
Limit on their Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of 
Information Related to SARMC's Wrongful Denial 
of Dr. Verska's Reappointment 
Defendants Reply in Support of Cross-Motions for Deborah Bail 
Protective Order on Peer Review and Order 
Striking Privileged Peer Review Records 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Deborah Bail 
02/03/201002:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Motion to Compel & Defendants' 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and 
Cross-Motions for (i) Protective Order on Peer 
Review, and (ii) Order Striking Privileged Peer 
Review Records 50 
Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs MOtion for 
Leave to File First Amended Complaint 
Affidavit of Stephanie C Westermeier 
Protective Order 
Deborah Bail 
Deborah B'6 0 0 004 
Deborah Bail 
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Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to File First Deborah Bail 
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
Affidavit of Raymond D. Powers in Support of Deborah Bail 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of 
Information Related to SARMC'S Wrongful Denial 
of Dr. Verska's Reappointment 
Document sealed 
Hearing result for Motion held on 02/10/2010 Deborah Bail 
02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 50 
Notice Of Service Deborah Bail 
Order Re: Motion To Compel/Protective Order Deborah Bail 
Plaintiffs Motion for Premissive Appeal Deborah Bail 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Deborah Bail 
Premissive Appeal 
Notice Of Hearing (03/17/10 @ 3:30pm) Deborah Bail 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Deborah Bail 
03/17/201003:30 PM) Motion for Permissive 
Appeal 
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Deborah Bail 
First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial 
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial Deborah Bail 
Defendants Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Deborah Bail 
Permissive Appeal 
Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Deborah Bail 
Permissive Appeal 
Defendants St Alphonsus Reg Med Cntr and Deborah Bail 
Donald Fox MDs Answer to Amended Complaint 
Defendant Christian G Zimmerman MDs Answer Deborah Bail 
to Amended Complaint 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Deborah Bail 
03/17/201003:30 PM: District Court Hearing He/< 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Motion for Permissive Appeal 50 
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Permissive Deborah Bail 
Appeal 
Plaintiffs Motion to Stay District Court 
Proceedings During Processing of Motion for 
Permissive Appeal 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion 
Notice Of Hearing (05/12/10 @ 2:30pm) 
Deborah Bail 
Deborah Bail 
Deborah Ba{) 0 0005 
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Date Code User Judge 
3/24/2010 HRSC CCWRIGRM Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Deborah Bail 
05/12/2010 02:30 PM) Motion to Stay District 
Court Proceedings 
4/5/2010 STIP CCNELSRF Stipulation to Stay District Court Proceedings Deborah Bail 
During Processing of Motion for Permissive 
Appeal 
4/6/2010 HRVC DCTHERTL Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Deborah Bail 
05/12/201002:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion 
to Stay District Court Proceedings 
ORDR DCTHERTL Order to Stay District Court Proceedings During Deborah Bail 
Processing of Motion for Permissive Appeal 
STAT DCTHERTL STATUS CHANGED: inactive Deborah Bail 
6/4/2010 APSC CCHOLMEE Appealed To The Supreme Court Deborah Bail 
6/18/2010 REQU CCSWEECE Defendant's Request For Add'i Records to be Deborah Bail 
Included in the Clerk's Record on Appeal and or 
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Portia L. Jenkins 
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POWERS THOMSON, P.c. 
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 150 
Post Office Box 9756 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 577-5100 
Facsimile: (208) 577-5101 
W:\17\17-002\Complaint.docx 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
J. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE 
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. 
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD 
FOX, M.D., 
Defendants. 
CV DC 0 11804 
Case No. -------
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE SPINE INSTITUTE OF 
IDAHO, by and through their attorneys of record, POWERS THOMSON, P.C., and hereby 
allege the following as and for claims against Defendants in the above-captioned litigation. 
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, f , 
JURISDICTION & PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Joseph M. Verska, M.D. ("Dr. Verska") IS an Idaho resident and 
orthopedic spine surgeon, licensed and practicing in the State ofIdaho. 
2. The Spine Institute of Idaho is a professional corporation conducting business in 
the State ofIdaho. 
3. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("SARMC") is a non-profit corporation 
conducting business and providing medical services to the general public in the state of Idaho. 
4. Christian G. Zimmerman, M.D. is an Idaho resident licensed and practicing 
medicine in the State ofIdaho. Dr. Zimmerman is a neurosurgeon whose specialty includes the 
practice of spine surgery. 
5. Donald Fox, M.D. is an Idaho resident licensed and practicing medicine in the 
State ofIdaho. Dr. Fox's specialty is anesthesia. 
6. Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court under Idaho Code §5-404. The 
amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold of this Court. 
FACTS 
7. Dr. Verska created The Spine Institute of Idaho In April, 2001. The Spine 
Institute ofIdaho provides services to the general public that include surgical, rehabilitation and 
radiographic services for spine related conditions. 
8. Dr. Verska applied for and was granted privileges at SARMC on January 22, 
1996. Since that time and until July 1,2008, Dr. Verska's privileges were renewed at SARMC 
on a regular basis, without lapse. Every time Dr. Verska's privileges were renewed, he was 
presented by SARMC with a new set of Bylaws and Medical Staff Policies and Plans ("MSPP"). 
Dr. Verska and SARMC and its agents agreed to act and deal with one another in a consistent 
fashion by virtue of the Bylaws and MSPP. By virtue of their respective conduct and actions, 
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SARMC and Dr. Verska entered into a fiduciary relationship pursuant to SARMC's MSPP and 
Bylaws as a result of Dr. Verska being granted renewed privileges and continuously practicing 
medicine at SARMC. 
9. The actions and conduct of SARMC and Dr. Verska established duties and 
responsibilities between SARMC and Dr. Verska wherein both parties held reasonable 
expectations that each would act in good faith in fulfilling their respective responsibilities set 
forth in the SARMC MSPP and Bylaws. 
10. In January of2004, SARMC initiated a review of Dr. Verska's practice. 
11. Commencing in 2004 and continuing thereafter, together SARMC, its agents, 
employees and Board Members, Dr. Zimmerman and Dr. Fox conspired to damage Dr. Verska's 
professional reputation and his ability to practice spine surgery in Boise, Idaho. This effort 
continues on the date of the filing of this complaint. 
12. In 2004, SARMC approached Dr. Verska and asked him to provide on-call trauma 
spine services at SARMC. Dr. Verska agreed in an effort to assist SARMC manage the loss of 
trauma spine neurosurgeons created by the Hospital's dispute with the Neurosurgical Group. 
13. In March of 2005, the SARMC Medical Executive Committee ("MEC") 
appointed an Ad Hoc committee to conduct a peer review of certain aspects of Dr. Verska's 
practice. Dr. Verska cooperated in the peer review process. 
14. In January of2006, the Ad Hoc Committee presented its fmdings to the MEC and 
made certain recommendations. Dr. Verska complied with the recommendations. 
15. In 2006, the Spine Medicine Institute ("SMI") was conceived and created by 
SARMC. It was at the time and remains the vision ofSMI at SARMC to be the destination spine 
care program for the Northwest. SMI offers multidisciplinary management of back and neck 
pain, including medical evaluation, diagnostic imaging, pain management, physical therapy, 
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spine surgery, psychosocial care. SMI competes directly with the services offered by Dr. Verska 
and the Spine Institute ofIdaho. 
16. Dr. Christian Zimmerman is held out by SARMC as a spine surgeon affiliated 
with SMI. Dr. Zimmerman is an employee of SARMC. The physicians affiliated with SMI are 
direct competitors of Dr. Verska and the Spine Institute ofldaho. 
17. Dr. Donald Fox was appointed Vice President and President Elect of the Medical 
Statfin February of2005. 
18. In April of 2006, the SARMC Quality Care Committee modified the Ad Hoc 
Committee's earlier recommendation and the review of Dr. Verska's practice continued. 
19. In January of 2007, the MEC voted to discontinue the ongoing peer review of 
Dr. Verska. Nevertheless, the Board of Trustees of SARMC, without justification, directed the 
MEC to continue its investigation of Dr. Verska. 
20. In October of 2007, the MEC, led by Dr. Fox as the President of the Medical 
Staff, voted to commission another Ad Hoc Committee to conduct another peer review. 
2l. In November of 2007, the Ad Hoc Committee appointed by the MEC and 
consisting of Dr. Michael McMartin, Dr. Gertjan Mulder and Dr. Timothy Floyd, recommended 
another review of Dr. Verska's practice at SARMC. Dr. Floyd is a spine surgeon who was and is 
a direct competitor of Dr. Verska's. Dr. Floyd was and is affiliated with SMI. Dr. McMartin is a 
rehabilitation medicine specialist and former President of the Medical Staff at SARMC. 
Dr. McMartin's practice competes with services offered by the Spine Institute of Idaho. 
Dr. Mulder is a former president ofthe medical staff at SARMC. 
22. SARMC, its Board, Dr. Fox and the MEC knew that Dr. McMartin and Dr. Floyd 
had a conflict of interest acting as members of the Ad Hoc Committee conducting the peer 
000010 
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review of Dr. Verksa. Nevertheless, SARMC, through its agents, selected them to be members 
ofthe Committee conducting the peer review of Dr. Verska's care. 
23. In November of 2007, the Ad Hoc Committee presented the MEC with its initial 
recommendations, which were approved; Dr. Verska complied with the requests for infonnation 
from the Committee and cooperated in its review of his practice. 
24. On December 6, 2007, through a letter from Dr. Fox, Dr. Verska was notified of 
the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation and the continuing peer review as directed by the 
SARMC Board of Trustees. Members of the Ad Hoc Committee considered the process a peer -
review with no punitive or adverse consequences to Dr. Verska. 
I 
25. From January through June of2008, Dr. Verska submitted additional materials to 
the Ad Hoc Committee as it continued its peer review. During this same period oftime, Dr. Fox 
breached confidentiality and disclosed privileged, confidential peer review information regarding 
the review to physicians outside of the peer review process, including Dr. Zimmerman. 
26. Dr. Fox breached confidentiality by disclosing confidential information to 
individuals outside of the process in violation of the Bylaws of SARMC and in breach of the 
responsibilities and duties attached to the position of President of the Medical Staff This breach 
of confidentiality damaged Dr. Verska's professional reputation in the community. 
27. During the review process at SARMC, Dr. Zimmerman has disclosed confidential 
information relative to Dr. Verska's practice to members of the medical community, employees 
and staff members at SARMC, SARMC administrators, including Dr. Robert Polk and former 
CEO, Sandra Bruce, health care insurers, pharmaceutical representatives and the general public 
in an effort to damage Dr. Verska's professional reputation, undermine Dr. Verska's medical 
practice and increase income generated by SMI. These representations and actions were 
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intended to damage Dr. Verska's professional reputation in the community and further the 
interests ofSMI. 
28. In June of 2008, the Ad Hoc Committee, consisting of Dr. Mulder, Dr. Floyd and 
Dr. McMartin, made certain recommendations to the MEC. 
29. The recommendations set forth by the Ad Hoc Committee were intended by the 
Committee to constitute collegial intervention and be non-punitive as provided under Chapter 
VIII, Section 6 of the MSPP. Nowhere in the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation is there any 
indication that they intended their recommendation be punitive resulting in Dr. V erska' s 
privileges not being renewed at SARMC. 
30. On June 25, 2008, Dr. Fox with the approval of the SARMC Board of Trustees 
presented information to the MEC regarding the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendations. 
Dr. Fox knowingly misrepresented and intentionally omitted presenting relevant information and 
manipulated the recommendations and conclusions of the Ad Hoc Committee in an eflort to 
exclude Dr. Verska from medical staff membership at SARMC. Dr. Fox was successful in this 
effort and the MEC voted to ignore key recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee resulting in 
Dr. Verska's privileges not being renewed on July 1, 2008. 
3l. On July 1, 2008, SARMC refused to renew Dr. Verska's privileges. 
32. On July 9, 2008, Dr. Verska requested a hearing before a Fair Hearing Panel 
("FHP"). 
33. Under the language of the MSPP, Dr. Verska was entitled to a formal hearing to 
challenge an adverse action before his privileges could be adversely affected. SARMC failed to 
comply with the MSPP and its own Bylaws in this regard in its decision to not renew 
Dr. Verska's privileges on July 1, 2008, effectively removing Dr. Verska from the medical staff 
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with no opportunity for Dr. Verska to have a hearing to review and challenge the basis for the 
decision. 
34. The MSPP provided that a panel of three physicians be appointed to hear and take 
evidence from both parties. Under Chapter XII, Section 17 Burden of Proof, Fair Hearing Plan, 
the Hospital's MEC had the burden of initially presenting evidence in support of its 
recommendation. The burden then shifted to the physician. The section goes on to state that 
35. 
[T]he Hearing Panel will recommend against the Practitioner who 
requested the hearing unless it finds that said Practitioner has 
proved that the recommendation which prompted the hearing was 
unreasonable, not sustained by the evidence, or otherwise 
unfounded. 
In 2008, Dr. Zimmerman was offered employment by SARMC. His 
responsibilities as an employee of SARMC include recruitment of spine surgeons to SMI and 
efforts to increase the volume of patients and income generated by SMI. 
36. In late September, 2008, SARMC adopted a position before the FHP regarding 
Dr. Verska's competence and skill which misrepresented the conclusions and recommendations 
reached by the Ad Hoc Committee in June 2008. 
/37. In September of 2008, SARMC through its agents, employees and 
representatives, disclosed confidential information to -.§.t. Luke's Regional ~ Center's 
agents and officers regarding Dr. Verska's status at SARMC and the confidential process that 
SARMC had engineered leading to Dr. Verska's privileges not being renewed. The disclosure 
violated the terms and conditions of the MSPP and Bylaws and misrepresented the facts and 
circumstances regarding Dr. Verska's competence to practice and be a member of the medical 
staff at SARMC. The disclosure was intended to damage the professional reputation of 
Dr. Verska and the Spine Institute ofIdaho. 
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38. Between October 28, 2008 and October 30, 2008, the FHP appointed by SARMC 
heard evidence presented by SARMC and Dr. Verska on the issue of whether SARMC's 
decision to now renew Dr. Verska's privileges was unreasonable, not sustained by the evidence, 
or was otherwise unfounded. At the hearing both parties presented evidence, called witnesses, 
cross-examined witnesses, and presented written closing statements to the panel members. 
Dr. Verska presented evidence rebutting the position adopted and maintained by SARMC. 
39. In November of 2008, after considering the evidence and applying the burden of 
proof outlined in the MSPP, the FHP found that SARMC's position that Dr. Verska was not 
qualified to be on staff and the MEC decision to not renew Dr. V erska' s privileges were not 
supported by the evidence, and were unfair and unreasonable. The FHP recommended that 
Dr. Verska have his privileges at SARMC reinstated immediately. 
40. Thereafter, Dr. Fox misrepresented the FHP's conclusions and recOlmnendations 
in a meeting with the MEC. On December 15, 2008, the MEC chose to ignore the FHP and 
instead embraced the position first articulated in September, 2008 that Dr. Verska was not 
competent and qualified to be on the SARMC medical staff 
41. The MEC did not seek the assistance or benefit of a spine surgeon to assist it in 
analyzing the recommendation of the FHP. Instead it relied upon advice, misrepresentations and 
intentional omissions of information provided by Dr. Fox. Dr. Fox in presenting the issues to the 
MEC mischaracterized the Fair Hearing process, the findings of the FHP, and the responsibilities 
ofSARMC and the MEC under the terms of the MSPP. 
42. Dr. Verska appealed the misinformed and arbitrary recommendation of the MEC. 
The SARMC Board of Trustees, after hearing Dr. Verska's appeal, chose to ignore the FHP's 
recommendation, the terms of the MSPP and affirmed the unsupportable, arbitrary MEC 
directive that Dr. Verska was not qualified to be on its medical staff. 
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Civil Conspiracy 
43. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth 
in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
44. SARMC, Dr. Fox and Dr. Zimmerman, as well as with other unnamed co-
conspirators, who include physicians and hospital staff employed by or who are agents of 
SARMC and SMI, conspired with malice and intent to injure Plaintiffs' professional practice and 
reputation and; 
(a) engaged in a pattern of conduct pursuant to which they improperly 
removed Dr. Verska from the SARMC medical staff in bad faith, thus 
preventing Dr. Verska from pursuing his livelihood and practicing his 
specialty in the hospital; 
(b) fabricated and exaggerated claims against Dr. Verska regarding quality of 
care issues, his surgical skill and competence, used discriminatory criteria 
in quality of care determinations, and acted in secrecy to further their 
personal and corporate interests rather than those of the patients of 
SARMC; 
(c) subverted the mandated SARMC peer reVIew process and SARMC's 
MSPP and Bylaws; 
(d) concealed the real anti-competitive motives for not renewing Dr. Verska's 
medical staff privileges; 
(e) caused Dr. Verska's privileges not to be renewed by SARMC by 
improperly influencing and manipUlating SARMC Medical Executive 
Committee in bad faith; and 
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(1) fabricated additional allegations against Dr. Verska during the pendency 
of and following the appeal process from his denial of medical staff 
privileges at SARMC in an attempt to further alter the record and give 
credibility to their arbitrary actions. 
45. Such conduct has harmed and will continue to harm in the future, consumers of 
orthopedic neck and back care in Southwestern Idaho. 
46. The actions taken by Defendants SARMC, Dr. Fox and Dr. Zimmerman were 
intended to damage Dr. Verska and the Spine Institute of Idaho, Dr. Verska's reputation and 
career, as well as financially cripple his professional practice. 
47. As a direct and proximate result of the reckless, wrongful acts of Defendants, 
Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
48. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth 
in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
49. SARMC failed to comply with its own Bylaws and MSPP when it did not inform 
Dr. Verska that his staff privileges were being reviewed under the Corrective Action plan 0 f the 
MSP P, thereby breaching its duty 0 f good faith and fair dealing with Dr. Verska. 
50. SARMC failed to comply with the MSPP and inappropriately manipulated the 
MSPP for the purpose ofdepriving Dr. Verska ofthe ability to practice at SARMC. 
51. As a result of SARMC's failure to comply with the MSPP, Dr. Verska did not 
have an opportunity to adequately defend himself in the peer review process. 
52. As a result ofSARMC's failure to comply with the MSPP, SARMC unjustly and 
without good cause refused to grant Dr. Verska's application for renewal of his staff privileges 
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and required him to fulfill a one year spine fellowship effectively removing him from the 
medical community for a period of one to two years, before it would even consider granting him 
staff privileges. 
53. Defendants SARMC and Dr. Fox breached the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing when it refused to grant Dr. Verska's application for renewal of his staff privileges only 
five days before his privileges were to lapse with no right to a hearing or due process. 
54. Defendants SARMC and Dr. Fox breached the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing by failing to discharge its responsibilities as outlined in the MSPP and as required by the 
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA). 
55. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants SARMC's and Dr. Fox's actions, 
Plaintiffs have been damaged and are entitled to be compensated for those damages in an amount 
to be determined at trial. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Intentional and/or Negligent 
Interference with Economic Advantage 
56. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth 
in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
57. Dr. Verska has been a member of the Boise medical community for over fifteen 
(15) years and has established a wide patient base throughout Southern Idaho and is affiliated 
with a number of medical institutions in the community. Dr. Verska has invested substantial 
sums of money to establish continuing treatment relationships with patients, members of the 
medical community, colleagues, and institutions in the community. 
58. Defendants knew or should have known about the relationships established 
between Dr. Verska, his patients, physicians, and other institutions in the medical community. 
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59. SARMC's refusal to grant Dr. Verska's application for renewal of staff privileges 
at SARMC was an intentional attempt to harm and undermine Dr. Verska's professional practice. 
SARMC inappropriate refusal to renew Dr. Verska's privileges amounts to dishonest, reckless, 
improper, and unfair acts to affIrmatively damage Dr. Verska's reputation. 
60. The reckless interference by Defendants with Dr. V erska' s reputation and 
business will permanently damage the business relationships between Dr. Verska, his patients 
and those medical institutions in the community that he is affiliated with. 
61. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' reckless actions, Plaintiffs have 
been damaged and are entitled to be compensated for those damages in an amount to be 
detennined at trial. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Interference with Prospective 
Contractual Relations or Business Expectations 
62. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all ofthe allegations set forth 
in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
63. Dr. Verska has continuing pro fessional and business relationships with other 
physicians and medical institutions who pennit Dr. Verska to practice at their facilities. 
64. Defendants knew of these relationships between Dr. Verska and these institutions 
and acted recklessly in their actions. 
65. Defendants intentionally and wrongfully intertered with these relationships and 
business expectations by their bad faith actions outlined herein, and as a direct and proximate 
result, Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount to be detennined at trial. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Defamation Per Se, Libel Per Se, and Slander Per Se 
66. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all ofthe allegations set forth 
in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
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67. Defendants have maliciously, willfully and intentionally defamed Plaintiffs by 
fabricating instances of misconduct, exaggerating and misrepresenting Dr. Verska's 
qualifications and abilities, and reporting such false and defamatory statements to members of 
the Medical Staff at SARMC, St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, members of the medical 
community, health care insurers and state and federal regulatory authorities, including but not 
limited to, the Idaho State Board of Medicine and the Idaho State Board of Phannacy, all in 
furtherance of its attempt to damage Dr. Verska's reputation and exclude Dr. Verska from 
competing in orthopedic spine care with SARMC, SMI, and Dr. Zimmerman. 
68. Defendants, by improperly refusing to grant Dr. Verska's application for renewal 
of staff privileges, and other defamatory conduct and statements set forth herein, knew that 
Dr. Verska would be compelled to disclose the outcome and recommendations of the SARMC 
committees in connection with applications for hospital medical staff privileges of other 
institutions in Southern Idaho where he held privileges or could have applied for privileges, 
malpractice insurance, membership in professional organizations, credentialing with health 
insurers and related purposes. 
69. Dr. Verska, in fact, has been compelled to disclose the outcome of the SARMC 
committee actions to malpractice insurers, licensing boards, state and federal regulatory 
agencies, health insurers and other healthcare institutions, and will be compelled to make further 
disclosures ofthis type for the remainder of his professional career. 
70. Defendants' reckless conduct and actions were performed with malice, ill will, 
personal spite, with knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or 
falsity, and for the purpose of injuring Dr. Verska's professional reputation, the reputation of the 
Spine Institute ofIdaho and preventing competition from Dr. Verska and the Spine Institute of 
Idaho. 
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71. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have uttered and published false and 
defamatory statements about Dr. Verska in writing and, upon information and belief, orally, with 
respect to Dr. Verska's conduct, skill level, competence, employment, career, and qualifications 
to practice medicine, and have compelled Dr. Verska to repeat Defendants' defamation to others 
in connection with his professional career, with the intent of steering business away from 
Dr. Verska and to SARMC and SMI thereby limiting competition. 
72. Such statements constitute defamation per se, libel per se and/or slander per se. 
73. Plaintiffs have had their business reputation damaged. Plaintiffs have been and 
will continue to be damaged financially as a result of such defamatory statements, causing 
damage in an amount to be proven at trial. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Denial of Common Law Fair Procedure Rights 
74. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth 
in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
75. SARMC failed to comply with the MSPP when it allowed a peer review process 
to result in a denial ofprivileges without a hearing and due process. 
76. As a result of SARMC's failure to comply with the MSPP, Dr. Verska did not 
have an opportunity to adequately defend himself in the peer review process, which is a denial of 
his common law right to a fair procedure. 
77. The decision by SARMC to refuse to grant Dr. Verska's application to renew his 
staff privileges without a hearing was without justification and not supported by any reasonable 
ground and constitutes a violation Dr. Verska's COlmnon law right to a fair procedure and due 
process. 
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78. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiffs have been 
damaged and will continue to be damaged and are entitled to be compensated for those damages 
in an amount to be determined at trial. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Fiduciary Duties 
79. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth 
in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
80. Dr. Verska trusted in and relied upon Defendant SARMC to follow the MSPP and 
assure that proper policies and procedures were implemented, established, and adhered to both 
by SARMC and those appointed by SARMC to serve on committees and in position of authority. 
This relationship of trust and confidence between Dr. Verska and SARMC established fiduciary 
duties on behalf ofSARMC to act in good faith and with due regard to Dr. Verska's interests. 
81. SARMC breached said fiduciary duties by, inter alia, inducing Dr. Zimmerman, 
Dr. Fox and other unnamed parties, to conspire to damage Dr. Verska's professional reputation 
and wrongfully deny Dr. Verska's application for renewal of privileges. Defendants' conduct 
was reckless in this regard. 
82. As a result ofthese breaches of fiduciary duties, Plaintiffs have been damaged and 
will continue to be damaged in an amount to be proved at trial. 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Violation of Due Process Rights 
83. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth 
in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
84. SARMC violated Dr. Verska's due process rights when they chose to ignore the 
findings and recommendation of the three neutral, objective panel members comprising the FHP 
and continued to rely on the unjustified, arbitrary decision ofthe MEC made in June of2008. 
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85. The FHP found that Dr. Verska had met his burden of proof as set forth in the 
Bylaws and determined that the decision by the MEC was unfair. The FHP's recommendation 
was based on substantial evidence and testimony by both parties. The FHP's recommendation to 
reinstate Dr. Verska's privileges immediately was reasonable in light of the evidence presented. 
By ignoring the FHP recommendation, SARMC violated Dr. Verska's due process rights. 
86. The decision by the MEC and SARMC to repeatedly ignore the recommendations 
of intemal committees and the FHP is patently unfair to Dr. Verska and vio lates his due process 
rights. 
87. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant SARMC's reckless actions, 
Plaintiffs have been damaged and will continue to be damaged and are entitled to be 
compensated for those damages in an amount to be detennined at trial. 
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
88. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth 
in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
89. Defendants intentionally, willingly and/or negligently inflicted emotional distress 
upon Dr. Verska by acting in bad faith and unjustly refusing to renew Dr. Verska's privileges at 
SARMC. 
90. As a result of Defendants' reckless, extreme and outrageous conduct, Dr. Verska 
has suffered, and continues to suffer, severe emotional distress, including physical manifestations 
of that distress. 
91. Defendants' acts and/or omissions were intentional, reckless, willful, malicious, 
and/or grossly negligent. 
92. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful acts of SARMC, Plaintiffs have 
been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 000022 
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TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Injunctive Relief 
93. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth 
in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
94. Dr. Verska has a right to earn a living and has done so through the practice of 
medicine. He has been, and continues to be, greatly harmed due to his exclusion from the 
medical staff 0 f SARMC. 
95. Based upon the improper refusal ofSARMC to renew Dr. Verska's privileges, Dr. 
Verska seeks injunctive relief restoring his privileges and his ability to earn a living, to which he 
is entitled, pending the final outcome ofthe present action. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Plaintiffs have been required to retain counsel to pursue this matter. Plaintiffs have 
retained the law firm of POWERS THOMSON, P.C., and have agreed to pay said attorneys a 
reasonable fee. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred 
in the prosecution of this matter pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Idaho Code §12-121, or other applicable law. 
PRAYER 
Plaintiffs' claims for damages exceed the jurisdiction amount of this Court and include, 
but are not limited to loss of income due to Dr. Verska's inability to perionn surgery at SARMC, 
damage to his reputation, interference with his past and present business and professional 
relations. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the above-named Defendants 
as follows: 
1. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
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2. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
3. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
4. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Fourth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
5. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
6. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Sixth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
7. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Seventh Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
8. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Eighth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
9. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Ninth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial; and 
10. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Tenth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this complaint to include a cause of action for 
punitive damages, pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1604. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury as to all issues so triable pursuant to Rule 38(b) 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and will not stipUlate to a jury ofless than 12 jurors. 
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DATED this ~_ day of June, 2009. 
POWERS THOMSON, PC 
BYRa£,;:~~~ 
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Portia L. Jenkins - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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VERI FICA TION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D., being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
That he is the plaintiff in the above-entitled action 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, knows the conte 
d that he has read the foregoing 
nd believes the same to be true. 
IQ (VI-
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this R day of June, 2009. 
a 0 fMv14V; 
Notary Public for Id~h~ Id _ L 
Residing at O1et,cL aY7 J t:UIl O 
Commission expires_~-1/,....a,,-,(p=+J--,-J-,,3,,--____ _ 
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Robert B. White (ISB #4438) 
J. Will Varin (lSB #6981) 
Gi yens Pursley LLP 
601 W. Bannock Street 
PO Box 2720 





Attorneys for Defendants 
AUG 18 ?-Q09 
J. NAVARRO, CiQ(k 
8yLAMES 
OEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D., and THE ) 






SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL ) 
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. ) 
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD ) 




No. CV OC 0911804 
ANSWER OF DEFENDANT 
CHRISTIAN G. ZIMMERMAN, M.D. 
COMES NOW Defendant Christian G. Zimmerman, M.D. ("Defendant"), by and through 
his attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP and Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, and Answering 
Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("Complaint") on file herein, admits, denies, 
and alleges as follows: 
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JURISDICTION AND PARTIES 
1. Answering the allegations in paragraph 1 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
2. Answering the allegations in paragraph 2 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
3. Answering the allegations in paragraph 3 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
4. Defendant admits the allegations in paragraph 4 of the Complaint. 
5. Answering the allegations in paragraph 5 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sut11cient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
6. Answering the allegations in paragraph 6 of the Complaint, although Defendant 
believes the claims asserted against him are frivolous and are brought without basis in law or 
fact, he does not challenge venue or jurisdiction. 
FACTS 
7. Answering the allegations in paragraph 7 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
8. Answering the allegations in paragraph 8 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
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9. Answering the allegations in paragraph 9 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
10. Answering the allegations in paragraph 10 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
11. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 11 of the Complaint. 
12. Answering the allegations in paragraph 12 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
13. Answering the allegations in paragraph 13 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
14. Answering the allegations in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
15. Answering the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint, Defendant admits that 
SARMC offers multidisciplinary management of certain spine issues, and denies that SARMC or 
SMI competes directly with services offered by Dr. Verska. Except as expressly admitted or 
denied, Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth 
or falsity of the other allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint, and therefore denies them 
16. Answering the allegations in paragraph 16 of the Complaint, Defendant admits that 
he is employed by SARMC, and that he is identified, among other things, as a spine surgeon. 
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Except as expressly admitted or denied, Defendant is without knowledge or information 
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the other allegations in paragraph 16 of the 
Complaint, and therefore denies them 
17. Answering the allegations in paragraph 17 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
18. Answering the allegations in paragraph 18 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
19. Answering the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
20. Answering the allegations in paragraph 20 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
21. Answering the allegations in paragraph 21 of the Complaint, Defendant admits that 
Dr. Floyd is a spine surgeon. Except as expressly admitted, Defendant is without knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the other allegations in 
paragraph 21 of the Complaint, and therefore denies them. 
22. Answering the allegations in paragraph 22 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
ANSWER OF DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN G. ZIMMERMAN, M.D. - 4 
641184 
000030 
23. Answering the allegations in paragraph 23 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
24. Answering the allegations in paragraph 24 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
25. Answering the allegations in paragraph 25 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of falsity of Dr. Verska's peer 
review process in January through June of2008 and therefore denies them. Defendant denies the 
remaining allegations in paragraph 25 of the Complaint. 
26. Answering the allegations in paragraph 26 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
27. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 27 of the Complaint. 
28. Answering the allegations in paragraph 28 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
29. Answering the allegations in paragraph 29 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
30. Answering the allegations in paragraph 30 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
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31. Answering the allegations in paragraph 31 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or intormation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
32. Answering the allegations in paragraph 32 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or intormation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
33. Answering the allegations in paragraph 33 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or intormation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
34. Answering the allegations in paragraph 34 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and theretore denies them. 
35. Answering the allegations in paragraph 35 of the Complaint, Defendant admits that 
he was offered employment by SARMC, and denies the remaining allegations therein. 
36. Answering the allegations in paragraph 36 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them .. 
37. Answering the allegations in paragraph 37 of the Complaint, Defendant denies the 
allegations to the extent they are directed to him, and is otherwise without knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, and therefore 
denies them. 
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38. Answering the allegations in paragraph 38 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
39. Answering the allegations in paragraph 39 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
40. Answering the allegations in paragraph 40 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
, 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
41. Answering the allegations in paragraph 41 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
42. Answering the allegations in paragraph 42 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Civil Conspiracy 
43. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 42 of the Complaint as 
if set forth fully herein. 
44. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 44 of the Complaint, and each of its 
subparagraphs (a)-( t). 
45. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 45 of the Complaint. 
46. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 46 of the Complaint. 
47. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 47 of the Complaint. 
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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
48. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 47 of the Complaint as 
if set forth fully herein. 
49. Answering the allegations in paragraph 49 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
50. Answering the allegations in paragraph 50 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
51. Answering the allegations in paragraph 51 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
52. Answering the allegations in paragraph 52 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
53. Answering the allegations in paragraph 53 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
54. Answering the allegations in paragraph 54 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
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55. Answering the allegations in paragraph 55 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Intentional and/or Negligent 
Interference with Economic Advantage 
56. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 55 of the Complaint as 
if set forth fully herein. 
57. Answering the allegations in paragraph 57 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore deny them. 
58. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 58 of the Complaint. 
59. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 59 of the Complaint. 
60. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 60 of the Complaint. 
61. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 61 of the Complaint. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Interference with Prospective 
Contractual Relations or Business Expectations 
62. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 61 of the Complaint as 
if set forth fully herein. 
63. Answering the allegations in paragraph 63 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore deny them. 
64. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 64 of the Complaint. 
65. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 65 of the Complaint. 
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Defamation Per Se, Libel Per Se, and Slander Per Se 
66. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 66 of the Complaint as 
if set forth fully herein. 
67. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 67 of the Complaint. 
68. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 68 of the Complaint. 
69. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 69 of the Complaint. 
70. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 70 of the Complaint. 
71. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 71 of the Complaint. 
72. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 72 of the Complaint. 
73. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 73 of the Complaint. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Denial of Common Law Fair Procedure Rights 
74. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 73 of the Complaint as 
if set forth fully herein. 
75. Answering the allegations in paragraph 75 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
76. Answering the allegations in paragraph 76 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
77. Answering the allegations in paragraph 77 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
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78. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 78 of the Complaint. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Fiduciary Duties 
79. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs I through 78 of the Complaint as 
if set forth fully herein. 
80. Answering the allegations in paragraph 80 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
81. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 81 of the Complaint. 
82. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 82 of the Complaint. 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Violation of Due Process Rights 
83. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 82 of the Complaint as 
if set forth fully herein. 
84. Answering the allegations in paragraph 84 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
85. Answering the allegations in paragraph 85 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
86. Answering the allegations in paragraph 86 of the Complaint, Detendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
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87. Answering the allegations in paragraph 87 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
88. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 87 of the Complaint as 
if set forth fully herein. 
89. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 89 of the Complaint. 
90. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 90 ofthe Complaint. 
91. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 91 ofthe Complaint. 
92. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 92 ofthe Complaint. 
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Injunctive Relief 
93. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 92 of the Complaint as 
if set forth fully herein. 
94. Answering the allegations in paragraph 94 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
95. Answering the allegations in paragraph 95 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
96. Answering the unnumbered paragraphs at pages 17-18 of the Complaint, Defendants 
denies that plaintiffs are entitled to any of the relief requested. 
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97. Any allegations in the Complaint that are not admitted or otherwise addressed above 
are hereby denied. 
98. Without assuming any burden that is properly borne by Plaintiffs, Defendant reserves 
the right to assert the following as defenses to Plaintiffs' claims: 
DEFENSES 
99. Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each of the counts asserted against Defendant, fails to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendant. 
100. Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each of the counts asserted against Defendant, was 
made without good cause, without any basis in law or fact, frivolously, unreasonably, and 
without foundation. 
10 1. Damages suffered by Plaintiffs, if any, were caused by the Plaintiffs' own fault or 
negligence. 
102. Defendant is not the proximate cause of any damage suffered by Plaintiffs. 
103. Communications by Defendant concerning Verska, ifany, were privileged. 
104. Communications by Defendant concerning Verska, if any, were true. 
105. Plaintiffs have unclean hands. 
106. Damages suffered by Plaintiffs, if any, were caused by or contributed to by the 
superseding and unexpected acts and conduct of other persons and entities. 
107. Plaintiffs' alleged injuries and/or damages may be the result of actions or inaction 
of other persons or entities over whom Defendant has no control and no responsibility. To the 
extent the evidence reveals the same, plaintifts' recovery, if any, must be proportionately 
reduced and/or barred. 
108. Defendant reserves the right to assert additional defenses based upon further 
investigation and discovery. 




Wherefore, Defendant prays for judgment against Plaintiffs as follows: 
1. For judgment in his favor on all counts of Plaintiffs' Complaint; 
2. For a finding that the claims against Defendant were brought frivolously, 
unreasonably, and without foundation; 
3. For an award of costs and attorneys' fees to the full extent permitted by law, 
including Idaho Code § 12-121 and other law; and 
4. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just in the premises. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendant hereby demands a trial by a jury of not less than twelve (12) on all issues so 
triable pursuant to LR.C.P. 38(b). 
DATED this 18th day of August, 2009. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
((, W{;j:, 
Robert B. White 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of August 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy ofthe foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Raymond D. Powers 
Powers Thomson, P.c. 
345 Bobwhite Court, Ste #150 
P.O. Box 9756 
Boise, ID 83707 
/) , lh 
1<-. W 
_ Hand Delivery 
v Facsimile (208) 577-5101 
_ Overnight Courier 
1U.S. Mail 
Robert B. White 
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Robert B. White (ISB #4438) 
J. Will Varin (ISB #6981) 
Givens Pursley LLP 
601 W. Bannock Street 
PO Box 2720 
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By LAMES 
DePUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D., and THE 
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. 





) Case No. CV OC 0911804 
) 
) ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS SAINT 
) ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 








COMES NOW Defendants Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center and Donald Fox, 
M.D. ("Defendants"), by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP and Davis 
Wright Tremaine LLP, and Answering Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
("Complaint") on file herein, admit, deny, and allege as follows: 
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JURISDICTION AND PARTIES 
1. Answering the allegations in paragraph 1 of the Complaint, Defendants are without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore deny them. 
2. Answering the allegations in paragraph 2 of the Complaint, Defendants are without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore deny them. 
3. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 3 of the Complaint. 
4. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 4 of the Complaint. 
5. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 5 of the Complaint. 
6. Answering the allegations in paragraph 6 of the Complaint, although Defendants 
believe the claims asserted against them are brought without basis in law or fact, they do not 
challenge venue or jurisdiction. 
FACTS 
7. Answering the allegations in paragraph 7 of the Complaint, Defendants are without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore deny them. 
8. Answering the allegations in paragraph 8 of the Complaint, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore denies them. 
9. Answering the allegations in paragraph 9 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that 
Dr. Verska was granted certain privileges at SARMC on or about January 22, 1996, that he had 
certain privileges after that time until July 1, 2008, and that his privileges were governed by 
certain Bylaws and Medical Staff Policies and Plans. Defendants deny that SARMC and Dr. 
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Verska had a tiduciary relationship. Except as expressly admitted or denied, Defendants are 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
remaining allegations in paragraph 9 of the Complaint, and therefore deny them. 
10. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 10 of the Complaint. 
11. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 11 of the Complaint. 
12. Answering the allegations in paragraph 12 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that 
SARMC asked Dr. Verska to provide certain on-call trauma services. Except as expressly 
admitted, Detendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 
truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 12 of the Complaint, and therefore deny 
them. 
13. Answering the allegations in paragraph 13 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that 
in 2005, the Medical Executive Committee (the "MEC") appointed a committee to review certain 
aspects of Dr. Verska's practice. Except as expressly admitted, Defendants are without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the remaining 
allegations in paragraph 13 of the Complaint, and therefore deny them. 
14. Answering the allegations in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that 
III January 2006, the committee reported certain findings to the MEC and made certain 
recommendations. Except as expressly admitted, Defendants are without knowledge or 
intormation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in 
paragraph 14 of the Complaint, and therefore deny them. 
15. Answering the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that 
the SARMC offers multidisciplinary management of certain spine issues, and denies that the. 
SARMC or SMI competes directly with services offered by Dr. Verska. Except as expressly 
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admitted or denied, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief 
as to the truth or falsity of the other allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint, and therefore 
deny them 
16. Answering the allegations in paragraph 16 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that 
Dr. Zimmerman is employed by SARMC, and that he is identified, among other things, as a 
spine surgeon. Except as expressly admitted or denied, Defendants are without knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the other allegations ill 
paragraph 16 of the Complaint, and therefore deny them 
17. Answering the allegations in paragraph 17 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that 
Dr. Fox was elected as President Elect of the MEC in February 2005, and denies the remaining 
allegations. 
18. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 18 of the Complaint. 
19. Answering the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that 
the MEC voted to discontinue the review of Dr. Verska's practice and that the SARMC Board of 
Trustees elected to continue the investigation. Except as expressly admitted, Defendants deny 
the remaining allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint. 
20. Answering the allegations in paragraph 20 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that 
MEC elected to commission a committee to review certain aspects of Dr. Verska's practice. 
Except as expressly admitted, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to 
form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 20 of the 
Complaint, and therefore deny them. 
21. Answering the allegations in paragraph 21 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that a 
committee comprised of Dr. McMartin, Dr. Floyd and Dr. Mulder made certain 
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recommendations, that Dr. Floyd is a spine surgeon, that Dr. Floyd has been a participant in 
meetings and other activities of the Spine Medicine Institute, that Dr. McMartin is a 
rehabilitation medicine specialist and former President of the Medical Staff at SARMC, and that 
Dr. Mulder is a former President of the Medical Staff at SARMC. Except as expressly admitted, 
Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 21 of the Complaint. 
22. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 22 ofthe Complaint. 
23. Answering the allegations in paragraph 23 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that 
the committee presented initial recommendations to the MEC. Except as expressly admitted or 
denied, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 
truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 23 of the Complaint, and therefore deny 
them. 
24. Answering the allegations in paragraph 24 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that 
Dr. Verska received a letter from Dr. Fox on or about December 6, 2007. Except as expressly 
admitted, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the 
truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 24 of the Complaint, and therefore deny 
them. 
25. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 25 of the Complaint. 
26. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 26 of the Complaint. 
27. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 27 of the Complaint. 
28. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 28 of the Complaint. 
29. Answering the allegations in paragraph 29 of the Complaint, Defendants are without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore deny them. 
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30. Answering the allegations in paragraph 30 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that 
Dr. Fox met with the MEC on or about June 25, 2008, and deny the remaining allegations. 
31. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 31 of the Complaint. 
32. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 32 ofthe Complaint. 
33. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 33 of the Complaint. 
34. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 34 ofthe Complaint. 
35. Answering the allegations in paragraph 35 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that 
Dr. Zimmerman was offered employment by SARMC in 2008, and deny the remaining 
allegations therein. 
36. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 36 ofthe Complaint. 
37. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 37 of the Complaint. 
38. Answering the allegations in paragraph 38 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that a 
hearing took place between October 28 and 30, 2008, and denies that Dr. Verska presented 
evidence rebutting SARMC's position. Except as expressly admitted or denied, Defendants are 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
remaining allegations in paragraph 38 of the Complaint, and therefore deny them .. 
39. Answering the allegations in paragraph 39 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that 
the panel made recommendations that differed from those of SARMC, and deny the remaining 
allegations. 
40. Answering the allegations in paragraph 40 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that 
the MEC disagreed with the recommendations of the panel, and deny the remaining allegations. 
41. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 41 of the Complaint. 
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42. Answering the allegations in paragraph 42 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that 
Dr. Verska appealed to the Board of Trustees and that the appeal was rejected. Expect as 
admitted, Defendants deny the remaining allegations in paragraph 42 ofthe Complaint. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Civil Conspiracy 
43. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 42 of the Complaint as 
if set forth fully herein. 
44. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 44 of the Complaint, and each of its 
subparagraphs (a)-(f). 
45. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 45 of the Complaint. 
46. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 46 ofthe Complaint. 
47. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 47 of the Complaint. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
48. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 47 of the Complaint as 
if set forth fully herein. 
49. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 49 of the Complaint. 
50. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 50 of the Complaint. 
51. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 51 of the Complaint. 
52. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 52 of the Complaint. 
53. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 53 of the Complaint. 
54. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 54 of the Complaint. 
55. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 55 of the Complaint. 
ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER AND DON~I\ 0048 
FOX, M.D. - 7 U U 
641188 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Intentional and/or Negligent 
Interference with Economic Advantage 
56. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 55 of the Complaint as 
if set forth fully herein. 
57. Answering the allegations in paragraph 57 of the Complaint, Defendants are without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and therefore deny them. 
58. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 58 of the Complaint. 
59. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 59 of the Complaint. 
60. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 60 of the Complaint. 
61. Detendants deny the allegations in paragraph 61 of the Complaint. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Interference with Prospective 
Contractual Relations or Business Expectations 
62. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 61 of the Complaint as 
if set forth fully herein. 
63. Answering the allegations in paragraph 63 of the Complaint, Detendants are without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and theretore deny them. 
64. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 64 of the Complaint. 
65. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 65 of the Complaint. 
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Defamation Per Se, Libel Per Se, and Slander Per Se 
66. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 66 of the Complaint as 
if set forth fully herein. 
67. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 67 of the Complaint. 
68. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 68 of the Complaint. 
69. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 69 of the Complaint. 
70. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 70 of the Complaint. 
71. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 71 of the Complaint. 
72. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 72 of the Complaint. 
73. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 73 of the Complaint. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Denial of Common Law Fair Procedure Rights 
74. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 73 of the Complaint as 
if set forth fully herein. 
75. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 75 ofthe Complaint. 
76. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 76 ofthe Complaint. 
77. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 77 of the Complaint. 
78. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 78 of the Complaint. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Fiduciary Duties 
79. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 78 of the Complaint 
as if set forth fully herein. 
80. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 80 of the Complaint. 
81. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 81 of the Complaint. 
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82. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 82 of the Complaint. 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Violation of Due Process Rights 
83. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 82 of the Complaint as 
if set forth fully herein. 
84. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 84 of the Complaint. 
85. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 85 of the Complaint. 
86. Detendants deny the allegations in paragraph 86 of the Complaint. 
87. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 87 of the Complaint. 
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
88. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 87 of the Complaint as 
if set torth fully herein. 
89. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 89 of the Complaint. 
90. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 90 of the Complaint. 
91. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 91 of the Complaint. 
92. Detendants deny the allegations in paragraph 92 of the Complaint. 
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Injunctive Relief 
93. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 92 of the Complaint 
as if set forth fully herein. 
94. Answering the allegations in paragraph 94 of the Complaint, Detendants are without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, 
and there tore denies them. 
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95. Answering the allegations in paragraph 95 of the Complaint, Defendants deny the Dr. 
Verska is entitled to the requested relief, and deny any other allegations contained therein. 
96. Answering the unnumbered paragraphs at pages 17-18 of the Complaint, Defendants 
deny that plaintiffs are entitled to any of the relief requested. 
97. Any allegations in the Complaint that are not admitted or otherwise addressed above 
are hereby denied. 
98. Without assuming any burden that is properly borne by Plaintiffs, Defendants reserve 
the right to assert the following as defenses to Plaintiffs' claims: 
DEFENSES 
99. Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each of the counts asserted against Defendants, fails to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendants. 
100. Plaintiffs' Complaint, and each of the counts asserted against Defendants, was 
made without good cause, and without any basis in law or fact. 
101. Defendants are immune from the claims asserted by plaintiff under federal and 
state law. Specifically, and without limitation, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 
1986,42 U.S.c. §11101, et. seq., and Idaho Code §§ 39-1392c, provide Defendants with 
immunity from the claims asserted by plaintiff in this action. 
102. Damages suffered by Plaintiffs, if any, were caused by the Plaintiffs' own fault or 
negligence. 
103. Defendants are not the proximate cause of any damage suffered by Plaintiffs. 
104. Communications by Defendants concerning Verska, if any, were privileged. 
105. Communications by Defendants concerning Verska, if any, were true. 
106. Detendants' conduct is privileged under both state and federal law. 
107. Plaintiffs have unclean hands. 
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108. Damages suffered by Plaintiffs, if any, were caused by or contributed to by the 
superseding and unexpected acts and conduct of other persons and entities. 
109. Plaintiffs' alleged injuries and/or damages may be the result of actions or inaction 
of other persons or entities over whom Defendants have no control and no responsibility. To the 
extent the evidence reveals the same, plaintiffs' recovery, if any, must be proportionately 
reduced and/or barred. 
110. Defendants reserve the right to assert additional defenses based upon further 
investigation and discovery. 
PRAYER 
Wherefore, Defendants pray for judgment against Plaintiffs as follows: 
1. For judgment in their favor on all counts of Plaintiffs' Complaint; 
2. For an award of costs and attorneys' fees to the full extent permitted by law, 
including Idaho Code § 12-121; and 
3. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just in the premises. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendants hereby demand a trial by a jury of not less than twelve (12) on all issues so 
triable pursuant to LR.C.P. 38(b). 
DATED this 18th day of August, 2009. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
Robert B. White 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of August, 2009, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Raymond D. Powers 
Powers Thomson, P.C. 
345 Bobwhite Court, Ste #150 
P.O. Box 9756 
Boise, ID 83707 
_ Hand Delivery 
(2. wiJ;: 
Robert B. White 
v Facsimile (208) 577-5101 
Overnight Courier 
V U.S. Mail 
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ORIGINAL 
Raymond D. Powers 
ISB #2737; rdp@powerstoiman.com 
Portia L. Rauer 
ISB #7233; plr@powersrolman.com 
POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC 
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 150 
Post Office Box 9756 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 577-5100 
Facsimile: (208) 577-5101 
W:\17\17-002\Disclosure - Mot.docx 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE 
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. 
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD 
FOX,M.D., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0911804 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
COMPEL PRODUCTION OF 
INFORMATION RELATED TO 
SARMC'S WRONGFUL DENIAL OF 
DR. VERSKA'S REAPPOINTMENT 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and the SPINE INSTITUTE OF 
IDAHO (Dr. Verska), by and through their attorneys of record, POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC, 
and, pursuant to Rule 37(a)(2), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully move this Court for 
an order compelling production of information relevant to S1. Alphonsus Regional Medical 
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'\ WRONGFUL DENIAL OF DR. VERSKA'S REAPPOINTMENT - 1 
Center's (SARMC) wrongful denial of Dr. Verska's reappointment to the SARMC medical staff 
and overruling the peer review privilege and immunity objections asserted by SARMC. 
Specifically, Dr. Verska moves this Court for an order that 1) the peer review privilege in Idaho 
Code Section 39-1392b is inapplicable, 2) the immunity in Idaho Code Section 39-1392c is 
inapplicable, 3) prohibits SARMC, absent exceptional circumstances, from raising peer review 
privilege and immunity objections in further discovery, and 4) compels SARMC to produce the 
information Dr. Verska has requested in his interrogatory nos. 1, 3-7, 10-24, requests for 
production nos. 1,2,4,5,7-54, and request for admissions nos. 2-4, 14-16,26-30,32-62,64-110 
to which SARMC has objected, but has not fully responded asserting peer review privilege and 
immunity objections. 
This motion is supported by the memorandum and affidavit filed contemporaneously 
herewith. 
DATED thi~~ay of December, 2009. 
POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC 
By~~K ___ 
Raymond D. Powers - Of the Firm 
Portia L. Rauer - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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Robert G. Homchick 
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Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP 
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 
Seattle, WA 98101-3045 
Fax: (206) 757-7700 
Attorneys for Defendants 




-V Electronic Mail 




-V Electronic Mail 
Ray 
Portia L. Rauer 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION RELATED TO SARMC'S 
WRONGFUL DENIAL OF DR. VERSKA'S REAPPOINTMENT - 3 
000057 
ORIGINAL 
Raymond D. Powers 
ISB #2737; rdp@powerstoiman.com 
Portia L. Rauer 
ISB #7233; plr@powerstoiman.com 
POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC 
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 150 
Post Office Box 9756 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 577 -51 00 
Facsimile: (208) 577-5101 
w :\17\17 -OO2\Disclosure Memo-Appendix.docx 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE 
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. 
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD 
FOX,M.D., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0911804 
APPENDIX IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
COMPEL PRODUCTION OF 
INFORMATION RELATED TO 
SARMC'S WRONGFUL DENIAL OF 
DR. VERSKA'S REAPPOINTMENT 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE SPINE INSTITUTE OF 
IDAHO (Dr. Verska), by and through their attorneys of record, POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC, and 
submit this appendix in support of their motion to compel production of information surrounding 
St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's (SARMC) wrongful denial of Dr. Verska's 
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reappointment to the SARMC medical staff. This appendix contains definitions of key terms 
specific to the issues in this case, a timeline of events, and an overview of the pertinent Bylaws 
and Medical Staff Policy and Plans. This appendix has been provided to give the Court 
additional context for the background information and argument set forth in plaintiffs' 
memorandum in support of their motion to compel. The information that follows is not intended 
to be comprehensive, but is provided only to give a brief explanation to assist the Court. l 
A. DEFINITIONS - Generally. 
• SARMC Bylaws - govern the relationship between the hospital and members of 
the medical staff. 
• SARMC Medical Staff Policy and Plans - govern the process related to medical 
staff discipline and are part of the SARMC's Bylaws. 
• Privileges - permission by a health care facility to a physician to provide medical 
care service at said facility for a certain length of time. Grant of privileges results 
in appointment to the medical staff. 
• Reappointment - physicians must apply for reappointment to the medical staff 
within a certain time of their privileges expiring. 
• Medical Executive Committee (MEC) - organizational body to represent and act 
on behalf of the physicians on the medical staff. 
• Peer Review - an activity carried out by active medical staff that fundamentally 
involves a review of physician specific data regarding performance, competency, 
and overall quality with regard to patient care. 
• Corrective Action Plan - an investigation of a physician which could result in an 
adverse recommendation affecting a physician's privileges. 
• External Review - provided for under the Peer Review chapter and allows for an 
external review of medical care related to certain patients to be conducted by an 
outside reviewer. 
• Intensified Review - provided for under the Peer Review chapter and provides 
for a more detailed review to be conducted when trended data or a trigger so 
indicates. 
• Greeley Company - a company that conducts external reviews of medical care 
based on information provided to it by the hospital who requested the review. 
• Ad hoc committee - a committee appointed by the MEC if peers within a 
department cannot do an unbiased review. 
• 2005 ad hoc committee - committee of four physicians (Drs. Mulder, Bishop, 
MacDonald, and Knochel) appointed in 2005 to review Dr. Verska's medical 
I See the attached exhibits to the Affidavit of Raymond D. Powers, filed simultaneously herewith, for copies of 
pertinent documents identified herein. 
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care. Committee concluded there was no clear indication that Dr. Verska's 
privileges should be restricted. 
• 2005 Greeley Company Report - report by Greeley Company that was 
commissioned in 2005 to assist the 2005 ad hoc committee, finding that Dr. 
Verska was a fine practitioner, providing quality care to his patients. 
• Quality Care and Professional Practice Committee - oversees the maintenance 
of physician quality information and provides information to medical staff 
department chairs at the time of reappointment; reviews individual cases for 
identification of physician or system opportunities for improvement. 
• 2007 ad hoc committee - committee of three physicians (Drs. McMartin, Floyd, 
and Mulder) appointed in October of 2007 to conduct a second review of Dr. 
Verska. 
• Fair Hearing - practitioner is entitled to a formal hearing whenever a 
recommendation adverse to him has been made by the MEC or Board. 
• Fair Hearing Panel - panel appointed by MEC to take evidence and hear 
testimony at practitioner's formal hearing and to recommend a course of action to 
those acting for the hospital. 
B. TlMELINE - Generally. 
• May of 1995 - Dr. Verska was licensed to practice medicine in Idaho and applied 
for privilege at SARMC. 
• January of 1996 - SARMC approved Dr. Verska's appointment for provisional 
staff membership. 
• January of 1998 - SARMC advanced Dr. Verska to active medical staff 
membership. 
• April of 2001 - Dr. Verska formed "Spine Institute of Idaho" to provide 
comprehensive spine care. 
• February of 2004 - SARMC solicited Dr. Verska to provide on call trauma spine 
service. 
• January of 2005 - SARMC began to develop the concept for an organization that 
would compete for patients with Dr. Verska and named it "Spine Medicine 
Institute of Idaho." 
• January of 2005 - SARMC appointed an ad hoc committee to review Dr. 
Verska's medical care; the review included cases going back to January 2004. An 
external review by the Greeley Company was also commissioned. 
• October of 2005 - The Greeley Company reported that Dr. Verska was a "fine 
practitioner, providing quality care to his patients." 
• January of 2006 - the ad hoc committee reported to the MEC that there was "no 
clear indication" that Dr. Verska's privileges should be restricted; the ad hoc 
committee's review is completed, without adverse consequence to Dr. Verska. 
• April of 2006 - The Quality Care and Professional Practice Committee requested 
that another external review of Dr. Verska's care be undertaken by the Greeley 
Company and began an intensified peer review of Dr. Verska related to patients 
over the age of 50. 
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• June of 2006 - SARMC's "Spine Medicine Institute of Idaho" began accepting 
patients at SARMC and was advertised to the public. 
• January of 2007 - The MEC voted unanimously to discontinue the intensified 
peer review of Dr. Verska. 
• February of 2007 - Dr. McMartin sent Dr. Verska a letter notifying him that the 
MEC voted to discontinue the intensified peer review. 
• February of 2007 - Dr. Fox elected as president of the MEC. 
• July of 2007 - Sandra Bruce sent Dr. Verska a letter verifying that the internal 
peer review had been successfully completed. 
• August of 2007 - the Greeley Company commissioned in April of 2006 reported 
that in the 11 cases it reviewed, Dr. Verska's care was within the standard of care. 
• Aug/Sept/Oct of 2007 - The Board of Trustees inexplicably voted to again 
pursue "review" of Dr. Verska. 
• October of 2007 - The MEC voted to commission a second ad hoc committee to 
review Dr. Verska. 
• November of 2007 - The second ad hoc committee was charged with the 
responsibility of reviewing the Greeley Company report from August and 
reviewing Dr. Verska's current cases. 
• December of 2007 - Dr. Fox wrote Dr. Verska a letter informing him that he 
would be the subject of an intensified peer review that was to begin immediately. 
• June 23, 2008 - The second ad hoc committee concluded its review and 
recommended that Dr. Verska be offered two non-punitive options that would not 
affect Dr. Verska's privileges. 
• June 25, 2008 - Dr. Fox misrepresented the recommendation of the second ad 
hoc committee to the MEC. 
• June 25, 2008 - Dr. Fox wrote CEO Sandra Bruce informing her that the MEC 
voted to deny Dr. Verska's reappointment to the medical staff unless Dr. Verska 
agreed to complete a one-year spine fellowship. 
• June 25, 2008 - Sandra Bruce wrote Dr. Verska informing him that unless he 
agreed to complete a one-year spine fellowship, his privileges would not be 
renewed. She also informed him that if he exercised his right to a fair hearing his 
privileges would not be renewed, effective July 1, 2008. 
• June 27,2008 - Dr. Verska received the letter from Sandra Bruce which was the 
first time he knew his privileges were in jeopardy. 
• July 1, 2008 - Dr. Verska is not reappointed to the SARMC medical staff. 
• July 9, 2008 - Dr. Verska exercised his right to a fair hearing. 
• September 30, 2008 - SARMC enlarged its position against Dr. Verska to 
include new, unsupported claims that he was not qualified to be a member of the 
medical staff, that he did not demonstrate excellent judgment, that he did not 
demonstrate the ability to safely and competently exercise his privileges, and that 
he did not demonstrate any insight into the danger he was presenting to his 
patients. 
• September of 2008 - Dr. Zimmerman is hired as an employee of SARMC. 
• October of 2008 - A fair hearing panel was appointed by the MEC. It took 
evidence and heard testimony from Dr. Verska's spine surgeon colleagues that he 
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was an excellent surgeon, competent to safely perform surgery, and met the 
requirements for membership to the medical staff. 
• November of 2008 - The Fair Hearing Panel recommended in favor of Dr. 
Verska, finding that the spine fellowship requirement was unfair, and 
recommended that Dr. Verska's privileges be reinstated immediately. 
• December of 2008 - Dr. Fox misrepresented the findings of the Fair Hearing 
Panel to the MEC and again enlarged its position against Dr. Verska to include 
that he engaged in risky behaviors. The MEC again ignored the recommendation 
of the second ad hoc committee, ignored the recommendation of the Fair Hearing 
Panel, and upheld its own original decision to not reappoint Dr. Verska to the 
medical staff. 
• February of 2009 - The SARMC Appellate Review Panel also ignored the 
recommendations of the second ad hoc committee and Fair Hearing Panel and 
voted to uphold the original decision of the MEC. 
• March of 2009 - The Board of Trustees also ignored the recommendations of the 
second ad hoc committee and the Fair Hearing Panel and voted to uphold the 
original decision of the MEC. 
C. SARMC'S BYLAWS AND THE MEDICAL STAFF POLICY AND PLANS. 
The Bylaws and MSPP of SARMC outline and govern the process and activities to be 
followed when making the decision to deny a physician's reappointment to the medical staff.2 
Interestingly, SARMC would not admit that it is governed by its own Bylaws and Medical Staff 
Policy and Plans.3 Dr. Verska maintains that the review of his medical care conducted by the 
2007 ad hoc committee was a new review; SARMC contends otherwise. To fully appreciate the 
divergence of opinions and to understand the interplay between a peer review procedure and a 
corrective action plan, an overview of the SARMC Bylaws and MSPP is necessary. 
Article I, Section 7.A.4. of the Bylaws sets forth that each member of the medical staff 
must abide by the Bylaws and Medical Staff Policy and Plans. Section 8.G. of Article I of the 
Bylaws also sets forth that any practitioner has a right to a hearing/appeal pursuant to the 
Medical Staff's Fair Hearing Plan in the event that an action or recommendation involves denial 
2 Article I of the Bylaws and Chapters VIII, XI, and XII are attached as exhibits to the Affidavit of Raymond D. 
Powers. 
3 Response to Request for Admission NO.9. 
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or revocation of Medical Staff appointment. SARMC wrongfully denied Dr. Verska's 
reappointment, effective July 1,2008, without a prior hearing. 
The peer review process is described in Chapter VIII of the MSPP of SARMC Bylaws. 
1. Peer Review. 
According to Chapter VIII, Performance and Peer Review Policy, Section 1 of the MSPP, 
the intent of the peer review policy, "is to create a non-punitive peer review process in which 
individual medical errors do not always lead to corrective action." 
Punitive actions, impacting a physician's privileges, are not contemplated under the peer 
review process. Peer review fundamentally involves a review of physician specific data relative 
to patient care to review outcomes in relation to expectations for the purpose of assuring patient 
safety and quality of patient care by a review of medical staff performance. 
When conducting a peer review, SARMC is to respect an individual practitioner's 
expectations of confidentiality and fair treatment. Ch. VIII, Sec. 2.A., MSPP. External peer 
reviews from outside reviewers are contemplated when it is determined that circumstances exist 
requiring such external review as set forth in Chapter VIII, Section 2.E. of the MSPP. The peer 
review mechanism identifies individual practitioner performance, which may require in-depth 
inquiry by peers or by an ad hoc panel appointed by the MEC. Ch. VIII, Sec. 4.B., MSPP. 
Section 5 of Chapter VIII outlines the data collection process, data analysis, as well as other 
processes associated with conducting a peer review including the potential actions resulting from 
the peer review. Those potential actions include policy changes to improve system processes, 
educating the physician in a documented manner, or an "intensified peer review" may occur. 
The 2007 ad hoc committee conducted an "intensified peer review" of Dr. Verska, as found only 
in this section of the MSPP. 
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Under Chapter VIII, Section 6 of the MSPP, an intensified review process is described as 
follows: 
An intensified review is done by the department, department chair or other 
appropriate committee, when trended data or a trigger, as described previously, 
has made it necessary. This process will be completed as rapidly as possible, but 
not longer than 30 days from identification of the problem without permission of 
the MEC. The review of the practitioner may include: 
A. Triggered Review • A review of all cases identified by the specific 
indicator which triggered the review; 
B. Random Sampling • Review of a random sample of cases for a 24 
month period; 
C. Prospective Review • Review of all the practitioner's cases for the next 
6 to 12 months; or 
D. Other Reviews • Any other review as defined by the MEC and the 
department chair. 
At the conclusion of the intensified review, the findings and recommendations are 
reported to the department chair and at the next MEC meeting for action. This 
may include but not be limited to, collegial intervention, education, or referral of 
the matter to the appropriate body for carrying out the corrective action policy and 
plan. A written report from the MEC will be sent to the practitioner within 14 
days of the meeting. 
Once the intensified peer review has been completed, the chapter mandates that a written 
report, containing the findings and recommendations, is to be provided to the MEC for it to 
consider. According to Chapter VIII, the findings and recommendations "may include, but are 
not limited to, collegial intervention, education, or referral of the matter to the appropriate 
body for carrying out the corrective action policy and plan." (Emphasis added.) Under 
Chapter VIII, a written report of the recommendation, resulting from the intensified peer review, 
must be sent to the practitioner within 14 days of the report being presented to the MEC. This is 
the only provision where reference is made to notifying the affected practitioner and the only 
avenue under which the affected practitioner would be made aware that corrective action was 
being recommended. 
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The key in this dispute being that if it was concluded that corrective action was 
appropriate, Dr. Verska was entitled to a written report informing him of this decision within 14 
days of such a decision being reached; Dr. Verska received no such notification. 
2. Corrective Action. 
According to Chapter XI, Corrective Action Plan, Section 1 of the MSPP, a written 
request for an investigation under the Corrective Action chapter must be sent to the MEC 
whenever there is cause to question a practitioner's clinical competence, regardless of who calls 
a particular physician's competence into question. The written request to the MEC must make 
specific reference to the activity or conduct giving rise to the request. The written request for the 
corrective action plan can be made by the president of the medical staff, the chair of a 
department, the chair of the credentials committee, a majority of the credentials committee or 
MEC, the chair of any other committee, a majority of a committee, the chair of the board, or the 
chief executive officer, as set forth in Chapter XI, Section 1. The Chief Executive Officer of the 
SARMC is to be notified in writing of all requests for investigation under the Corrective Action 
Plan. Ch. XI, Sec. l.B., MSPP. The MEC has the discretion to appoint a three-person ad hoc 
committee to conduct the investigation. Ch. XI, Sec. 1.C.2.d., MSPP. To date, Dr. Verska is 
unaware that any such written request to the MEC exists. 
Once the investigation is complete, the MEC determines whether corrective action is 
warranted. Ch. XI, Sec. 2., MSPP. If corrective action is warranted as determined by the MEC, 
it may, among other options, recommend a decrease, restriction or modification of clinical 
privileges; recommend revocation of appointment; or take such other actions or make such other 
recommendations, as it deems appropriate. Ch. XI, Sec. 2.B.5, 7., and 8., MSPP. Section 3 of 
Chapter XI provides that any recommendation that decreases, restricts, or modifies a physician's 
clinical privileges, or acts as a revocation of the physician's medical staff appointment is 
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considered an adverse recommendation. Such recommendation will be forwarded to the Chief 
Executive Officer who will notify the affected physician. The Chief Executive Officer is to then 
hold the recommendation until after the individual has exercised his right to a fair hearing. Ch. 
XI, Sec. 3., MSPP. The import of this requirement is to give the affected physician the 
opportunity to challenge the recommendation that adversely affected his privileges before the 
recommendation goes into effect, as set forth in Article I of the Bylaws, so that the affected 
physician will not be unnecessarily damaged and his reputation tarnished by having his 
privileges affected. Here, SARMC wrongfully "restricted" or "revoked" Dr. Verska's privileges 
when it denied his reappointment and did so long before he was afforded a fair hearing, as 
described below. Sandra Bruce refused to hold the MEC's adverse recommendation and, in fact, 
notified Dr. Verska that if he chose to exercise his right to a fair hearing, without question, he 
would no longer have privileges at SARMC. 
If patient care or safety in the hospital are an issue, the President of the MEC, department 
chairs, the chair of the credentials committee, the chair of the physician professional practice 
committee, the Chief Executive Officer, or the Chair of the Board of Trustees has the authority, 
as vested in Chapter XI, Section 6 of the MSPP, to suspend any and all clinical privileges of a 
physician. The President of the MEC also has the authority to suspend a physician during the 
pendency of the investigation for the protection of hospital patients; the suspension is considered 
administrative in nature. Ch. XI, Sec. 5, MSPP. SARMC did not suspend Dr. Verska's 
privileges while the 2007 ad hoc committee was reviewing his care, which leads to the logical 
conclusion that since patient care and safety were not threatened, denial of Dr. Verska's 
privileges was unwarranted. 
The Corrective Action Plan chapter is silent with regard to external reviews and 
intensified reviews. 
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3. Fair Hearing Plan. 
As set forth in Article I of the Bylaws and reiterated below, in the event an action or 
recommendation results in the denial of medical staff appointment the affected practitioner is 
entitled to a fair hearing. Under the scheme set forth in paragraph 2 above and Chapter XI of 
the MSPP, the CEO is required to hold an adverse recommendation and the terms of that 
recommendation until the fair hearing requirements are met. According to Chapter XII, Fair 
Hearing Plan, Section 1, of the MSPP, denial or revocation of medical staff reappointment is a 
ground for the right to a fair hearing. Denial of reappointment is deemed an adverse 
recommendation or an adverse action as such terms are used in Chapter XII and Chapter XI of 
the MSPP. Ch. XII, Sec. I.B., MSPP. The purpose of the hearing is to recommend a course of 
action for the hospital. Ch. XII, Sec. I.e., MSPP. The hearing panel is to be composed of not 
less than three members. Ch. XII, Sec. 4., MSPP. 
The MEC has the initial burden of proof to come forward with evidence in support of its 
recommendation. Thereafter the burden will shift to the physician to come forward with 
evidence in support of his appeal. Significantly, the Fair Hearing Plan places a heavy burden of 
proof upon the affected physician. "The hearing panel will recommend against the 
physician unless it finds that the physician has proved that the recommendation was 
unreasonable, not sustained by the evidence, or otherwise unfounded." Ch. XII, Sec. 17., 
MSPP. Once Dr. Verska finally received a fair hearing, the Fair Hearing Panel recommended, 
inter alia, that his privileges should be reinstated immediately. 
Upon a final recommendation adverse to him, the physician may request appellate 
review. Ch. XII, Sec. 20, MSPP. After the conclusion of the proceedings before an appellate 
review panel, the Board will render a final decision in writing. Ch. XII, Sec. 20.E., MSPP. 
Dr. Verska exhausted the administrative appeal process in the case at bar. 
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CONCLUSION 
Dr. Verska has provided background information and argument to support his motion to 
compel production of information related to SARMC's wrongful denial of his reappointment in 
the memorandum and affidavit filed simultaneously herewith. 
DATED this ;;~ay of December, 2009. 
POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC 
By ;:;: J?;P~ 
Raym~nd D. PZ.ers - Of the Firm 
Portia L. Rauer - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thd ~ day of December, 2009, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing APPENDIX IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
COMPEL PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION RELATED TO SARMC'S WRONGFUL 
DENIAL OF DR. VERSKA'S REAPPOINTMENT, by the method indicated below, and 
addressed to each of the following: 
Robert B. White 
J. Will Varin 
Givens Pursley LLP 
601 W. Bannock Street 
PO Box 2720 
Boise,ID 83701-2720 
Fax: 388-1300 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Robert G. Homchick 
Brad Fisher 
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP 
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 
Seattle, WA 98101-3045 
Fax: (206) 757-7700 
Attorneys for Defendants 











Raymond D. Powers 
Portia L. Rauer 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE 
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. 
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD 
FOX,M.D., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0911804 
MffiMORANDUMINSUPPORTOF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
COMPEL PRODUCTION OF 
INFORMATION RELATED TO 
SARMC'S WRONGFUL DENIAL OF 
DR. VERSKA'S REAPPOINTMffiNT 
COMffi NOW, Plaintiffs JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and the SPINE INSTITUTE OF 
IDAHO (Dr. Verska), by and through their attorneys ofrecord, POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC, and 
submit this memorandum in support of their motion to compel production of information 
relevant to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's (SARMC) wrongful denial of Dr. Verska's 
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reappointment to the SARMC medical staff and overruling the peer reVIew privilege and 
immunity objections asserted by SARMC. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Dr. Verska brought this action against defendants as the result of SARMC's wrongful 
denial of his reappointment to the medical staff, effective July 1,2008. Dr. Verska alleges that 
defendants SARMC and Dr. Fox acted in bad faith during the review process and activities they 
initiated against Dr. Verska, and in the decisions to deny his reappointment. The goal of this 
process was to eliminate him from the practice of spine surgery at SARMC. The process and the 
decisions made ultimately led to the denial of Dr. Verska's reappointment to the medical staff. 
SARMC's Bylaws and Medical Staff Policy and Plans (MSPP) govern the activities and set forth 
the procedures that SARMC should have followed when SARMC and Dr. Fox set out to deny 
Dr. V erska' s reappointment. 
Dr. Verska propounded discovery to SARMC seeking information related to the 
processes, activities, and decisions that ultimately led to the denial of his reappointment. Dr. 
Verska plans to depose those individuals who have relevant knowledge about the wrongful 
denial of his reappointment. 
SARMC has asserted a broad objection to Dr. Verska's discovery requests! that relate in 
any way to information surrounding the process, activities, or decisions to deny Dr. Verska's 
reappointment. SARMC asserts that the discovery requested is either protected by immunity 
under Idaho Code Section 39-1392c or is confidential and privileged under Idaho Code Section 
39-1392b. Out of 110 requests for admission propounded by Dr. Verska, SARMC has objected 
I Dr. Verska anticipates that SARMC will also object to his deposing many of the necessary witnesses who have 
relevant information, the information shared, and the basis for the decision to deny renewal of Dr. Verska's 
privile.ges. Dr. Vers~~ seeks a ruling from the Court which will provide guidance on the issues that can betiPffl1iFf9\ 70 
about In these deposltlons. U U U U 
to 88 of the requests stating "SARMC objects to Request No. _ to the extent it seeks 
information protected by the peer review privilege;" SARMC did attempt to respond to all of the 
requests for admission.2 With regard to the 24 interrogatories propounded by Dr. Verska, 
SARMC objected to two of them on the grounds that the "Plaintiffs' claims fail as a matter of 
law for reasons including the immunity provided under Idaho Code § 39-1392c, the Healthcare 
Quality Improvement Act, and the release language contained in the Medical Staff Bylaws, 
Policy and Plans. .. .,,3 SARMC objected to 19 of the interrogatories on the ground that the 
information is protected by the peer review privilege; it made no attempt to respond to the 
interrogatories to which it objected. Of the 54 requests for production, SARMC objected 
claiming peer review privilege on 52 of them and did not produce any documents. 
Idaho Code Sections 39-1392b and 39-1392c do not apply to the issues framed by this 
case. The type of information requested is not the type of information that arises from patient 
care activities within a hospital. Dr. Verska's allegations are not related to any particular 
medical malpractice action, do not revolve around the care of one particular patient, and have not 
been brought against particular individuals who served on any review committees. The type of 
information requested is no different than the type of information requested in a wrongful 
termination case. Just as an employer's personnel file, thought processes, and decisions related 
to an employee's termination are discoverable by an aggrieved employee, so should SARMC's 
"personnel" file on Dr. Verska be discoverable, as well as the thought processes and decisions 
related to Dr. Verska's "termination" from the medical staff. Therefore, "peer review privilege" 
and immunity are inapplicable here. 
2 Defendant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's Response to Plaintiffs' First Set of Requests for Admission 
to Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, attached as an exhibit to the Affidavit of Raymond D. Powers filed in 
support hereof. This document, as well as the additional documents that follow, are all exhibits to Mr. Powers' 
affidavit. 
3 Defendant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's Response to Plaintiffs' First 
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. 
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Dr. Verska moves this Court for an order that 1) the peer review privilege in Idaho Code 
Section 39-1392b is inapplicable, 2) the immunity in Idaho Code Section 39-1392c is 
inapplicable, 3) prohibits SARMC, absent exceptional circumstances, from raising peer review 
privilege and immunity objections in further discovery, and 4) compels SARMC to produce the 
information Dr. Verska has requested in his interrogatory nos. 1, 3-7, 10-24, requests for 
production nos. 1,2,4,5, 7-54, and request for admissions nos. 2-4, 14-16,26-30,32-62,64-110 




SARMC, through its Board of Trustees, administrators, representatives, and agents, 
including Dr. Fox, wrongfully denied Dr. Verska's reappointment to the medical staff, claiming 
its decision had merit and was the result of a corrective action plan investigation conducted by an 
ad hoc committee appointed in 2007. However, SARMC's position is without merit because the 
ad hoc committee did not function as if conducting a corrective action plan investigation and did 
not recommend in any way that Dr. Verska's privileges be revoked or denied. SARMC's 
position is also unsupportable because it did not follow its own Bylaws and its MSPP throughout 
the process that ultimately led to the decision to deny Dr. Verska's reappointment and its 
decision was inconsistent with the Bylaws and MSPP. The limited information available to Dr. 
Verska demonstrates that the ad hoc committee was conducting a non-punitive peer review of 
Dr. Verska, which should not have resulted in Dr. Verska losing his privileges. Moreover, the 
decision to deny Dr. Verska reappointment is contrary to the findings of several committees, two 
external reviews, and a fair hearing panel, all of which recommended in favor of Dr. Verska. 
The background that follows provides additional detail to support Dr. Verska's argument that the 
peer review statutes do not apply to the issues in this case. 
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An appendix in support of Dr. Verska's motion has been filed separately and contains 
definitions, a timeline, and an overview of the pertinent Bylaws and MSPP sections to give the 
Court context for the following background information, should such context be necessary. 
The following background information is provided to illustrate the importance of 
overruling SARMC's peer review privilege and immunity objections. Dr. Verska cannot know 
all of the facts to support his case at this time because SARMC has objected to his discovery 
requests; therefore, not all of the alleged facts and background information provided in this 
section can be linked to specific supporting documentary or testimonial evidence at this time. 
Dr. Verska believes he can prove the allegations he has asserted but he needs the right to conduct 
meaningful discovery. 
A. DR. VERSKA'S STATE LICENSURE AND HIS HISTORY OF CONTINUOUS 
PRIVILEGES AT SARMC DEMONSTRATES THAT HE IS QUALIFIED FOR 
MEDICAL STAFF MEMBERSHIP. 
Dr. Verska was first appointed to the medical staff at SARMC in 1996. From that time 
forward, SARMC had continuously reappointed Dr. Verska to its medical staff. In fact, SARMC 
continued to reappoint Dr. Verska as an active member in the Department of Orthopedics with 
Orthopedic and Spine Surgery cores and Fluoroscopy privileges until SARMC wrongfully 
denied his reappointment effective July 1,2008. For Dr. Verska to have been reappointed to the 
medical staff, it necessarily follows that SARMC found that he met the minimum qualifications 
for medical staff membership and met the standard of care in the community. 
Dr. Verska had timel~ submitted his application for reappointment in April of 2008, as 
required, because his privileges were up for renewal on July 1,2008. 
B. THE FORMATION OF SARMC'S "SPINE MEDICINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO" 
COINCIDED WITH THE INITIATION OF THE PROCESS THAT LED TO DR. 
VERSKA'S LOSS OF PRIVILEGES. 
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In April of 2001, Dr. Verska formed the "Spine Institute of Idaho," which was created to 
provide patients with comprehensive spine care, including diagnostic and treatment services for 
back pain and spinal disorders. In January of 2005, SARMC appointed an ad hoc committee 
(2005 ad hoc committee) to conduct a review of Dr. Verska that was allegedly triggered by one 
specific case. Curiously, the review included the triggering case, plus review of other cervical 
spine trauma cases attended by Dr. Verska that dated back to January of 2004. SARMC never 
notified Dr. Verska that its review was anything more than a peer review. 
During this same time frame, SARMC was developing the concept for an entity 
ultimately designated as the "Spine Medicine Institute of Idaho," which would provide the same 
spine services as Dr. Verska's "Spine Institute of Idaho." In 2005, SARMC knew that Dr. 
Verska and the Spine Institute of Idaho would directly compete for the same patients and provide 
the same spine services to be offered by SARMC's newly conceived Spine Medicine Institute of 
Idaho, which opened for business in 2006. 
SARMC commissioned the Greeley Company on June 13, 2005, to conduct an 
independent, external review of the cervical spine trauma cases reviewed by the 2005 ad hoc 
committee and report on the adequacy of Dr. Verska's care and treatment. The Greeley 
Company reported on October 4, 2005 (2005 Greeley Report) that Dr. Verska was a "fine 
practitioner, providing quality care to his patients. His clinical judgment and technical skills are 
sound, resulting in good outcomes for his patients.,,4 Consistent with the 2005 Greeley Report, 
the 2005 ad hoc committee reported to the MEC in January of 2006 that there was "no clear 
indication that there should be a restriction on [Dr. Verska's] clinical activity.,,5 SARMC admits 
that the 2005 ad hoc committee investigation was completed and did not result in an adverse 
4 Greeley Report dated October 4,2005. 
5 2005 Ad Hoc Committee Report, dated October 24, 2005. 000074 
recommendation against Dr. Verska.6 Any further review of Dr. Verska would necessarily 
require SARMC to begin the process anew. 
In April of 2006, however, the Quality Care and Professional Practice Committee 
(QCPPC) "modified the MEC's recommendation" by adding a chart review for Dr. Verska's 
inpatients 50 years and older.7 At the same time, unsatisfied with the 2005 ad hoc committee's 
finding and the 2005 Greeley Report, SARMC again commissioned the Greeley Company to 
review Dr. Verska's elective cases covering a three month period (second Greeley review).8 
SARMC admits that in January of 2007, before receiving the result of the second Greeley 
review, the MEC voted unanimously to discontinue the intensified peer review of Dr. Verska, 
which had commenced at the request of the QCPPC in April of 2006.9 Dr. McMartin, then-
President of the MEC, notified Dr. Verska of the MEC vote through a letter dated February 12, 
2007. JO Dr. McMartin informed Dr. Verska that the MEC "unanimous 1 y voted to discontinue 
your intensified peer review" as soon as those cases have been reviewed and confirmed as 
meeting the standard of care. 
Sandra Bruce, then CEO of SARMC, wrote Dr. Verska on July 9, 2007 and stated that 
the "internal peer review has been successfully completed and I believe you have been notified 
of such. When the external peer review results are received, the medical staff leadership will 
review those with you and determine if there are any opportunities for improvement." II 
Consistent with Dr. McMartin and Ms. Bruce's letters, Dr. Verska believed that the internal 
intensified peer review had been completed and, if the second Greeley Report, commissioned in 
6 Defendants' Response to Request for Admission No. 30. 
7 2007 Ad Hoc Committee Report, dated June 23, 2008. 
8 Id. The report of the Greeley Company related to the 2006 request for external review was sent to SARMC in 
August of 2007. 
9 Defendants' Response to Request for Admission No. 34; Answer of Defendants, pg. 4, IJl 19 on file herein. 
10 Letter from Dr. McMartin to Dr. Verska, dated February 12,2007. 
IILetter from Sandra Bruce to Dr. Verska, dated July 9, 2007; "opportunities for improvement'O' aft ~~75" 
contemplated in the Chapter VIII, Peer Review Performance, of the MSPP. U U U 
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2006, came back with a finding that he had not breached the standard of care; the process of 
determining opportunities for improvement could be considered completed. 
On August 27, 2007, some 17 months after the request, the Greeley Company issued its 
report relative to the second external review it was asked to conduct. The report (2007 Greeley 
Report) concluded that Dr. Verska's care in the cases reviewed was "within the standard of 
care," which implicitly confirmed the MEC's earlier decision to discontinue any review of Dr. 
Verska. 12 The finding of the Greeley Company in August of 2007 should have brought the 
matter to a close, as promised by Dr. McMartin and Ms. Bruce. It was reasonable for Dr. Verska 
to have assumed in the fall of 2007 that since he had heard nothing from SARMC or the MEC 
about opportunities for improvement, he was no longer under any kind of review by SARMC. 
Such was not the case, however. 
C. THE MEC IGNORED THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS 
FAVORABLE TO DR. VERSKA AND IN AN ARBITRARY, UNSUPPORTED 
MANNER SUBJECTED DR. VERSKA TO FURTHER REVIEW. 
Despite all of the recommendations and findings favorable to Dr. Verska, SARMC's 
Board of Trustees, nonetheless, elected to place Dr. Verska under peer review investigation. 13 
On October 29, 2007, the MEC, led by its President Dr. Fox and under the direction of the Board 
of Trustees, commissioned a second ad hoc committee to again review Dr. Verska. There was 
no objective support through the previous investigatory process for this action and there was no 
foundation for it under the hospital's own MSPP. Because SARMC has not provided an 
explanation for such an arbitrary decision, this decision needs to be explored in discovery. 
It was not until he received a letter from Dr. Fox, dated December 6, 2007, that Dr. 
Verska became aware that he had been under review by a new second ad hoc committee (2007 
p 
- 2007 Greeley Company Report. 
13 Answer of Defendant, pg. 4, 'II 19. 000076 
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ad hoc committee or second ad hoc committee). Dr. Verska had been led to believe that he was 
no longer the subject of review based on the letters he received from the MEC and Sandra Bruce. 
According Dr. Fox's letter, the second ad hoc committee had already met and formulated 
recommendations. Much to his surprise, the letter informed Dr. Verska that the 2007 ad hoc 
committee had formulated a two-part recommendation consisting of 1) an intensified peer review 
that was to begin immediately, and 2) a recommendation that Dr. Verska provide certain 
information to the ad hoc committee. 14 SARMC admits that Dr. Fox did not inform Dr. Verska 
that he was being investigated under the "Corrective Action Plan" section of the MSpp. 15 
Instead, Dr. Fox stated in his letter that the MEC "had voted to commission an Ad Hoc 
Committee to review, among other documentation, the August 27, 2007, Greeley report which 
examined and evaluated procedures you have performed at Saint Alphonsus." (Emphasis 
added.)16 According to SARMC's own Bylaws and MSPP, an "intensified peer review" is only 
contemplated in the peer review chapter. 
Dr. Verska reasonably believed that any subsequent review or investigation was a 
completely new peer review. Any subsequent unfavorable recommendation would be non-
punitive as set forth in the SARMC Bylaws and would result in opportunities for improvement. 
He had no reason to believe he was now in a corrective action process in December of 2007. 
Confused by the process as it was playing out, Dr. Verska wrote Dr. McMartin, chairman 
of the ad hoc committee, on February 24, 2008, asking for clarification on several matters. 17 
Specifically, Dr. Verska wanted to know "the end point to this intensified peer review" and 
asked for the "rationale for another intensified peer review process" in light of the fact that the 
Greeley reports found no breach of the standard of care and that no problems were raised in the 
14 Letter from Dr. Fox to Dr. Verska, dated December 6,2007. 
15 Response to Request for Admission No. 48. 
16 Letter from Dr. Fox to Dr. Verska, dated December 6, 2007. 
17 Letter from Dr. Verska to Dr. McMartin, dated February 24,2008. 000077 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION Tn rn~tfDPT DDr.mTro'T'U'<>.' ~~ T' .~--- -. -- _.-
first intensified peer review process. 18 It was Dr. Verska's letter that prompted Dr. Fox to write 
Dr. Verska on March 14,2008. In his letter, Dr. Fox used the word "review," or phrases such as 
"peer review," "peer review process," or "review process" no less than a dozen times throughout 
the letter. 19 For the first time, however, some five months into the process, a vague reference is 
made to Chapter XI of the MSPP. While the letter does state that the 2007 ad hoc committee 
was commissioned under "Chapter XI, Section 1.C.2.D. of the Medical Staff Bylaws," which 
happens to be the Corrective Action Plan, SARMC admits that the letter does not include the 
phrases "corrective action" or "corrective action plan.,,2o Dr. McMartin wrote Dr. Verska two 
letters in May of 2008 and SARMC admits that neither of those letters included the phrases 
"corrective action" or corrective action plan.,,21 In fact, the letters repeatedly refer to the process 
as a review and note it is an intensified peer review. 
Dr. Verska acknowledges now that Chapter XI is related to corrective action. However, 
given his prior experiences with the same process at SARMC, the peer review references in Dr. 
Fox's letters, the failure of Dr. McMartin to mention corrective action, as well as the behavior of 
the ad hoc committee, there was no reason for Dr. Verska to be concerned in the spring of 2008 
that the ad hoc activities were part of a corrective action plan and not a peer review. Dr. Verska 
did not appreciate that the reference to Chapter XI in Dr. Fox's March letter would be used by 
SARMC to manipulate an adverse recommendation out of the process. Dr. Verska did not 
believe the ad hoc committee was proceeding under corrective action and that his privileges were 
in jeopardy. 
Dr. Verska met with the 2007 ad hoc committee on June 5, 2008, as he had done on a 
previous occasion. The minutes from the June 5, 2008, meeting state that "Dr. McMartin 
18 Letter from Dr. Verska to Dr. McMartin, dated February 24, 2008. 
19 Letter from Dr. Fox to Dr. Verska, dated March 14,2008. 
20 Response to Request for Admission No. 49. 
21 Responses to Request for Admissions nos. 52 and 53. 000078 
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reminded [Dr. Verska] that the Ad Hoc Committee had been appointed by the Medical Executive 
Committee (MEC) to investigate concerns that had been raised .... ,,22 Dr. Verska was not 
"reminded" that he was under a corrective action plan. The minutes also state that "the Ad Hoc 
Committee had reviewed the cases that had been reviewed earlier by the Greeley Company," and 
that "Dr. McMartin referred Dr. [Verska] to the Intensified Review that Dr. McMartin had 
completed." (Emphasis added.) These minutes further demonstrate that the 2007 ad hoc 
committee did not function as if carrying out the corrective action plan. 
If, in fact, SARMC had initiated a corrective action plan, SARMC's own Bylaws and 
MSPP require a paper trail, including: a notice sent to Dr. Verska that an intensified peer review 
had been completed with a referral for corrective action; a written request sent to the MEC that a 
corrective action plan be initiated; and written notification of the request for a corrective action 
plan sent to the CEO of the hospital. Dr. Verska did not receive any such notice, as he should 
have under the MSPP. More importantly, Dr. Verska should be allowed to explore the existence 
of any such documentation within SARMC's internal documents. SARMC takes the position 
that the 2007 ad hoc committee was initially commissioned in October of 2008 under Chapter 
XI, Corrective Action Plan, and to ensure patient safety during the pendency of the review, the 
MEC imposed an intensified peer review. 23 This position is inconsistent with the process as 
outlined in the MSPP and it is inconsistent with the words and actions of the 2007 ad hoc 
committee. These inconsistencies must be explored through meaningful discovery in order for 
Dr. Verska to prove the allegations he has made. 
D. THE 2007 AD HOC COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED OFFERING DR. VERSKA 
TWO NON-PUNITIVE OPTIONS; THE MEC CHOSE TO IGNORE THE 
RECOMMENDATION AND WRONGFULLY DENIED DR. VERSKA'S 
REAPPOINTMENT WITHOUT A PRIOR HEARING. 
22 Meeting Notes for Ad Hoc Committee Commissioned to Investigate Dr. Verska, dated June 5, 2008. 
23 Response to Request for Admission No. 47. 000079 
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The 2007 ad hoc committee's intensified peer review of Dr. Verska came to an end in 
June of 2008 when it prepared a written report outlining its findings and recommendations. The 
written report does not refer to "corrective action" or "corrective action plan." The June 2008 
report of the 2007 ad hoc committee uses the word "review" repeatedly throughout. For 
example, the 2007 ad hoc committee states in its report that it was "charged with the 
responsibility of reviewing an external peer review provided by the Greeley Company;" the 
committee was also "asked to address this Greeley review in the context of the prior reviews;" 
the Committee met to review the circumstances of Dr. [Verska];" a "review of Dr. [Verska's] 
credentials file;" "after reviewing the materials available to the Committee ... a more thorough 
review of Dr. [Verska's] current practice [is required];" "the Committee determined that they 
needed more time to review the extensive materials provided by Dr. [Verska],,24 (Emphasis 
added.) 
On page four of the 2007 ad hoc committee report, the committee notes what Dr. Verska 
has learned "as a result of the input he has received through this intensified peer review process." 
The 2007 ad hoc committee also concluded that Dr. Verska cooperated with the committee 
during the "intensified peer review which the MEC approved on November 15, 2007." Such 
references are further proof that the committee itself did not believe it was conducting a 
corrective action investigation. (Emphasis added.) 
Further evidence that the 2007 ad hoc committee was conducting a peer review is the 
committee's recommendation. The 2007 ad hoc committee recommended offering Dr. Verska 
two options:25 1) that Dr. Verska successfully complete a six to twelve month advanced complex 
spine fellowship or 2) that Dr. Verska be shadowed by a proctor during his surgeries and second 
24 2007 Ad Hoc Committee Report, dated June 23, 2008, pgs. I and 2. 
25 2007 Ad Hoc Committee Report, dated June 23, 2008. 000080 
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assist three different spine surgeons at SARMC.26 The 2007 ad hoc committee did not 
recommend revoking Dr. Verska's privileges or denying Dr. Verska's reappointment, nor was it 
their intent to do so. 
The members of the 2007 ad hoc committee have testified under oath that they believed 
they were engaged in a non-punitive peer review process.27 SARMC admits that the 
recommendations of the 2007 ad hoc committee were not punitive.28 This non-punitive 
recommendation of a proctorship or fellowship is consistent with the language from the peer 
review chapter wherein "at the conclusion of the intensified review" the recommendation may 
include "collegial intervention" or "education." Ch. VIII, Sec. 6, MSPP. 
Remarkably, Dr. Verska was not made aware of the options recommended by the 2007 ad 
hoc committee. Dr. Fox made the arbitrary, unilateral decision not to seek input from Dr. Verska 
and unilaterally determined that the recommended option of a proctorship was not, in fact, an 
option. Dr. Fox misrepresented the 2007 ad hoc committee's findings and recommendations to 
the MEC and withheld critical information from them that would have been important in their 
decision on reappointment. 
Dr. Fox wrote to Sandra Bruce on June 25, 2008, informing her that the MEC had met to 
consider two separate, but related matters, concerning Dr. Verska.29 Dr. Fox stated that the 2007 
ad hoc committee had conducted an extensive review of Dr. Verska's practice and determined 
that "he should be required to engage in a comprehensive proctoring process or, alternatively, 
26 2007 Ad Hoc Committee Report, dated June 23, 2008. 
27Testimony before the Fair Hearing Panel of Dr. Mulder, 282-83: 25-6; Dr. Floyd, 226-27: 18-1; and Dr. McMartin, 
77: 7-10, 82-83: 21-7, 83-84: 20-1, 85: 5-13. Copy of hearing transcript excerpts attached to Affidavit of Raymond 
D. Powers. 
28 Response to Request for Admission No. 67 
29 Letter from Dr. Fox to Sandra Bruce, dated June 25, 2008. 000081 
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complete a 12-month spine fellowship." He went on to report that the Credentials Committee30 
recommended that Dr. Verska be reappointed subject to the recommendations the Ad Hoc 
Committee made for restrictions on Dr. Verska's practice.31 As was becoming the MEC's habit 
under Dr. Fox's direction, however, it disregarded the favorable 2007 ad hoc committee's 
recommendation, as well as the favorable Credentials Committee's recommendation. Going 
against those recommendations, the MEC, arbitrarily and without support, voted to only 
reappoint Dr. Verska if, and only if, he agreed to take a leave of absence to complete a one-year 
spine fellowship program, with the leave of absence to become effective after June 30, 200S.32 
This was the first formal decision interpreting the 2007 ad hoc committee's review as requiring a 
restriction on Dr. Verska's privileges and it came without any opportunity for Dr. Verska to 
present his position, which goes against all notions of fairness and due process as contemplated 
under the Bylaws. How these unilateral, arbitrary decisions were made can only be discovered 
by Dr. Verska through access to SARMC's internal documents and the testimony under oath of 
those involved in the decisions. 
Sandra Bruce notified Dr. Verska of the MEC's arbitrary decision by way of her letter to 
him dated June 25, 200S, which Dr. Verska did not receive until Friday, June 27, 200S?3 Ms. 
Bruce informed Dr. Verska that his reappointment was conditioned upon his agreement to take a 
leave of absence to complete a one-year spine fellowship and that after June 30, 200S; his 
privileges at SARMC would lapse. No other options were offered to Dr. Verska. She also 
acknowledged that the decision of the MEC was an adverse recommendation that entitled him to 
30 Because Dr. Verska's privileges were up for renewal, the Credentials Committee had presumably been reviewing 
his credentialing information to make its recommendation. 
31 Dr. Verska's application for reappointment was pending approval at this same time. 
32 Letter from Dr. Fox to Sandra Bruce, dated June 25, 2008. 
33 Letter from Sandra Bruce to Dr. Verska, dated June 25, 2008. 000082 
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a fair hearing under the SARMC Bylaws.34 She went on to inform him that if he chose to 
exercise his right to a fair hearing, then during the pendency of the hearing he would not have a 
current appointment to the medical staff. 
Dr. Verska was shocked to learn that not only had the latest review resulted in an adverse 
recommendation, but he was faced with the immediate loss of his privileges at SARMC. He was 
also shocked to learn of the additional, arbitrary punishment that if he chose to exercise his right 
to a fair hearing, he definitely would not have any privileges. None of these decisions is 
consistent with the terms of the MSPP. Dr. Verska should be allowed to discover how these 
decisions could be made in such an inconsistent fashion. 
Any choice made by Dr. Verska in response to Ms. Bruce's letter would result in 
SARMC's desired outcome - he would not have privileges at SARMC, which would eliminate 
him from practice at the hospital thereby eliminating his ability to compete for spine surgery 
patients with SARMC's Spine Medicine Institute of Idaho, led by defendant Zimmerman. Dr. 
Fox readily acknowledged that it would likely take longer than a year for Dr. Verska to enroll in 
and complete a spine fellowship program, the result of which being that Dr. Verska would not be 
eligible for privileges again at SARMC until sometime well after June 30, 2009.35 Furthermore, 
SARMC would not guarantee that Dr. Verska's privileges would be renewed upon successful 
completion of a spine fellowship program.36 
Dr. Verska did not agree with the MEC's decision and did not agree to the unreasonable 
burden of the spine fellowship requirement. Instead, Dr. Verska exercised his right to a fair 
hearing on July 9,2008, as provided in SARMC's Bylaws; a hearing date was set for October 28, 
2008. Ms. Bruce did not, however, hold the MEC's recommendation until after Dr. Verska's 
34 Letter from Dr. Fox to Sandra Bruce, dated June 25, 2008. 
35 Letter from Dr. Fox to Sandra Bruce, dated June 25, 2008. 
36 Letter from Dr. Fox to Sandra Bruce, dated June 25, 2008. 000083 
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hearing as required under Chapter XI, Section 3, of the MSPP. Therefore, Dr. Verska was 
without privileges at SARMC, without a prior hearing, as of July 1, 2008. 
E. CONSISTENT WITH ITS PATTERN OF ARBITRARY DECISIONS TOWARD 
DR. VERSKA, SARMC ENLARGED ITS REASONS FOR CONCERN 
INVOLVING DR. VERSKA. 
On September 30, 2008, in a letter from its counsel to Dr. Verska's counsel, SARMC 
boldly "enlarged" its reasons for concern involving Dr. Verska. Specifically, Patrick Miller, 
counsel for SARMC, stated that the position of the MEC against Dr. Verska at the hearing to be 
held on October 28, 2008, would be that Dr. Verska "does not meet the minimum qualifications 
for Medical Staff membership," and that Dr. Verska "has not demonstrated that he possess[es] 
excellent judgment and has not demonstrated the ability to safely and competently exercise the 
clinical privileges requested.,,37 Mr. Miller also stated that Dr. Verska "did not demonstrate any 
insight into the danger he was presenting to patients." Neither Dr. Fox nor SARMC made these 
accusations known to Dr. Verska prior to the September 30, 2008, letter. 
These new claims were only asserted a month before Dr. V erska' s fair hearing and some 
three months after the 2007 ad hoc committee had adjourned. From the face of the September 
30, 2008, letter, it appears that SARMC reached these conclusions independently, without 
deferring to any qualified peer review committee, spine surgeon, or other qualified committee. 
Dr. Verska must be allowed to discover whether any basis existed for this expanded conclusion 
other than eliminating him from the ability to compete against SARMC's Spine Medicine 
Institute of Idaho, led by defendant Zimmerman, who became an employee of SARMC in 
September of 2008. 
F. THE FAIR HEARING PANEL FINDS THAT THE FELLOWSHIP 
REQUIREMENT IS UNFAIR AND RECOMMENDS THAT DR. VERSKA'S 
PRIVILEGES BE REINSTATED IMMEDIATELY. 
37 Patrick Miller letter to Raymond D. Powers, dated September 30, 2008. 000084 
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Because Dr. Verska exercised his right to a fair hearing, SARMC appointed three 
physicians of its choosing to comprise the Fair Hearing Pane1.38 Beginning on October 28, 2008, 
the Fair Hearing Panel took evidence and heard sworn testimony from SARMC and Dr. Verska. 
Noteworthy is the sworn testimony of several of Dr. Verska's spine surgeon colleagues who 
testified as to Dr. Verska's excellent surgical skills and judgment. Dr. Timothy Floyd, who was 
one of the three members on the 2007 ad hoc committee and an orthopedic spine surgeon like Dr. 
Verska, gave testimony that supported Dr. Verska. Dr. Floyd was a witness called by the MEC 
and testified that Dr. Verska is competent to safely perform surgery, meets the minimum staff 
requirements, and is "an excellent surgeon." Three other Boise spine surgeons, Drs. Paul 
Montalbano, Sam Jorgenson and Timothy Doerr, presented similar testimony - that Dr. Verska 
meets minimum staff requirements and possesses the skill and provides the care of a competent, 
qualified spine surgeon, qualified to be a member of the medical staff at SARMC. 
Not surprisingly, the Fair Hearing Panel recommended in favor of Dr. Verska, believing 
he is a competent and qualified spine surgeon deserving of privileges at SARMC. Included in its 
recommendation was that Dr. Verska's privileges at SARMC be reinstated immediately.39 After 
considering the evidence and applying the burden of proof as required under the MSPP, the Fair 
Hearing Panel was not persuaded that Dr. Verska failed to meet the minimum standards required 
to be on the medical staff. According to the panel, the 2007 ad hoc committee appropriately 
offered non-punitive options to achieve resolution of the matter. The panel also found that the 
MEC's requirement of a fellowship was unfair to Dr. Verska. It is apparent that the Fair Hearing 
Panel found that the MEC's decision to deny Dr. Verska's reappointment was not supported by 
38 Drs. Mark Clawson, Austin Cushman and Roy Ellsworth were appointed to the Fair Hearing Panel. 85 
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the evidence, was unfair, and was unreasonable. Remarkably, Dr. Verska met and exceeded the 
heavy burden of proof placed upon him by the language of Chapter XII, Sec. 17, of the MSPP. 
G. DR. FOX MISREPRESENTED THE CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATION OF THE FAIR HEARING PANEL TO THE MEC. 
Upon receipt of the Fair Hearing Panel's conclusions and recommendation in support of 
Dr. Verska, Dr. Fox called a special meeting of the MEC to vote on the panel's 
recommendation.4o Dr. Fox again misrepresented the process and misrepresented the Fair 
Hearing Panel's conclusions and recommendation to the MEC. He intentionally omitted key 
pieces of information critical to the panel's analyses.41 For example, the minutes of the special 
meeting held December 9,2008, do not reflect that Dr. Fox reported the testimony of Drs. Floyd, 
Jorgenson, Montalbano, and Doerr that Dr. Verska was an excellent surgeon and practiced within 
the standard of care. The minutes reflect that Dr. Fox falsely reported to the MEC that the 
hearing panel's report states that the "timing of the MEC's fellowship recommendation relative 
to the end of [Dr. Verska's] appointment was not unfair." Dr. Fox erroneously reported to the 
MEC that Dr. Verska had been notified in writing that he was under the Bylaws' Corrective 
Action Plan. The minutes of the special meeting also make reference to Dr. Fox's comment that 
Dr. Verska engages in "risky behavior." There is no evidence in the record, however, that any 
committee, external review, or panel ever concluded that Dr. Verska engaged in "risky 
behavior." Dr. Fox omitted all of the evidence favorable to Dr. Verska that supported the panel's 
decision and he created or manipulated facts to suggest to the MEC that the Fair Hearing Panel 
report should be ignored. 
The MEC relied upon Dr. Fox's misrepresentations, manipulations and erroneous 
information and reached a manipulated decision to uphold its own fonner decision to deny Dr. 
40 Minutes of the special MEC meeting, dated December 9,2008. 
41 Minutes of the special MEC meeting, dated December 9,2008. 000086 
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Verska's reappointment, thereby choosing to ignore the objective reasoning of the Fair Hearing 
Panel. 
H. THE APPELLATE REVIEW PANEL AND BOARD OF TRUSTEES ALSO 
IGNORED THE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE FAIR 
HEARING PANEL. 
The SARMC Appellate Review Panel, appointed by SARMC, also chose to ignore the 
recommendations of the two prior ad hoc committees and the conclusions and recommendation 
of the Fair Hearing Panel and voted to uphold the MEC's decision. Ultimately, the Board of 
Trustees, as expected, rubber stamped the flawed process, chose to protect its own, and voted in 
favor of upholding the MEC's decision to deny Dr. Verska's reappointment. Interestingly, it was 
the Board of Trustees who inexplicably sought to continue Dr. Verska's peer review in the fall of 
2007. 
Dr. Verska is left with only the civil justice system to address the wrongs against him. 
He must have the opportunity to explore the decisions and the bases for those decisions to expose 
defendants' bad faith and wrongful conduct. If SARMC's objections are not overruled, SARMC 
will never be required to justify its decisions, which equates to a finding of absolute iImnunity. 
If Dr. Verska is not allowed to discover these materials and information, the Court will, in effect, 
be giving SARMC license to do whatever it wants, to whomever it wants, and in the manner it 
wants. Giving such sweeping power to SARMC is unsupportable. 
There are strong arguments supporting production of the information to which SARMC 
has objected. The Idaho Supreme Court decision in Harrison v. Binnion, 147 Idaho 645, 214 
P.3d 631 (2009) supports Dr. Verska's position that there is no peer review protection for a 
hospital's credentialinglreappointment decisions. Other jurisdictions have recognized the limited 
nature of the peer review statutes and have carved out an exception for this very type of situation. 
Failure to recognize the discovery of information in the present situation would create absolute 
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immunity, allowing hospitals to act without any accountability whatsoever. Further support of 
Dr. Verska's position is that Congress declined to create a medical peer review privilege in 
creating the Health Care Quality Improvement Act. Finally, public policy demands that Dr. 
Verska be allowed to discover information related to proceedings, which are about him, that 
adversely affect his privileges. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
SARMC has objected to Dr. Verska's discovery requests related to materials and 
information that concern the process carried out against Dr. Verska. The bases for defendants' 
objections are in Idaho's peer review statutes, specifically Idaho Code Sections 39-1392b and 
39-1392c. Reliance on these statutes is misplaced under the circumstances of this case. In fact, 
Idaho law supports this Court finding that the peer review privilege and immunity statutes are 
inapplicable, allowing for the discovery of information related to the credentialinglreappointment 
activities and decisions concerning Dr. Verska. 
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PEER REVIEW STATUTES SHOWS THAT 
THE STATUTES ARE TO PROTECT HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS FROM 
PARTIES SEEKING TO USE PEER REVIEW INFORMATION TO PROVE 
LIABILITY INMEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS. 
The general policy behind Idaho's peer review statutes, Idaho Code Section 39-1392 et 
seq., demonstrates why the statutes are inapplicable in this case. The policy provides guidance 
as to when the peer review statutes should be appropriately applied - and when they should not. 
Idaho's peer review statutes are designed to "encourage research, discipline and medical study 
by certain health care organizations for the purpose of reducing morbidity and mortality, 
enforcing and improving the standards of medical practice in the state of Idaho." Idaho Code § 
39-1392. The legislative history of the statutes paints a clear picture of the intended application 
of the peer review protections. The intended breadth of the peer review statutes, and the peer 
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review privilege specifically, is evidenced in the statement of purpose from the original 1973 
legislation: 
It is essential to the preservation of optimum medical care that the medical profession 
within Idaho be free to review patient care and to constantly enforce and improve the 
standards of medical practice within the state. Such intraprofessional action and review 
is inhibited and discouraged by present law, however, because of the lack of privilege 
for any proceedings or records which may be developed and the threat that such 
materials may be obtained by third parties, perhaps misinterpreted and used in 
litigation, against the practitioner. 
This bill would impose a confidential and privileged status upon certain reports, records 
and other materials developed by in-hospital medical staff committees, medical society 
committees and other approved entities concerned with research, discipline and medical 
study. It would also encourage the free exchange of information in such proceedings 
by granting civil immunity to persons providing information or opinions to such review 
and study committees. Access to and court room use of individual patients' records 
would not be affected. 
House B il1136 Statement of Purpose/ Fiscal Note (1973 Legislative Session) (Emphasis added). 
The original legislation specifically contemplated the need to encourage the exchange of 
information for continued improvement in patient care. The legislature made a specific effort to 
note that patient care was the primary focus for enacting this legislation. The legislation further 
contemplates the protections specifically applying to "persons providing information or 
opinions." 
The purpose in establishing the peer review privilege is to protect a physician and others 
participating in a review process from liability in a malpractice action. This is confirmed first by 
the statement that a third party could use the peer review information inappropriately in 
litigation, i.e., "perhaps misinterpreted and used in litigation, against the practitioner." Id. 
A peer review is a "collection, interpretation and analysis of data by a health care 
organization for the purpose of bettering the system of delivery of health care or to improve 
the provision of health care or to otherwise reduce patient morbidity and mortality and 
improve the quality of patient care." Idaho Code § 39-1392a(11) (emphasis added). The 
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mandate is for improvement to medical systems and patient care. The type of infonnation 
protected from discovery and referenced by the peer review statutes relates to the care of 
patients, and the activities that revolve around said activities. The statute is not a means by 
which a hospital can foreclose a physician from challenging inappropriate and wrongful 
credentialinglreappointment activities. Had the legislature intended otherwise, it would have 
explicitly drafted the statute to provide for such protections. See Harrison v. Binnion, 147 Idaho 
645,214 P.3d 631, 635 (2009). 
In 1997, the Idaho Legislature revisited Idaho Code Section 39-1392 et seq., amending 
certain portions of the act. See Senate Bill No. 1115. On February 11, 1997, the Senate Health 
and Welfare Committee discussed the bill and its purpose. hlcluded in the committee minutes is 
a handout summarizing the purpose of the bill. Recognizing the importance of quality assurance 
processes in continued improvement of health care, the proposed amendments were intended to 
further clarify who was protected under the act and how quality assurance processes are 
important to the process: 
This information is intended to help physicians improve, but could also be used to 
discredit a physician in a malpractice suit. Unless the information collected on 
physicians and the opinions they render about their peers is protected from discovery, 
physicians will refuse to participate in quality assurance programs. Without quality 
assurance programs, health care quality will suffer. 
ld. (Emphasis added). The act is designed to protect physicians and those who render opinions 
about their peers' work from actions brought by third parties-patients. See Murphy, 105 Idaho 
at 183-84,667 P.2d at 862-63. Secondarily, it is designed to elicit continued participation in the 
peer review process in order to improve patient and medical care by "encourag[ing] a free 
exchange of medical information that will ultimately benefit the public in the form of improved 
medical care." Murphy v. Wood, 105 Idaho 180, 184,667 P.2d 859,863 (Ct. App. 1983). 
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Dr. Verska's case against these defendants is not a medical malpractice action where a 
patient is seeking peer review information to prove negligence by the hospital or Dr. Verska. 
There is no third party patient attempting to prove hislher case using internal peer review 
records. This case is not about Dr. Verska's disagreement with an assessment of his patients' 
care or patient safety. This action is akin to a wrongful termination claim. In essence, Dr. 
Verska has alleged that, inter alia, SARMC has unlawfully terminated his staff privileges with 
the hospital thereby precluding him from practicing at SARMC. Were this a traditional wrongful 
termination claim, few records would be privileged, if any, and Dr. Verska would be entitled to 
discover those records and materials related to his termination and depose individuals who may 
have relevant knowledge. 
When comparing this action to the language and policy of the peer review statutes, 
discovery in this case is not impacted by the peer review statutes and should not be limited. Dr. 
Verska should be permitted to discover information that exposes defendants' bad faith 
motivations and wrongful conduct, which includes discovery of the underlying reasons for the 
inconsistencies in SARMC and Dr. Fox's decisions. 
B. THE FACTUAL RECORD IN THIS MATTER CAN ONLY BE DEVELOPED IF 
THE MATERIALS, WITNESSES, AND INFORMATION RELATED TO DR. 
VERSKA'S REAPPOINTMENT ARE DISCOVERABLE. 
Neither this Court nor Dr. Verska can know all the facts surrounding SARMC and Dr. 
Fox's involvement, motives, communications, and conduct in this matter without production of 
the materials, witnesses, and information related to SARMC's examination of Dr. Verska. The 
requested information concerns the wrongful actions taken against Dr. Verska in denying his 
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reappointment, actions which are not part of the traditional peer reVIew process. 42 Hence, 
Idaho's peer review statutes are not applicable here. 
The list of discoverable information below illustrates that the requested infolmation is 
much different than "peer review" and speaks directly to the decisions made by SARMC-
decisions that are beyond the scope of peer review. Production of the following types of 
information must be allowed in order for Dr. Verska to fairly question SARMC's wrongful 
reappointment decision: 
• Information related to his initial appointment and subsequent reappointments to 
the medical staff at SARMC. 
• Information related to the 2005 review, the thought processes of those individuals 
who had any involvement with the review, and information related to the decision 
making and the fact gathering associated with the 2005. 
o Information related to the Greeley Company conducting an external 
review, including discovery of the reactions and responses of those people 
who reviewed the 2005 Greeley Report. 
o Information related to the department of orthopedics at SARMC, the 
MEC, the QCPPC, the Credentialing Committee, and the Board of 
Trustees' involvement in the process during this time period. 
• Information related to the decision in April of 2006 made by the Quality Care and 
Professional Practice Committee to change the recommendation of the MEC and 
commission yet another external review by the Greeley Company. 
o Information related to the Greeley Company doing another external 
review in 2006, including discovery of the reactions and responses of 
those who reviewed the 2007 Greeley Report. 
o Information related to the MEC's unanimous vote in January of 2007 to 
discontinue Dr. Verska's intensified peer review. 
o Information related to Sandra Bruce's involvement since she was the CEO 
of SARMC during the time in question and authored several letters to Dr. 
Verska. 
o Information related to the department of orthopedics at SARMC, the 
MEC, the QCPPC, the Credentialing Committee, and the Board of 
Trustees' involvement in the process during this time period. 
42 Confidentiality concerns can be addressed through protective orders. Moreover, patient confidentiality should not 
be an issue since any time a patient's case required mention in the underlying hospital proceeding that patient W)!.S 92 
assigned a number to protect confidentiality at that level. 000 U 
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• Information related to the review of Dr. Verska that began in the fall of 2007 and 
culminated with the Board of Trustees upholding the MEC's original decision to 
deny Dr. Verska's reappointment. 
o Information related to the determination that Dr. Verska would again be 
under review or the determination that a new review would begin, 
including information relative to the Board of Trustees' involvement. 
o Information related to the thought processes of those individuals who had 
any involvement with determining that the 2007 review was necessary and 
the information related to the decision making and the fact gathering 
associated with the review that began in October of 2007. 
• Information to be included, for example: discovery of the specific 
chapter of the MSPP that the 2007 ad hoc committee was 
commissioned under, the motion before the MEC when it voted to 
further review Dr. Verska, the thought processes of the MEC 
members, Dr. Fox, 2007 ad hoc committee members, Sandra 
Bruce, the Board of Trustee members, the credentialing committee, 
hospital administrators and staff, and those involved in the 
department of orthopedics. 
• Information related to the MEC and Dr. Fox and the decision making processes 
involved in changing the 2007 ad hoc committee's recommendation from two 
non-punitive options to a single, adverse action. 
• Information related to SARMC's enlargement of its position against Dr. Verska in 
September of 2008 to include assertions that Dr. Verska did not meet the 
minimum qualifications, that he did not possess excellent judgment or ability to 
safely and competently exercise his privileges, and that he did not have insight to 
the danger he was presenting to patients. 
o Information related to the department of orthopedics at SARMC, the 
MEC, the QCPPC, the Credentialing Committee, and the Board of 
Trustees' involvement during this time period. 
• Information related to the MEC and Dr. Fox and the decision making and thought 
processes involved in disregarding the findings and recommendations of the Fair 
Hearing Panel. 
o Information related to the December 2008 MEC special meeting wherein 
Dr. Fox further enlarged SARMC's position against Dr. Verska to include 
that he engaged in risky behaviors. 
o Information related to the department of orthopedics at SARMC, the 
MEC, the QCPPC, the Credentialing Committee, and the Board of 
Trustees' involvement during this time period. 
• Information related to the appellate review panel and its decision to uphold the 
MEC's original recommendation. 
• Information related to how SARMC and Dr. Fox interpreted, executed and 
enforced the Bylaws and MSPP that governed the proceedings as to Dr. V€}G-O 093 
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The above list is not intended to be comprehensive; it represents the type of information that 
should be discoverable. 
The requested information transcends the peer review process and the explicit purpose of 
the peer review statutes. It does not implicate particular patients or other physicians. 
Accordingly, Dr. Verska requests that this Court find that the requested discovery is not subject 
to the peer review statutes and overrule SARMC's discovery objections. 
C. IDAHO AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE RECOGNIZED THE LIMITED 
NATURE OF PEER REVIEW STATUTES. 
Reappointment decisions do not enjoy the protection of Idaho's peer review statutes. 
Courts in Idaho, as well as other jurisdictions, permit the discovery of information and materials 
from a credentialinglreappointment challenge. 
In Harrison v. Binnion, the Idaho Supreme Court recently held that the credentialing 
decisions43 of a hospital did not enjoy immunity under Idaho's peer review statutes. 147 Idaho 
645, 214 P.3d 631 (2009). Harrison arises out of a medical malpractice action. During the 
course of the litigation, Harrison sought to amend his complaint to include a negligent 
credentialing claim against SARMC for granting privileges to one of the treating physicians. 
The district court held that a credentialing claim was barred by Idaho's peer review statutes, 
Idaho Code Section 39-1392 et seq., thereby denying the amendment to the complaint. !d. at 
658,214 P.3d at 634. The district court reasoned that if a health care organization has immunity 
for using information and opinions when making a credentialing decision, it must likewise have 
43 The fact that Harrison involved a credentialing decision and the present case deals with a reappointment is a 
distinction without a difference. Specifically, the MSPP discusses the credentials file in Chapter VII. The 
credentials file is described as follows: "[t]he Credentials File will contain information and documentation pertinent 
to the Medical Staff application, appointment, reappointment, and formal corrective action concerning each 
Member." MSPP, Ch. VII, Sec. 2. Accordingly, reappointment and the associated materials are circumscribed in 
the credentialing process. A credentialing decision would include those decisions made during the reappointment 
process, as here. Furthermore, the June 25, 2008 letter from Dr. Fox to Sandra Bruce references involvement ofAhh 9 4 
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· immunity for the actual credentialing decision made. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed with 
the district court and found that "[t]here is nothing in the wording of the statute that purports to 
grant immunity to a health care organization for making a credentialing decision." Id. at 649, 
214 P.3d at 635. The court further clarified that the purpose of the peer review privilege was to 
shield a person who contributes information or opinions during a peer review activity from 
"subsequent lawsuit[s] alleging claims such as slander, defamation, tortuous interference with 
contract or prospective advantage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress." Id. The court 
concluded, "[h]olding that Idaho Code § 39-1392c grants immunity for credentialing decisions 
would be an expansion of that statute beyond its wording. The district court therefore erred 
in holding that the statute granted such immunity." !d. (emphasis added). The court recognized 
the underlying public policy of the peer review statutes was to protect those who participated in 
providing information in traditional peer review activities from civil liability. The Harrison 
court's holding recognized that the traditional peer review activities relating to patient and 
medical care are specifically protected, while simultaneously recognizing that credentialing 
activities did not enjoy the same protection. A hospital's interpretation and decision on 
information gathered during credentialing activities is not shielded. 
Discovery of underlying credentialinglreappointment information III a credentialing 
decision is confirmed by the Harrison court's analogy that often two experts arrive at conflicting 
opinions after considering the same information. Id. at 649, 214 P.3d at 635. To analyze the 
opinion of the expert-or as here, a health care organization-the underlying information used to 
arrive at said opinion is necessary. By declaring that the hospital was not immune for its 
credentialing decision, the court unmistakably confirmed that where a challenge to a 
credentialing decision is made, the challenger must have an opportunity to discover the 
information that was provided to any committee and affected any committee decisions. If 
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Section 39-1392b were viewed as an absolute bar to the discovery of all 
credentialinglreappointment information, including a physician discovering his own records that 
resulted in a loss of staff privileges, the limited grant of immunity under Section 39-1392c would 
be rendered superfluous. See Dahl v. PSF Industries, Inc., 127 Idaho 232, 899 P.2d 445 (1995) 
(stating that courts should construe a statute to avoid surplusage or superfluous language). For a 
court to address an immunity claim under Section 39-1392c, the underlying information must be 
made available. Had the district court believed that the credentialing records were privileged, 
further inquiry into the credentialing claim would have been barred. To hold otherwise would 
render the immunity section of Idaho Code Section 39-1392c meaningless. 
To further support its holding, the Harrison court pointed to the actual statutory 
language-or lack thereof-granting immunity in credentialing decisions. Specifically, the court 
stated that to read immunity into credentialing decisions would be an impermissible expansion of 
the statute. The same justification can be applied to the language of Idaho Code Section 39-
1392b. As with the immunity section, the privilege section likewise does not discuss 
credentialing or reappointment activities. The same rationale employed by the Harrison court in 
denying immunity to the hospital for credentialing decisions should likewise be applied by this 
Court in overruling SARMC's discovery objections. 
It is important to note that Dr. Verska has not named as a defendant any individual who 
served on any ad hoc committee or hearing panel. The only individual named who was actually 
involved with the process is Dr. Fox as President of the Medical Staff. Unlike an individual who 
served on or supplied peer review information to a committee, Dr. Fox is a named party because 
of his role in manipulating the information gathered in the process by committees and individuals 
that led to the wrongful denial of Dr. Verska's reappointment to the medical staff. Dr. Verska 
alleges that Dr. Fox was a facilitator and agent of SARMC's plan to wrongfully deny Dr. 
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Verska's staff privileges. Admittedly, Harrison identifies who is likely to be shielded against 
liability for any credentialing decisions: "[a] person who provides such information or opinions 
need not fear a subsequent lawsuit alleging claims such as slander, defamation, tortuous 
interference with contract or prospective economic advantage, or intentional infliction of 
emotional distress." Id. at 645,214 P.3d at 635. As explained above, however, the language in 
Harrison regarding who enjoys protection in a credentialing decision is irrelevant in this case. 
Dr. Verska is challenging SARMC's wrongful denial of his reappointment, not an 
adverse finding regarding his patient or medical care. Such a challenge necessarily warrants a 
finding that the peer review statutes are inapplicable in this case. The Harrison court recognized 
that a health care organization cannot enjoy absolute immunity in credentialing matters. Just as 
in Harrison, to fairly question a reappointment decision, Dr. Verska must be given access to the 
information that led to the decision that resulted in his staff privileges not being renewed. 
Harrison is mandatory Idaho case law that requires this Court to overrule SARMC's immunity 
objections. The underlying rationale for the holding in Harrison also supports this Court 
overruling SARMC's peer review privilege objections. 
The Idaho federal district trial court relied upon underlying credentialing/reappointment 
information in considering a motion for summary judgment in a very similar type of case to the 
case at bar. In Laurino v. Syringa General Hospital, the trial court relied on 
credentialinglreappointment materials, including letters, committee minutes, and hearing 
transcripts, in determining whether to grant defendant's summary judgment motion. No. CIV 
98-0439-S-EJL (D. Idaho March 14,2005) (Order Granting Summary Judgment).44 Dr. Laurino 
challenged Syringa General Hospital's decision to terminate his privileges. Dr. Laurino alleged 
44 Laurino v. Syringa General Hospital, No. CIV 98-0439-S-EIL (D. Idaho March 14, 2005) (OrderrVHqtjl)!\ 97 
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breach of contract, violation of due process, bad faith, tortuous interference with prospective 
economic advantage and/or tortuous interference with contract, defamation, emotional distress, 
and antitrust violations. [d. at pg. 3. The hospital filed a motion for summary judgment. In 
reaching his decision, Judge Lodge, in footnote 2 on page 6 of the order, references letters and 
board minutes. On page 9, Judge Lodge refers to the transcript of Dr. Laurino's hearing; on page 
10 he states that he has "reviewed the transcript and entire record in this matter." 
Judge Lodge's reliance on information available only from the 
credentialinglreappointment process is evidence that disclosure of credentialinglreappointment 
information is vital in cases where physicians are challenging the loss of medical staff privileges. 
In Memorial Hospital For McHenry County v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1981), a 
physician brought both federal and state antitrust actions challenging the actions of a competing 
group of physicians who allegedly conspired against him in an effort to exclude him from 
providing competing medical services. The physician alleged that the physicians improperly 
used the organizational structure of the hospital to exclude him from the staff thereby destroying 
his practice. The physician claimed that the disciplinary proceedings against him were a sham 
and intended only as a means of implementing a restraint on trade. On that issue, the physician 
sought discovery regarding defendant's treatment of other doctors in comparable disciplinary 
d· 45 procee mgs. 
The defendants refused to produce the records claiming that such records were privileged 
under the state's peer review privilege statute. The Court of Appeals recognized that "because 
evidentiary privileges operate to exclude relevant evidence and thereby block the judicial fact-
finding function, they are not favored and, where recognized, must be narrowly construed." [d. 
45 Based upon the language of the Illinois peer review statute, the physician had full access to his own peer review 
records. Rather, at issue was whether the physician was entitled to discover peer review records of other JlN~~iciaM9.8 
not involved in the lawsuit. U U 0 U 
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at 1061 (citing u.s. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). Despite the policy behind the peer 
review privilege, the court noted that the instant case was signijkantly different than a medical 
malpractice action. The court noted: 
To recognize hospital review or disciplinary proceedings as privileged in the context 
of a malpractice action will generally have little impact upon the plaintiff's ability to 
prove a meritorious claim. For the crucial issue in that type of case is not what 
occurred at the review proceeding, but whether the defendant was in fact negligent in 
his care and treatment of the plaintiff. ... More importantly, the exclusion of that 
information will not prevent the plaintiff from otherwise establishing a valid claim. 
The same cannot be said, however, in a case such as this where the plaintiff's claim 
arises out of the disciplinary proceedings themselves and not some event or 
occurrence that exists independently of those proceedings. In this case, for example, 
Dr. Tambone has alleged that the defendants have used the Hospital committee 
apparatus discriminatorily to deny him staff privileges at the Hospital in furtherance of 
an unlawful restraint of trade. To prove this allegation, Dr. Tambone must present 
evidence that other physicians with comparable or worse records than his were not 
denied staff privileges. Such evidence, if it exists, would likely be found in the 
Hospital's records of disciplinary proceedings against other doctors. To deny Dr. 
Tambone access to this information may very well prevent him from bringing this 
action altogether. 
Id. at 1062-63. The court went on to deny the privilege and allow the doctor discovery of other 
physician's peer reviews, concluding that to grant the defendants privilege would in effect "grant 
such committees, their members and participants absolute immunity from prosecution for all 
statements made and actions taken in the context of such proceedings." Id. at 1063 (emphasis 
added). 
Shadur poignantly addressed a physician's inability to challenge improperly conducted 
credentialing/reappointment activities without the aid of discovery of the 
credentialing/reappointment records. The Shadur court recognized the significant distinction 
between a credentialing/reappointment case and a medical malpractice case. Specifically, it 
recognized that a plaintiff patient can still prevail in a medical malpractice action without any 
credentialing/reappointment materials; whereas a plaintiff physician challenging the 
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credentialing/reappointment process has no case at all without the ability to discover and review 
the underlying credentialing/reappointment materials. 
The underlying rationale in the above cases supports Dr. Verska's position that the peer 
review statutes are not applicable. The "confidential" nature of the information should not be 
used to protect from discovery evidence of a process that lacks credibility. Nor should the label 
given to the process govern the analysis of discoverability; the substance of the information is 
the critical issue here. SARMC has improperly used the organizational structure of the hospital 
to exclude Dr. Verska from the medical staff, thereby damaging his reputation and practice. 
As the Shadur court explained, Dr. Verska would be left with no remedy whatsoever 
against SARMC and Dr. Fox without access to the underlying information that led to the 
defendants' wrongful actions. Therefore, this Court must find that the peer review statutes are 
not applicable and compel SARMC to respond to Dr. Verska's discovery requests. 
D. PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS THE DISCOVERY OF RECORDS WHERE A 
PHYSICIAN IS CHALLENGING A PROCESS THAT LACKS CREDIBILITY. 
Denying a physician access to his own records and relevant witnesses to support a claim 
against an overbearing hospital creates absolute immunity, making the hospital untouchable. In 
order to avoid this very situation, public policy demands disclosure of 
credentialing/reappointment information where a physician IS challenging that 
credentialing/reappointment decision. 
1. Hospitals And Staff Members Would Have Absolute Immunity In This Type Of 
Situation If Discovery Of CredentialinglReappointment Information Is Not 
Allowed. 
The public policy behind enacting the privilege contradicts the practical effect of 
extending the privilege to include a physician challenging hospital disciplinary proceedings. If 
the privilege is extended under these circumstances, it necessarily gives health care organizations 
and its member's absolute immunity, even for grievous and wrongful actions. In Shatyo &100 
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court recognized this when it stated, "[t]o recogmze hospital disciplinary proceedings as 
privileged, regardless of the purpose for which disclosure is sought, would in effect grant such 
committees, their members and participants absolute immunity from prosecution for all 
statements made and actions taken in the context of such proceedings." Shadur, 664 F.2d at 
1063 (emphasis added). Unlike a medical malpractice action where a patient is still able to 
prosecute its case despite any peer review records, in a lawsuit such as this, application of the 
privilege acts as a complete bar to all cases, regardless of any egregious or wrongful conduct by 
the hospital or committee members. Even if the peer review statutes are applicable, they do not 
grant absolute immunity, especially in a case where a physician is challenging the reappointment 
process. To hold that the privilege and immunity may be invoked by SARMC under these 
circumstances will allow any hospital, physician, or committee member to improperly act against 
another physician without accountability or repercussion. Simply put, the interests of justice are 
not served by such a finding nor should the Court condone such an absolute immunity where 
none is contemplated. 
2. Seventeen States Have Statutory Allowances For Physician Challenges To 
Decisions Affecting Staff Privileges. 
Seventeen states have sought to address the problem created when a physician is 
challenging a hospital's decision affecting staff privileges by qualifying confidentiality and non-
discoverability statutes. These states have generally made an allowance in their "non-
discoverability" statutes by permitting a physician to obtain access to materials when challenging 
the curtailment, suspension, termination or denial of staff privileges. In those states, contesting a 
revocation or curtailment of staff privileges by the accused physician places a much heavier 
burden on the committee to perform a fair and honest review of a physician's perfonnance. The 
following states have adopted such an allowance: Alaska (Alaska Stat. 18.23.030), Arizona 
(Ariz. Rev. Stat. 32-1451), California (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 809.2), Colorado (Co1660101 
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Stat. 12-36.5-104(1O)(b)(I-IV», Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. 19a-17b(d», Hawaii (Haw. Rev. 
Stat. 663-1.7), Illinois (225 Ill. Compo Stat. 60/5), Kansas (Kan. Stat. Ann. 65-4915(4)(c», 
Kentucky (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 311.377), Louisiana (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13:3715.3), 
Mississippi (Miss. Code. Ann. 41-63-9(2», Missouri (Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.035), New 
Hampshire (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 317-A:17), Oregon (Or. Rev. Stat. 441.055 and 41.675), 
Rhode Island (R.I. Gen. Laws 23-17-25), South Dakota (S.D. Cod. Laws 36-4-26.1), 
Washington (Wash. Rev. Code 70.41.200). 
While Idaho has not specifically adopted any such allowance, the fact that many other 
states have recognized the inherent problem with denying a physician his 
credentialinglreappointment records is persuasive evidence that the purpose of the privilege is to 
shield from liability persons supplying information in medical malpractice cases. The privilege 
and immunity protections are inapplicable and should not be used to deny a physician 
challenging the reappointment process from discovering his own information. 
3. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act Does Not Recognize A Peer Review 
Privilege, Which Is Consistent With Federal Courts General Disfavor of 
Privileges. 
In 1986, Congress enacted the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 
V.S.C.A. § 11101 et seq. ("HCQIA"), which was inspired by the congressional finding that 
"[t]here is an overriding national need to provide incentive and protection for physicians 
engaging in effective professional peer review." 42 V.S.C.A. § 11101(5). Consideration of 
HCQIA is important to the instant motion given that in SARMC's Bylaws it defers to HCQIA if 
there are inconsistencies between its Bylaws and any HCQIA requirements. The federal Act and 
congressional intent underlying the Act should not be lightly cast aside since SARMC and Dr. 
Fox have invoked HCQIA as an affirmative defense. While the purpose of this motion is not to 
provide a discussion on the requirements and proof required under HCQIA, it is important to 
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understand that for defendants to invoke HCQIA as an affinnative defense requires reliance upon 
the very information they seek to prevent from disclosure to prove the HCQIA elements. 
HCQIA provides qualified immunity from suit to ofticials who conduct professional 
review activities that meet the standards outlined in the statute. Yet Congress, in providing 
protection for those involved in the professional review activity, did not establish a privilege to 
documents and information created in that process. In analyzing HCQIA, the Teasdale court 
declared that the legislature: 
[N]ot only considered the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of the peer 
review process, but took the action it believed would best balance protecting 
confidentiality with other important interests. Congress spoke loudly with its silence in 
not including a privilege against discovery of peer review materials in the HCQIA. 
Teasdale v. Marin General Hosp., 138 F.R.D. 691, 694 (N.D. Cal. 1991); see also In re: 
Administrative Subpoena Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts. Inc., 400 F. Supp. 2d 386 (D. 
Mass. 2005) (finding that although state law recognized medical peer review privilege, Congress 
chose not to include medical peer review privilege in HCQIA since HCQIA already provided for 
qualified immunity from suit for those participating in peer reviews and where documents would 
have been subject to protective order); Syposs v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 2d 301 (W.O.N.Y. 
1999) (finding that neither reason nor experience justified extending to peer review records a 
privilege against disclosure where Congress declined to create such a privilege in connection 
with enactment ofHCQIA). 
Congress was mindful of the relevant competing interests, even though it declined to 
create a privilege for medical peer review materials in HCQIA. The findings set forth in section 
11101 (5) demonstrate Congress' appreciation for the need to provide incentive and protection for 
physicians engaging in professional review activities. Id. at § 11101. The Supreme Court's 
position is that trial courts should be "especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an area 
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where it appears that Congress has considered the relevant competing concerns but has not 
provided the privilege itself." University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990). 
Congress' determination that a medical peer review privilege is unnecessary is further 
confirmation that Idaho's peer review privilege should be rendered inapplicable in this case and 
disclosure allowed. This conclusion is further supported by the many states that have adopted 
allowances for the discovery of credentialinglreappointment information, the Idaho Supreme 
Court's holding in Harrison regarding credentialing decisions, and the Idaho federal court's 
reliance on the similar records in Laurino. 
While not binding on Idaho courts, it is significant that federal courts have continually 
disfavored any evidentiary privilege, recognizing only a handful of applicable privileges under 
the federal rules. Evidentiary privileges remain disfavored and should not be lightly created. 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, (1974). The United States Supreme Court has cautioned 
that privileges "contravene the fundamental principle that the public '" has a right to every man's 
evidence." Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, (1990) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). There is a presumption against privileges that may only be overcome 
when it would achieve a "public good transcending the normally predominant principle of 
utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50, 
100 (1980). This is a high standard, and "only the most compelling candidates will overcome the 
law's weighty dependence on the availability of relevant evidence." Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 
57,67 (3rd Cir. 2000). 
In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, (1990), the Supreme Court held 
that neither federal common law nor the First Amendment warranted the recognition of a 
privilege for the peer review materials of a university. It cautioned that courts should be 
"especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an area where it appears that Congress has 
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considered the relevant competing concerns but has not provided the privilege itself." Id. at 
189 (emphasis added). The EEOC subpoenaed the tenure review files of a woman denied tenure 
and five male faculty members who allegedly were beneficiaries of the disparate treatment. In 
rejecting the University's privilege claim, the court noted that testimonial privileges are 
exceptions to the principle that "the public has a right to every man's evidence" and are to be 
construed strictly." Id. The court pointed to Congress' failure to create a privilege for peer 
review documents in extending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to educational 
institutions. Id. at 189-92. 
Holding true to the sentiment expressed by the Supreme Court, Dr. Verska should have a 
right to SARMC's evidence, especially in light of the fact that Congress refused to create an 
identical privilege when it created the Health Care Quality Immunity Act. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The search for the truth begins with the production of all the relevant information 
surrounding the decision denying Dr. Verska's reappointment. If Dr. Verska is denied access to 
the very information that would expose defendants' bad faith and wrong-doing against him, the 
search for the truth never begins. The defendants are then free to manipulate and control the 
information related to the process, activities and decisions surrounding that process to protect 
against Dr. Verska's challenges. 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the peer review statutes are not applicable to this 
case. Therefore, plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court order that 1) the peer review 
privilege in Idaho Code Section 39-1392b is inapplicable, 2) the immunity in Idaho Code Section 
39-1392c is inapplicable, 3) prohibits SARMC, absent exceptional circumstances, from raising 
peer review privilege and immunity objections in further discovery, and 4) compels SARMC to 
produce the information Dr. Verska has requested in his interrogatory nos. 1,3-7, 1O-24,ert':}&.fO 5 
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for production nos. 1,2,4,5,7-54, and request tor admissions nos. 2-4, 14-16,26-30,32-62,64-
110 to which SARMC has objected, but has not fully responded asserting peer review privilege 
and immunity objections. 
DATED this £ day of December, 2009. 
POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC 
By EJHi?~ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D., and THE SPINE 
INSTITUTE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. ZIMMERMAN, 
M.D.; and DONALD FOX, M.D., 
Defendants. 
No. CV OC 0911804 
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
COMPEL AND CROSS-
MOTIONS FOR (i) 
PROTECTIVE ORDER ON 
PEER REVIEW, and (ii) ORDER 
STRIKING PRIVILEGED PEER 
REVIEW RECORDS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs Joseph Verska, M.D. and the Spine Medicine Institute of Idaho filed a 
Motion to Compel information related to the processes, activities, and decisions of 
Defendant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's peer review of Dr. Verska. 
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Plaintiffs contend this information is necessary to support their challenges to Defendant 
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Centers' peer review of Dr. Verska and ancillary claims 
against Defendants Dr. Donald Fox and Christian Zimmerman. Defendants oppose 
Plaintitrs' Motion to Compel and further seek a Protective Order regarding the peer review 
materials as well as an order striking peer review records submitted by Plaintiffs in support 
of their motion to compel. Defendants seek to obtain and enforce the protections afforded 
by Idaho's peer review and immunity statutes. This memorandum is submitted in 
opposition to Plaintiffs' motion and in support of Defendants' motions. Although 
prompted by the exchange of initial discovery in the case, both parties seek a ruling by the 
Court establishing the extent of the peer review and immunity protection governing the 
claims and defenses raised, and which will provide guidance throughout the balance of this 
litigation. 
In their Motion to Compel Plaintiffs ask the Court to rule that Idaho's peer review 
privilege and immunity statutes only apply to malpractice actions. Plaintiffs concede they 
are demanding "information related to the processes, activities, and decisions that 
ultimately led to the denial of [Dr. Verska's] reappointment" to Saint Alphonsus' medical 
staff, and state it is their intention to "depose those individuals who have relevant 
knowledge." (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of 
Infonnation Related to SARMC'S Wrongful Denial of Dr. Verska's Reappointment 
("Plaintiff's Memorandum") at 2.) According to Plaintiffs, '''peer review privilege' and 
immunity are inapplicable here," and "Idaho Code Sections 39-1392b and 39-1392c do not 
apply to the issues framed by this case." (Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 3.) 
In so doing, Plaintiffs also request the Court create a new "exception" to the 
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protections afforded to peer review activity, which is contrary to both the unambiguous 
language crafted by the Idaho legislature and the sound public policy underlying the 
statute. The Idaho peer review statute clearly outlines the scope of peer review activities, 
the privileged nature of peer review information, and the very limited exceptions to the 
privilege which are not applicable in this matter: 
• "Peer review" includes "[ c ]redentialing, privileging or affiliating 
of health care providers as members of, or providers for, a health 
care organization," and any "[p]rofessional review action, meaning 
an action ... of a health care organization which is taken or made 
in the conduct of peer review ... " Idaho Code § 39-1392a(l1)(a), 
(c). It is patently false to claim the peer review statutes do not 
apply to "this type of case"; this is precisely the sort of matter for 
which peer review protection was enacted. 
• "[A]ll peer review records shall be confidential and privileged, and 
shall not be directly or indirectly subject to subpoena or discovery 
proceedings or be admitted as evidence, nor shall testimony thereto 
be admitted in evidence, or in any action of any kind in any court . 
. . for any purpose whatsoever." Idaho Code § 39-1392b. The 
discovery propounded by Plaintiffs, and their demand for 
depositions related to the peer review process, are expressly 
prohibited. 
• The Idaho legislature made specific exceptions to the peer review 
privilege for patient care records and allowed the use of certain 
peer review information in personal injury cases in a code section 
titled "LIMITED EXCEPTIONS TO PRIVILEGE AND 
CONFIDENTIALITY." Idaho Code § 39-1392e. The new 
"exception" that Plaintiffs ask this Court to create is not among 
the exceptions enacted by the legislature. In asking this Court to 
create such an exception Plaintiffs seek to have the Court 
grossly deviate from the judiciary's proper role in enforcing 
unambiguous statutory law. 
In sum, Idaho's peer review laws clearly do apply to Dr. Verska's challenges to the 
peer review process at Saint Alphonsus in this litigation. His contention that the peer 
review laws are inapplicable and/or that the Court should carve out a new exception are 
without merit. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel should be denied in its 
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entirety, and by way of cross-motion, Defendants further request (i) a protective order 
providing the privilege established by Section 39-1392b must be honored and observed 
during the remainder of this case, including any depositions conducted by the parties, and 
(ii) an order striking the peer review records Plaintiffs have attempted to offer in support of 
their Motion to Compel. 
II. OVERVIEW OF CASE AND BRIEF STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Idaho legislature mandates that every hospital conduct peer review activities, 
including causing its medical statf to organize in-hospital committees which shall review 
the professional practices of members of the hospital's medical staff for the purpose of 
reducing morbidity and mortality, and for the improvement of the care of the hospital's 
patients. Idaho Code § 39-1392f. Peer review is also a condition of participation in the 
Medicare program. 42 C.F.R. 482.21. The policy behind these legislative mandates is to 
encourage research, discipline, and medical study by health care organizations, and to 
enforce and improve the standard of medical practice in Idaho. See Idaho Code § 39-1392. 
Participation by independent physicians on the medical staffs at Idaho hospitals in 
reviewing their peers and colleagues' professional practice, including at Saint Alphonsus, is 
largely a voluntary activity. Participation in these critical organized peer review activities 
may require many hours of uncompensated time outside of the physicians' professional 
clinical practice to carefully and candidly review matters, exercising their best professional 
judgment under the circumstances to ensure clinical quality is being protected and served 
through their critical review. To facilitate the legislative mandate and accomplish the 
objectives of the law, including this candid participation by physicians, Idaho has 
established a peer review privilege and immunity from liability for peer review activity. 
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Idaho Code §§ 39-1392b and 39-1392c. 
Saint Alphonsus is a 381-bed, Boise-based medical center subject to the above-
referenced mandates of the Idaho legislature regarding peer review activities. It serves the 
communities and citizens of Southwest Idaho, Eastern Oregon, and Northern Nevada. Dr. 
Verska is a spine surgeon who practices medicine in Boise, primarily through an entity 
known as the Spine Institute of Idaho ("SII"), which represents to the public that it is "a 
comprehensive spine care facility offering a full range of diagnostic and treatment services 
for back pam and spinal disorders." See http://www.spineidaho.com/ 
AboutUs/ComprehensiveCare.aspx. Dr. Verska at one time possessed Medical Staff 
membership and certain clinical privileges at Saint Alphonsus, Saint Luke's Regional 
Medical Center, and Treasure Valley Hospital. He no longer has Medical Staff 
membership or privileges at Saint Alphonsus or Saint Luke's.1 In Plaintiffs' Memorandum 
Dr. Verska suggests he and SII are the victims of a "conspiracy" to destroy Dr. Verska's 
practice. The allegations are unfounded and are not even logical; for example, Dr. Fox is 
an anesthesiologist engaged exclusively at Saint Alphonsus who would actually benefit 
financially from Dr. Verska and other surgeons performing more surgeries at Saint 
Alphonsus, because he would have more patients for whom to care. 
Pursuant to its statutory obligation to conduct peer review and consistent with its 
medical staff bylaws, Saint Alphonsus commenced a focused peer review of Dr. Verska's 
practice in 2004. (Complaint, ~ 10.) This peer review process was thorough, exhaustive, 
and consistent with the Medical Staff Bylaws. It required countless hours of the voluntary 
Medical Staff leadership and appointed committees to review voluminous medical 
I Although his partner at SIl, Dr. Jorgenson, appears as a provider on St. Luke's website, Dr. Verska does 
not. 
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infonnation concerning his competence to provide care. Dr. Verska was afforded every 
opportunity provided in the Bylaws to participate and challenge the recommended actions 
of the Medical Staff in this process. 
While there is a long history of events relevant to the evaluation of Dr. Verska's 
clinical competence and practice, Defendants will necessarily focus on Saint Alphonsus' 
peer review process itself. Saint Alphonsus does not wish to waive the peer review 
privilege and in order too avoid any suggestion that the peer review privilege has been 
waived by Defendants, Defendants will confine their description of the process to matters 
alleged by Dr. Verska in his Complaint, Motion to Compel, and Plaintiffs' Memorandum. 
Specifically, the Saint Alphonsus Medical Executive Committee (the "MEC") 
commissioned a committee to review certain issues in 2005, (Complaint, ~ 10), and in 
2006, the MEC accepted certain recommendations but requested a further chart review. 
(PlaintitTs' Memorandum at 6-7.) Based on additional infonnation received, the Saint 
Alphonsus Board of Trustees requested further review, and a second ad hoc committee was 
appointed. (Complaint, ~~ 19-20; Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 8.) This committee made 
certain recommendations to the MEC in June 2008, (Complaint, ~ 28); those 
recommendations were modified by the MEC. (Complaint, ~ 30; Plaintiffs' Memorandum 
at 13-14.) As was his right, Dr. Verska demanded a hearing. (Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 
15.) The hearing panel's recommendations were presented to the MEC, which considered 
them and made a recommendation. (Complaint, ~ 40.) Dr. Verska once again sought 
review of the MEC's decision. 
The Saint Alphonsus Appellate Review Panel and, ultimately, its Board of 
Trustees, reviewed the matter and affirmed the decision of the MEC. (Complaint ~ 42; 
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Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 19.) The reasons for this decision are set forth in detail in Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center Board of Trustees Decision in the Matter of Physician 
958 ("Board Decision"V At the conclusion of the peer review process, Saint Alphonsus 
conditioned Dr. Verska's privileges at Saint Alphonsus on successful completion of a one-
year spine fellowship program. (Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 14.) Dr. Verska did not seek 
a fellowship, but instead brought this action against Saint Alphonsus, Dr. Fox (the former 
chair of the MEC), and another surgeon, Dr. Zimmerman. 
Faced with a dearth of evidence that the participants in the peer review decisions 
did anything other than exercise his or her best professional judgment, Plaintiffs served 
discovery requests on Saint Alphonsus, including interrogatories, requests for production, 
and requests for admissions, seeking detailed information about the peer review process. 
Candidly, Plaintiffs' effectively admit they cannot prove their case without the requested 
privileged peer review materials. (PlaintitTs' Memorandum at 19.) Saint Alphonsus 
objected to the discovery on the grounds that peer review proceedings are privileged under 
Section 39-1392b, and that the participants are immune for actions taken in the process 
pursuant to Section 39-1392c. Plaintiffs move to compel production of the requested 
information, asking the Court to rule that Idaho's peer review statutes do not apply to this 
litigation. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Peer Review Records and Activity Are Privileged and Confidential 
Under Idaho Law. 
The language in the peer review statutes is plain and unambiguous. Plaintiffs 
2 The Board Decision provides a comprehensive explanation of the findings of the peer review process, 
which Dr. Verska has omitted from his submission to this Court. Consistent with its position on the parties' 
pending motions, Defendants have not provided the Board Decision to Court to protect the privilege and 
confidentiality nature of its contents. 
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attempt to avoid discussing the plain meamng of the statutes in favor of selective 
arguments concerning the alleged "intent" and "legislative history" of the peer review 
provisions. (Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 20-23.) Plaintiffs argue the purpose of the peer 
review privilege is not to promote full and candid credentialing processes to improve the 
quality of care provided to the public, but is instead solely to protect practitioners from 
"liability in a malpractice action." (Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 21 Y Dr. Verska's 
argument that he is entitled to peer review materials while an injured patient is not is not 
only contrary to the plain statutory language, but reveals Dr. Verska's view that the law 
holds a physician's financial interest as more important than those of an individual who is 
seeking compensation for malpractice. Such is not the case. 
Plaintiffs' arguments do not help their cause: "If [a] statue is not ambiguous, th[e] 
Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written." McLean v. Maverick 
Country Stores, Inc., 135 P.3d 756,759 (Idaho 2006); see also Murphy v. Wood, 667 P.2d 
859 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983). While it is, of course, true that peer review privilege and 
immunity apply to certain third-party claims, by law, peer review materials are not 
discoverable or admissible in "any action of any kind in any court ... for any purpose 
whatsoever," Idaho Code § 39-1392b, save for the narrow statutory exceptions in Section 
39-1392e. Plaintiffs' attempt to dilute this protection is baseless. Even the sources cited in 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum state that the privilege is designed to "encourage the free 
exchange of information in such proceedings by granting civil immunity to persons 
providing information or opinions to such review and study committees." H.B. 136, 
Statement of Purpose, 1973 Leg., Sess. (Idaho 1973) (quoted at page 21 of Plaintiffs' 
3 Plaintiff appears to ignore the express exception for personal injury claims found in Idaho Code § 39-
J392e). 
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Memorandum); Murphy, 667 P.2d at 863 (purpose is to improve care by encouraging a 
free flow of information) (quoted at page 22 of Plaintiffs' Memorandum). Indeed, a full 
reading of the legislative history of Title 39 confirms that the purpose of protecting peer 
review processes is to foster an effective process which will improve the quality of care, 
not simply to protect practitioners from liability as Plaintiffs myopically argue. E.g., 2004 
S. Health & Welfare Comm. Minutes, S.B. 1320, 57th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2004) 
(,'Records used in peer review are confidential and privileged and generally are not subject 
to subpoena or discovery. This confidentiality allows open and honest communication 
which is critical for the peer review process to work."). 
In enacting and implementing a broad peer review privilege, Idaho is promoting the 
same public policy considerations that are well recognized by courts and commentators, 
including the policy goal of promoting candor and willing participation by qualified, busy 
physicians in the often uncomfortable, time-consuming, and voluntary process of 
evaluating a peer, for the overall good of reducing morbidity and mortality and improving 
the quality of care to the community. See, e.g., Vranos v. Franklin Med. Ctr., 862 N.E.2d 
11, 18 (Mass. 2007) ("We have recognized that the intent of these confidentiality 
provisions is '[t]o "promote candor and confidentiality" in the peer review process ... and to 
"foster aggressive critiquing of medical care by the provider's peers" , " (citation 
omitted); Claypool v. Mladineo, 724 So. 2d 373, 383 (Miss. 1998) (explaining peer 
review privilege statutes provide the confidentiality necessary "to pelmit quality assurance 
control and review of activities in a hospital"); Coburn v. Seda, 677 P.2d 173, 178 (Wash. 
1984) (explaining peer review privilege statutes "prohibit discovery of records on the 
theory that external access to committee investigations stifles candor and inhibits 
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constructive criticism thought necessary to effective quality review"); Donnell v. HCA 
Health Servs., 28 P.3d 420, 432 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining purpose of state peer 
review immunity statute is to "encourage hospitals to actively engage in peer review of 
staff physicians" (quoting Lemuz v. Fieser, 933 P.2d 134,144 (Kan. 1997)); see generally 
Ronald G. Spaeth, Kelley C. Pickering, & Shannon M. Web, Quality Assurance & 
Hospital Structure: How the Physician-Hospital Relationship Ajjects Quality Measures 12 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 235, 240-43 (2003); Susan O. Scheutzow & Sylvia Lynn Gillis, 
Confidentiality & Privilege of Peer Review Information: More Imagined than Real 7 J.L. 
& HEALTH 169, 169-76 (1992-1993) ("The fear of becoming embroiled in lawsuits as a 
result of candid discussion within the peer review process is recognized as a deterrent to 
effective peer review."); see also 40A AM. JUR. 2D Peer review; privilege and immunity 
§ 23 (2008); Alissa Marie Bassler, Comment, Federal Law Should Keep Pace with States 
and Recognize a Medical Peer Review Privilege 39 IDAHO L. REV. 689 (2002-2003). 
The relevant considerations are perhaps best summarized by the Arizona Court of 
Appeals in Yuma Regional Medical Center v. Superior Court, 852 P.2d 1256 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1993), a case in which the Court refused to allow an interrogatory asking for nothing 
more than the identity of persons present at a peer review proceeding. That court observed: 
Important policy considerations underlie the protection 
afforded by the peer review privilege. The legislature has 
mandated that peer reviews be conducted "for the purposes 
of reducing morbidity and mortality and for the improvement 
of the care of patients .... " A.R.S. § 36-445. However, 
doctors are somewhat reluctant to engage in peer review. 
Review by one's peers within a hospital is 
not only time consuming, unpaid work, it is 
also likely to generate bad feelings and 
result in unpopularity .... 
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Consequently, these reviews will effectively terminate if 
they are subject to unlimited discovery processes. 
Yuma Regional Medical Center, 852 P.2d at1259 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
If the physicians who participate in peer review proceedings (such as Dr. Fox, who 
has been sued by Dr. Verska in this very litigation for serving on Saint Alphonsus's 
Medical Executive Committee) are subject to subpoena, document discovery, deposition, 
and the looming threat of suit, they will be unwilling to engage in the very activities the 
statutory scheme is designed to promote and the purposes sought to be achieved by Idaho 
Code will be obliterated. The privilege is "intended to prohibit the chilling effect of the 
potential public disclosure of statements made to or information prepared for and used by 
the committee in carrying out its peer review function." Claypool, 724 So. 2d at 383 
(quoting Cruger v. Love, 599 So. 2d 111,114-15 (Fla. 1992». The potential chilling effect 
of Dr. Verska's litigation strategy is precisely the reason he is not permitted to obtain Saint 
Alphonsus's peer review files, and is not allowed to eviscerate the privilege by deposing 
and otherwise harassing witnesses who contributed their valuable time and energies to the 
process to improve the quality of the region's healthcare. For good reason, Idaho's peer 
review statutes apply to this case, and those statutes should be enforced as written. 
B. Dr. Verska's Asserted "Need" for Expansive Discovery of Peer Review 
Materials Is Not Grounds for Eviscerating the Privilege. 
In Plaintiffs' Memorandum, Dr. Verska provides a bulleted discovery "wish list" 
and argues that he needs peer review materials because expansive discovery of such 
information is the only way he can "know all the facts." (Plaintiffs' Memorandum at 23.) 
Without exception, the requested discovery seeks peer review records and related 
information that are expressly protected from discovery by Section 39-1392b. 
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Although the temptation for Defendants to waive the peer review privilege and 
debunk Dr. Verska's conspiracy theories and other allegations is great - and although the 
legislature has given Saint Alphonsus license to use peer review information in its own 
defense if it so chooses (see Section 39-1392e(f) - doing so would subject the medical 
stafT at Saint Alphonsus to the very sort of discovery and recrimination from which they 
are meant to be insulated by Section 39-1392b. For the policy reasons articulated above, 
Saint Alphonsus will not, for the sake of expediency, do this to the individuals who have 
participated in the "time consuming, unpaid work" involved in peer review. The residual 
etTect of this action would be to erode the quality of care Saint Alphonsus ofTers. 
A desire to "know all of the facts" is not an exception to a privilege; if it were, the 
"exception" would swallow the rule whole. By definition privileges apply to bar the 
discovery and use of potentially relevant information. Privileges are justified by a "public 
good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for 
ascertaining truth." Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1,9 (1996) (quoting Trammel v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980». Again, peer review privilege statutes are intended "to 
promote the public health, safety and welfare and to provide for basic standards of care and 
treatment of hospital patients." Claypool, 724 So. 2d at 383 (quoting Shelton v. !vforehead 
Mem'l HOJp., 347 S.E.2d 824, 828 (N .C. 1986». This important public policy outweighs 
an individual physician's need to find the supposed "truth" concerning his personal 
financial affairs, and it bars the discovery sought by Dr. Verska in this case. See Vranos, 
862 N .E.2d at 18 ("[T]he interests of the general public in quality health care are elevated 
over the interest of individual health care providers in unfettered access to information 
about peer review of their actions."). 
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL AND CROSS-MOTION FOR PROTEC@)OO 118 
ORDER AND ORDER STRIKING PEER REVIEW RECORDS - 12 
760483 
C. Idaho's Peer Review Statutes Are "Limited" Only to the Extent of the 
Limitations Established by the Legislature. 
At page 26 of their Memorandum, Plaintiffs argue that "[ c ]ourts in Idaho, as well 
as other jurisdictions, permit the discovery of information and materials from a 
credentialinglreappointment challenge." The majority of the argument at pages 26 to 32 is 
directed to interpretation of the decision in Harrison v. Binnion, 214 P.3d 631 (Idaho 
2009), with a limited of cases from other jurisdictions. 
As has been stated herein, the peer review privilege is a creature of statute in Idaho. 
The statutes at issue are plain and unambiguous, and do not allow for "creative 
interpretations" or "public policy exceptions" that are directed to advancing Dr. Verska's 
personal fInancial interests. By definition, the privilege applies to the review of Dr. Verska 
and any resulting limitations on his ability to practice at Saint Alphonsus, and the privilege 
precludes the discovery sought by Plaintiffs in their motion. 
Harrison v. Binnion is inapposite. It is not a case about the peer review privilege, 
or what discovery is and is not proper under Section 39-1392b - which are the issues 
presented by Plaintiffs' Motion. Saint Alphonsus disagrees with PlaintitTs' reading of 
Harrison, which is a case in which an injured patient was seeking leave to sue Saint 
Alphonsus for allowing a physician to practice at the hospital (the very fate that Saint 
Alphonsus seeks to head off with respect to Dr. Verska), not a challenge to the peer review 
process itself. See Harrison, 214 P.3d at 633-34. The peer review privilege is not even 
mentioned in Harrison (except in the dissent to acknowledge the "confIdentiality of peer 
review materials," see Harrison, 214 P.3d at 645 (Horton, J., dissenting in part)), and the 
decision does not support a common law exception to the statutory privilege against the 
discovery sought by Plaintiffs. 
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Similarly, the summary judgment ruling dismissing a claim almost identical to Dr. 
Verska's in Laurino v. Syringa General Hospital, No. 98-0439-S-EJL (D. Idaho 2005) 
says nothing whatsoever about the privilege. By law, a hospital such as Syringa is free to 
use peer review materials to defend itself against a practitioner's claim. Idaho Code § 39 -
1392e(f). Defendants do not know how or why the materials referenced in the Laurino 
order were obtained or considered, but there is no suggestion Judge Lodge was asked to 
interpret or enforce Section 39-1392b. The conclusions Plaintiffs seek to draw from the 
Laurino order cannot be found in the case. 
The Seventh Circuit case Plaintiffs cite, lvfemorial Ho!'>pital v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 
1058 (7th Cir. 1981), applying federal law to a federal antitrust claim, is simply a non 
sequitur; there is, and can be, no argument that federal privilege law applies here. 
Contrary to the heading preceding Plaintiffs' argument, nothing in the cited cases 
"recognizes the limited nature" ofldaho's peer review privilege. 
D. Plaintiffs' "Public Policy" Arguments Are, in the End, Irrelevant and 
Best Directed to the Legislature. 
In a final section of tripartite argument (at pages 32 through 37), PlaintitTs argue 
that "public policy" demands this Court disregard the peer review privilege. They argue 
that a privilege against discovery of peer review materials will result in "absolute 
immunity," that a number of other states have enacted exceptions for physician challenges 
to credentialing decisions, and that federal law does not provide a comparable privilege. 
These policy arguments have no merit and do not change Idaho law. 
First, the statutory limitation on discovery does not establish "absolute immunity." 
The law establishes a privilege, but limited judicial review of a credentialing decision is 
available in an appropriate case under the principles announced by the Idaho Supreme 
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Court in Miller v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 87 P.3d 934 (Idaho 2004), 
which provides for a determination of whether the peer review process afforded due 
process to the practitioner. Mille, 87 P.3d at 834-35. Here, there is no dispute that Dr. 
Verska (with the benefit of counsel) had the opportunity to present evidence and arguments 
at a full hearing; Plaintiffs disagree with the ultimate decision, but they fully availed 
themselves of the process to challenge the recommendations of the Medical Staff in the 
process. Plaintiffs are not confronting "absolute immunity," only a claim that fails under 
Miller and Laurino. 
Second, statutory exceptions enacted by other states do not apply to an Idaho 
proceeding brought by Idaho plaintiffs against Idaho defendants applying Idaho law. 
Without discussing the nuances of the laws in the 17 states that have allegedly enacted 
exceptions, Idaho is not one of them, nor are the other 32 states that are not discussed by 
PlaintifTs. If anything, the existence of specific exceptions under Section 39-1392e, 
coupled with the absence of the exception advocated by Dr. Verska, defeats the arguments 
being made to this Court. See Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Miller, 424 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.3 
(11 th Cir. 2005) ("[W]here the legislature has included certain exceptions to the [general 
rule], the doctrine of expressio unis est e exclusio allerius counsels against judicial 
recognition of additional exceptions."). 
Third, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.s.C. § 11101 
("HCQIA") provides qualified immunity to persons and entities who participate in 
professional review activities, but the fact that Congress did not provide an additional 
privilege does not vitiate the Idaho privilege. "HCQIA allows individual states to provide 
even further protection to medical peer review activities." Roe v. Walls Reg 'I H05p., Inc., 
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21 S.W.3d 647,652 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (applying state qualified immunity law and peer 
review privilege statute, barring discovery of "records and proceedings of a medical peer 
review committee," in a physician's defamation and negligence lawsuit against a hospital); 
see also Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 106 n.S (198S) ("The Act expressly provides that it 
does not change other 'immunities under law,' § 11115(a), including the state-action 
immunity, thus allowing States to immunize peer-review action that does not meet the 
federal standard."); 40A AM. JUR. 20 Peer revie'w; privilege and immunity § 24 (200S) 
("The immunity provisions of the HCQIA are not intended to preempt any state laws 
providing greater protection."). 
Ultimately, Plaintiffs simply want Idaho law to be different than it is. Section 39-
1392b of Idaho Code provides broad protection to peer review proceedings by barring 
discovery and excluding evidence. These protections foster candor and assist hospitals in 
securing the grudging participation of physicians that is critical to "enforcing and 
improving the standards of medical practice in the state of Idaho," Section 39-1392, which 
is the ultimate goal of peer review. Defendants have raised proper objections, the peer 
review laws should be enforced, and Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel should accordingly be 
denied. 
IV. DEFENDANTS' CROSS MOTIONS 
A. Defendants Are Entitled to a Protective Order Establishing the Peer 
Review Privilege Applies in Plaintiffs' Challenge to the Verska Peer 
Review Proceedings, and the Defendants and Other Third Parties Who 
Are Subject to Deposition and Other Discovery Need Not Disclose 
Privileged Peer Review Information. 
Given that the written discovery propounded upon Saint Alphonsus is only the first 
volley of discovery in this case, and that Plaintiffs have announced their intention to 
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depose an unknown number of individuals with knowledge of the review process, 
Defendants request a protective order that provides that Section 39-1392b means what it 
says, and that Plaintiffs are not entitled to inquire into "peer review records," or any 
"testimony relating thereto." Idaho Code § 39-1392b. See Idaho R. of Civ. P. 26(c) 
(where appropriate, a court can enter a protective order "that certain matters not be 
inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters"); Frost v. 
Hofmeister, 97 Idaho 757, 762 (1976) (discussing protective order barring deposition 
questions concerning grand jury testimony). The relief is necessary and appropriate, and 
flows directly from denial of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel. A proposed order is submitted 
herewith for the Court's consideration. 
B. The Court Should Strike the Portions of Plaintiffs' Submissions that 
Are "Peer Review Records" as that Term is Defined in Section 39-
1392a of the Idaho Code. 
As discussed above, "peer review records" are defined as "all evidence of 
interviews, reports, statements, minutes, memoranda, notes, investigative graphs and 
compilations and the contents thereof, and all physical materials relating to peer review of 
any health care organization." Idaho Code § 39-1392a(12). Peer review records "shall 
not be directly or indirectly ... admitted as evidence ... in any action of any kind." Idaho 
Code § 39-1392b. 
Here, in an effort to bootstrap an exception to this statutory peer review privilege, 
PlaintitIs have filed peer review records which are inadmissible. Pursuant to Section 39-
1392b, they should be stricken from the record. Specifically, Defendants object to, and 
request that the Court strike, the following peer review records: 
• Portions of Exhibit A to the Powers Declaration, specifically Saint 
Alphonsus's responses to Requests for Admission Nos. 3, 4, 14, 
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15, 16,26,27,28,29,30,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42, 
43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57, 58, 59,60, 
61,62,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77, 78, 79, 
80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,94, 95,96,97, 
98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,106,107,108,109 and 110; 
• Exhibit D to the Powers Declaration, the 2005 Greeley Report; 
• Exhibit E to the Powers Declaration, the Ad Hoc Committee 
Findings, Recommendations and Conclusions of October 24,2005; 
• Exhibit F to the Powers Declaration, the February 12, 2007 letter 
from Dr. McMartin to Dr. Verska; 
• Exhibit G to the Powers Declaration, the July 9, 2007 letter from 
Ms. Bruce to Dr. Verska; 
• Exhibit H to the Powers Declaration, the 2007 Greeley Report; 
• Exhibit I to the Powers Declaration, the December 9, 2007 letter 
from Dr. Fox to Dr. Verska; 
• Exhibit J to the Powers Declaration, an unsigned February 24, 
2008 letter from Dr. Verska to Dr. McMartin; 
• Exhibit K to the Powers Declaration, a March 14, 2008 letter from 
Dr. Fox to Dr. Verska; 
• Exhibit L to the Powers Declaration, Meeting Notes of the Ad Hoc 
Committee Commissioned to Investigate Dr. 958; 
• Exhibit M to the Powers Declaration, Ad Hoc Committee 
Commissioned to Investigate Dr. 958: Summary and 
Recommendations; 
• Exhibit N to the Powers Declaration, a June 25, 20008 letter from 
Dr. Fox to Ms. Bruce; 
• Exhibit 0 to the Powers Declaration, a June 25, 2008 letter from 
Ms. Bruce to Dr. Verska; 
• Exhibit P to the Powers Declaration, a September 30, 2008 letter 
from Mr. Miller to Mr. Powers; 
• Exhibit Q to the Powers Declaration, excerpts of "Fair Hearing 
Testimony; " 
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• Exhibit R to the Powers Declaration, Fair Hearing Panel 
Recommendation; and, 
• Exhibit S to the Powers Declaration, December 9,2008 Minutes of 
Medical Executive Committee. 
All of the foregoing selectively chosen exhibits fall squarely within the definition 
of "peer review records," Section 39-1392a(12), and the Court should immediately order 
them stricken and removed from the court files. In addition, the Court should strike the 
"Background Information" presented by Plaintiffs at pages 4 to 20 of their Memorandum. 
Not only are peer review records confidential and privileged, but so is "testimony relating 
thereto." Idaho Code § 39-1392b. At a minimum, the Court should place those portions of 
the motion under seal to preserve the confidentiality of the peer review process. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs unapologetically state their demands: They want discovery to which they 
are not entitled, and they want to use peer review records that are inadmissible as a matter 
of law. For the foregoing reasons, defendants Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 
Dr. Donald Fox, and Dr. Christian Zimmerman respectfully request the Court deny 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel, and enter orders properly implementing Title 39, Chapter 13 
of the Idaho Statutes governing peer review. 
DATED this 20th day of January, 2010. 
Robert B. White 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 20th day of January, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL AND 
CROSS-MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND ORDER STRIKING PEER REVIEW 
RECORDS, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Raymond D. Powers 
Powers Tolman, PLLC 
345 Bobwhite Court, Ste #150 
P.O. Box 9756 
Boise, 1D 83707 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
_ Hand Delivery 
L Facsimile (208) 577-5101 
_ Overnight Courier 
U.S. Mail 
Robert B. White 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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Raymond D. Powers 
ISB #2737; rdp@powerstoiman.com 
Portia L. Rauer 
ISB #7233; pir@powerstolman.com 
POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC 
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 150 
Post Office Box 9756 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 577-5100 
Facsimile: (208) 577-5101 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE 
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. 
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD 
FOX,M.D., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0911804 
REPL Y IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
COMPEL AND RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTIONS 
FOR (i) PROTECTIVE ORDER ON 
PEER REVIEW, AND (ii) ORDER 
STRIKING PRIVILEGED PEER 
REVIEW RECORDS 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE SPINE INSTITUTE OF 
IDAHO (Dr. Verska), by and through their attorneys of record, POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC, and 
submit this reply in support of their Motion to Compel Production of Information Related to 
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SARMC's Wrongful Denial of Dr. Verska's Reappointment, as well their response to 
Defendants' Cross-Motions for (i) Protective Order on Peer Review and (ii) Order Striking 
Privileged Peer Review Records. 
INTRODUCTION 
Dr. Verska moved this Court for an order that 1) the peer review privilege in Idaho Code 
§ 39-1392b is inapplicable to the instant action, 2) the immunity in Idaho Code Section 39-1392c 
is inapplicable, 3) prohibits SARMC from raising peer review and immunity objections in future 
discovery, and 4) compels SARMC to produce the information requested in Dr. Verska's 
interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admission. Defendants argue that the 
peer review statutes are unambiguous and applicable in this case. However, when the statutes 
are read as a whole and in conjunction with the legislative purpose, it is clear that the legislature 
did not intend to keep a physician from discovering information related to challenging 
privileging decisions. Furthermore, Defendants' own Bylaws and MSPP provide for the 
disclosure of the peer review information upon consent by the physician. 
Contrary to Defendants' assertions, discovery of the information sought by Dr. Verska 
will not have a "chilling effect" on peer review activities, nor will it be a disincentive for 
members of the medical staff to serve on the various hospital committees - assuming that the 
peer review activities were conducted in good faith by those so serving. What discovery wi1l 
chill, however, is bad faith conduct by Defendants. 
Information surrounding the wrongful denial of a physician's privileges is exactly the 
type of information that must be discoverable so that a physician who has been wronged will 
have access to justice. Dr. Verska's motion to compel must be granted so that the Defendants 
will be held accountable for their wrongful conduct. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. THE PEER REVIEW STATUTES ARE INAPPLICABLE GIVEN THE 
LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE AND PUBLIC POLICY UNDERLYING THE 
STATUTES. 
"The words of a statute should be gIven their plain meanmg, unless a contrary 
legislative purpose is expressed or the plain meaning creates an absurd result." Doe v. Boy 
Scouts of America, Nos. 35639 and 35681, 2009 WL 5101498 (Idaho, Dec. 29, 2009) (emphasis 
added). "If the words of the statute are subject to more than one meaning, it is ambiguous and 
the statute must be construed to mean what the legislature intended it to mean." Id. To 
determine that intent, not only the literal words of the statute, but the reasonableness of the 
proposed construction, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history must be 
examined. Id. 
To the extent the language of the peer review statutes are subject to differing 
interpretations, the statutes are ambiguous and the Court must look to the legislative purpose, 
intent and history, the reasonableness of the proposed construction, the public policy, and 
whether an absurd result is created when only the plain meaning of the words is considered. 
1. Legislative Purpose, Intent, and History. 
The statement of purpose from the original 1973 legislation contains compelling 
language to support Dr. Verska's position that the peer review statutes are inapplicable: 
It is essential to the preservation of optimum medical care that the 
medical profession within Idaho be free to review patient care and 
to constantly enforce and improve the standards of medical 
practice within the state. Such intraprofessional action and review 
is inhibited and discouraged by present law, however, because of 
the lack of privilege for any proceedings or records which may be 
developed and the threat that such materials may be obtained by 
third parties, perhaps misinterpreted and used in litigation, 
against the practitioner. 
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This bill would impose a confidential and privileged status upon 
certain reports, records and other materials developed by in-
hospital medical staff committees, medical society committees and 
other approved entities concerned with research, discipline and 
medical study. It would also encourage the free exchange of 
information in such proceedings by granting civil immunity to 
persons providing information or opinions to such review and 
study committees. Access to and court room use of individual 
patients' records would not be affected. 
House Bill 136 Statement of Purpose/ Fiscal Note (1973 Legislative Session) (emphasis added). 
As much as Defendants would like to pretend the statement of purpose does not exist, it 
is essential for interpreting the breadth of the peer review statutes. There is no mistake that the 
statement of purpose specifically identifies the need for the protection to avoid the threat that 
peer review materials could be used by third parties against the practitioner. The statement of 
purpose is silent on protecting peer review materials in litigation when it is the practitioner who 
seeks to use the materials in litigation against a hospital to challenge a privileging decision. Had 
the legislature intended that the peer review materials would be protected from discovery in 
cases such as Dr. Verska's it would have been included in the statement of purpose. 
Defendants would also like to ignore the purpose of the 1997 amendment to Idaho Code 
Section 39-1392 et seq. The purpose of the bill amending the statutes was summarized in a 
handout. See Senate Bill No. 1115. The following italicized language reiterates the legislature's 
intent that the purpose of providing such protection was to prevent peer review related 
infOlmation from being used against a physician in a malpractice action: 
This information is intended to help physicians improve, but 
could also be used to discredit a physician in a malpractice suit. 
Unless the information collected on physicians and the opinions 
they render about their peers is protected from discovery, 
physicians will refuse to participate in quality assurance programs. 
Without quality assurance programs, health care quality will suffer. 
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ld. (Emphasis added). The italicized sentence modifies the sentences that follow. The fact that 
the legislature included the modifying sentence is proof that the infonnation that comes after the 
modifying sentence must be interpreted in relationship to the preceding sentence. Therefore, 
information collected on physicians and the opinions they render about their peers is protected 
from discovery in malpractice suits. The legislature chose to reiterate the original statement of 
purpose when it included the italicized language in the amendment. Again, there is no language 
suggesting that the peer review materials in a wrongful denial of reappointment case will be 
protected from discovery. 
The language of 39-1392b and 39-1392c cannot be read in a vacuum, without considering 
the legislative intent and history. It is the legislative intent and history that provides the 
necessary context to interpret and apply the language of the statutes. From the language quoted 
above, the peer review statutes were not intended to apply to actions brought by a physician 
challenging the denial of hislher reappointment to expose wrongful conduct by a hospital. 
Several of the cases cited by Defendants are medical malpractice cases. As expected, the 
rationale and analysis of the courts in Yuma Medical Center, Coburn, and Claypool support 
finding peer review protection since those cases were brought by third parties seeking 
information from the peer review process related to their medical malpractice claims. Yuma 
Medical Center v. Superior Court, 852 P.2d 1256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Coburn v. Seda, 677 
P.2d 173 (Wash. 1984»; Claypool v. Mladineo, 724 S.2d 373 (Miss. 1998). Because the 
holdings in these cases are medical malpractices actions, the cases are distinguishable on the 
facts and have little value this instance. 
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2. Reasonableness of the Proposed Construction; Absurd Result. 
The construction of the peer review statutes proposed by Defendants is unreasonable and 
would create an absurd result. To follow Defendants' logic would result in absolute immunity 
for the Defendants whereby there would never be an instance of accountability. In their 
responsive memorandum, Defendants do not address how it is that a physician can challenge the 
wrongful conduct of a hospital without access to relevant information in possession of the 
hospital. To find that the peer review statutes protect the kind of information Dr. Verska is 
seeking would make the Defendants untouchable and above the law. There is no proof 
whatsoever that the legislature intended the peer review statutes to empower and protect the 
hospital to such an extreme degree. Absolute immunity is an extreme protection and had the 
legislature intended for it to be part of the peer review statutes, it surely would have made 
mention of it. Defendants' interpretation of the statutes creates an absurd result that should not 
be condoned by this Court. 
Defendants contend that absolute immunity is not created by invoking the peer review 
statutes because of the limited judicial review of credentialing decisions set forth in Miller v. St. 
Alphol1SUS Reg'l Med. etr. 87 P.3d 934 (Idaho 2004) (addressing whether due process was 
afforded). Defendants go on to claim that Dr. Verska was afforded the due process available to 
him, implying somehow that there is no absolute immunity issue. The Miller case is factually 
distinct from the present case because it involved the initial credentialing of a new physician to 
the hospital and implicates different sections of the SARMC's Bylaws and MSPP. Furthermore, 
contrary to Defendants' claim, Dr. Verska was not afforded the due process to which he was 
entitled because he was denied reappointment without a fair hearing before his privileges were 
adversely affected. Absolute immunity is created in this case if the peer review statutes are 
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allowed to shield the Defendants because the very information needed to expose Defendants' 
wrongful conduct will never be seen. 
Dr. Verska has not argued that the peer review statutes are inapplicable in every situation. 
Clearly, there is a need for peer review protection when third parties are attempting to use 
information against a physician. Dr. Verska's case is very different and his interpretation of the 
peer review statutes is reasonable given the facts and circumstances surrounding his particular 
case. It is entirely reasonable for a physician to have access to the information relative to 
decisions that directly and adversely impact the physician. There is no third party involved who 
is attempting to penetrate the privilege from the outside. The privilege should not be used to 
deny a physician challenging the peer review process from discovering his own privileging 
information. 
The information Dr. Verska is seeking is information about him. It is reasonable that he 
should be allowed access to this type of information. 
3. Public Policy Supports Compelling Defendants to Produce the Information. 
The public policy surrounding disclosure of the information sought by Dr. Verska is 
important to consider. As argued above, the absurd result of absolute immunity would be 
created if the Defendants are allowed to hide behind the peer review statutes and shield their 
improper motivations and ill will. Such a result invites corruption and wrongful conduct. If the 
hospital is not held accountable for its actions, then it can eliminate physicians from practicing at 
SARMC by simply claiming that its actions are protected by the peer review statutes and are 
never subject to scrutiny by anyone. Public policy does not support corruption and hiding 
wrongful conduct. Public policy does not support cutting off a person's access to justice and 
allowing an institution to be the judge, jury and executioner without some kind of accountability 
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or oversight. The public has a right to every man's evidence and that must include Defendants' 
evidence in this case. 
Defendants have offered no proof that the public policy goals of encouraging the free 
exchange of information and improving the quality of care will suffer if the statutes are found to 
be inapplicable. None of the committee members directly and actively involved in the review of 
Dr. Verska are named parties. The very physicians who have served on the peer review 
committees could be the next physicians to have their privileges adversely affected through 
SARMC's wrongful conduct. Every member of the medical staff has a vested interest in this 
Court finding that the peer review statutes are inapplicable when it is the physician who is 
challenging a privileging decision. Allowing for discovery of privileging information will likely 
improve the exchange of information because those serving on the committees and providing the 
information will be more careful and thorough. The quality of care at SARMC could actually 
improve if Defendants no longer had the protection of the peer review statutes in privileging 
matters. It is possible that members of the medical staff will be more at ease and more willing to 
participate, which will improve patient care, if they knew there was a deterrent in place to act as 
a check on Defendants' conduct. 
Throughout their briefing, Defendants have argued that Dr. Verska's financial position or 
personal financial interests should not outweigh public policy. To be clear, Dr. Verska brought 
this suit against Defendants for their wrongful conduct and to expose their bad faith, improper 
motives, and ill will towards him. This is not a medical malpractice action. Dr. Verska has been 
damaged and is entitled to a remedy for those damages. Public policy is not advanced by 
disparaging Dr. Verska for claiming a remedy for his damages, nor is public policy advanced by 
permitting Defendants to hide their wrongful conduct. 
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Evaluating the legislative purpose, the reasonableness of the interpretation, and the public 
policy leads to the conclusion that the peer review statutes are inapplicable in this case. 
B. THE PEER REVIEW STATUTES, WHEN READ AS A WHOLE, DO NOT 
APPL Y IN ACTIONS BY PHYSICIANS WHO CHALLENGE THE PEER 
REVIEW PROCESS ITSELF. 
Idaho Code Section 39-1392b identifies the types of documents that are covered by the 
peer review privilege, but does not distinguish who is entitled to assert the privilege. Rather, it 
focuses upon the type of evidence that can be excluded from discovery. Companion subsections 
show, however, that the physician who is the subject of the peer review can waive the peer 
review privilege either by consent or by placing the peer review process at issue. 
Idaho Code Section 39-1392e( d) provides for disclosure of peer review information if the 
investigated physician consents. In the context of a medical malpractice action where the 
claimant or patient is requesting peer review information beyond that allowed by the statute, 
section 39-1392e(d) states that "disclosures may be voluntarily made '" if all disciplined, 
accused or investigated physicians ... consent thereto .... " The language of this subsection is 
similar to the language from SARMC's own Bylaws, which also provides an avenue for the 
physician to consent to disclosure of otherwise protected peer review information. J 
J Article VII of the SARMC Medical Staff Bylaws expressly pennits a medical staff member to consent to disclosure 
of his credentialing, peer review, corrective action, fair hearing, and appeal records. The relevant portion of the 
Bylaws is as follows: 
SECTION 3. CONFIDENTIALITY 
A. POLICY - Except as provided below, all written records of interviews, all 
reports, statements, minutes, memorandum, charts, and the contents thereof, and 
all physical materials relating to the process of an initial application for 
appointment, corrective action procedures, hearing and appeal procedures and 
the proceedings of all medical staff committees, will be confidential and no 
disclosure of such information will be made outside the context of the 
proceedings provided for in these Bylaws. Nothing herein will prevent limited 
disclosure of information deemed confidential hereunder in the following 
circumstances: 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL AND RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT~ 5 
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR (i) PROTECTIVE ORDER ON PEER REVIEW, AND (ii) ORDER STRIKINc1l 0013 
PRIVILEGED PEER REVIEW RECORDS - 9 
Idaho Code Section 39-1392e(f) provides that if a physician who is the subject of a peer 
review investigation brings suit on account of the investigation against the health care 
organization "then, in defense thereof, confidentiality and privilege shall be deemed waived by 
the making of such claim" and the health care organization shall be allowed to use protected 
infonnation "for the purpose of presenting proof of facts surrounding such matter." The impact 
of this particular subsection is to allow the hospital to use the peer review records in its defense 
on the assumption that the physician has not consented to the disclosure of unfavorable 
infonnation. 
Since Section 13-1392b is silent as to who may exercises the privilege or who may waive 
the privilege, it is reasonable to conclude Dr. Verska has the power to waive the privilege based 
on the language found in section 13-1392e. It is also reasonable to conclude that Dr. Verska has 
the power to waive the privilege since the privileging infonnation sought concerns him. And, 
just as the health care organization under Idaho Code Section 39-1392e(f) shall be allowed to 
present proof of facts surrounding a certain matters that would otherwise be privileged, it is 
reasonable to conclude that this Court would also be interested in allowing Dr. Verska to present 
proof of facts surrounding the matters that would otherwise be privileged. 
It is difficult to fathom that the legislature intended that the privileging statutes could be 
used as both a sword and a shield by a hospital. A hospital should not be allowed to use the 
2. Where the Medical Staff Member about whom the information 
pertains consents to the disclosure of such information and no 
privileged or confidential information regarding any other patient, 
physician or person will be disclosed thereby; 
(Emphasis added). SARMC Medical Staff Bylaws, Art. VII, Sec. 3. 
The records that Dr. Verska seeks through discovery are the same records described in the article and do not involve 
other patients, physicians or persons. 
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privilege statutes as a sword and permitted to waive the privilege to use information favorable to 
it in its defense, while at the same time using the privilege statutes as a shield against disclosure 
when the information to be disclosed is less than favorable and would benefit the other party. 
There is no logical reason to prohibit Dr. Verska from consenting to the disclosure of 
information that is directly related to the peer review process of which he was the subject. This 
is not a medical malpractice action where the patient is claiming that a physician is liable for 
personal injury damages as the result of negligent medical care and is seeking peer review 
information to prove his/her case against the physician or the hospital. Dr. Verska is the 
investigated physician. He consents to the disclosure of his own peer review infoffi1ation in an 
action where he is challenging the outcome of the peer review process that was conducted by 
SARMC, and where presentation of the proof of facts surrounding the matter are crucial in the 
search for truth. 
C. OTHER COURTS HAVE ALLOWED THE DISCOVERY OF PEER REVIEW 
INFORMATION. 
Other courts have specifically addressed the peer review statutes lI1 cases where 
physicians have challenged hospital decisions regarding staff privileges. In Hayes v. Mercy 
Health Corp., 739 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1999), Dr. Hayes challenged the hospital's suspension of his 
privileges. [d. at 115. In its decision allowing the discovery of peer review information, the 
court focused on the intent of the Pennsylvania statute which sought to keep peer review 
proceedings confidential. The statute states, in part, that peer review proceedings are to remain 
confidential "in any civil action ... arising out of the matters which are the subject of evaluation 
and review by such committee." [d. The court interpreted the language of the statute to mean 
that it was intended "to prevent the disclosure of peer review information to outside parties 
seeking to hold professional health care providers liable for negligence, while at the same time 
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ensuring •.• confidentiality did not operate to shield from discovery those rare instances in 
which the peer review process was misused." Id. at 118 (emphasis added). Furthennore, Dr. 
Hayes' challenge of the suspension did not arise out of the substantive issue of patient care. Id. 
at 117. The court recognized that peer review statutes were originally enacted to protect parties 
contributing to the peer review process from third parties alleging negligence via their 
participation. 
The Hayes court recognized that there were situations in which the confidentiality 
provision did not apply, especially where a protection is not expressly worded in the statute. The 
court recognized that the issues at stake were the fairness and integrity of the peer review 
proceedings and whether the plaintiff-physician was the victim of bad faith. 
A similar result was reached by the federal trial court in Oklahoma where it recognized 
that disclosure of peer review records is appropriate when a physician challenges a sham peer 
review process. In Cohlmia v. Ardent Health Services, LLC, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (N.D. Okla. 
2006), plaintiff alleged numerous state and federal claims. The defendants, in turn, filed a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and sought privilege and confidentiality protection 
under Oklahoma's peer review statutes. The district court observed that federal antitrust claims 
had been alleged and that exclusion of "relevant and possibly crucial evidence by application of 
the [peer review] privilege" ran against strong public policy. Id. at 1273. In finding the peer 
review privilege inapplicable, the court further noted that allowing discovery of the peer review 
materials was especially appropriate given the allegations of sham peer review proceedings. Id. 
Cohlmia recognizes, then, that peer review records are essential to a physician challenging a 
sham peer review process. 
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While Hayes and Collimia are not binding, they illustrate that other jurisdictions have 
recognized the limited application of peer review statutes and have been willing to find the 
statutes inapplicable. 
Defendants have made a cursory attempt to distinguish several of the cases previously 
cited by Dr. Verska. Defendants suggest that Harrison v. Binnion is not applicable to the present 
case because Harrison does not mention peer review and arose from a medical malpractice 
action. 147 Idaho 645, 214 P.3d 631 (2009). Dr. Verska did not argue that Harrison was 
directly on point factually. It is true that in Harrison the plaintiffs were moving to amend their 
medical malpractice action to include a claim for negligent credentialing. [d. at 214 P.3d at 635-
36. The Harrison case must not be dismissed out of hand because the court's rationale is 
applicable to the present case. As argued in previous briefing, credentialing decisions and 
privileging decisions are virtually identical. In finding that St. AI's did not enjoy immunity with 
regard to credentialing decisions, the court explained that there was nothing in the wording of the 
statute that purported to grant immunity for making a credentialing decision. [d. at 214 P.3d at 
634. Likewise in the instant case, there is nothing in the wording of the statute, or the legislative 
purpose, that purports to grant the hospital the protection of peer review privilege or immunity 
when a physician challenges the hospital's credentialing or privileging decision. The result from 
Harrison should be the result here - no statutory protection is afforded the hospital to avoid 
accountability for their reappointment decision. 
Defendants also attempted to distinguish Laurino v. Syringa General Hospital, claiming 
that it was unknown how or why the referenced peer review materials were part of the record. 
The "how or why" is less important than the fact that Judge Lodge heavily relied on the 
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information in reaching his decision. Clearly, the peer review information was important. No. 
CIV 98-0439-S-EJL (D. Idaho March 14,2005) (Order Granting Summary Judgment). 
Defendants also attempted to distinguish Memorial Hospital v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058 
(7th Cir. 1981), by stating that federal privilege law does not apply. However, Defendants failed 
to appreciate that the federal court was applying the Illinois medical peer review statutes when it 
allowed discovery. Defendants would have this Court ignore the analysis and holdings of the 
federal courts. However, because state courts generally, and Idaho specifically, do not have 
large bodies of case law on the subject, it makes sense to look to the federal courts for guidance. 
The case law provided by Dr. Verska supports his position that the peer review statutes 
are inapplicable in cases where physicians are challenging decisions related to the physician's 
privileges; therefore, his motion to compel should be granted in full. 
D. DEFENDANTS' CROSS MOTIONS MUST BE DENIED. 
1. Defendants' Cross Motion for Protective Order Related to the Peer Review 
Privilege Must be Denied. 
Through their responsive briefing, Defendants have moved for a protective order asking 
the Court to find the peer review statutes applicable. Dr. Verska objects to Defendants' cross 
motion as argued throughout this reply and as argued in his memorandum in support of his 
motion to compel, which is incorporated herein by reference. 
2. Defendants' Cross Motion Striking Plaintiffs' Submission of Peer Review 
Records and "Background Information" Must be Denied. 
Defendants have moved to strike most of the documents Dr. Verska provided to the Court 
in support of his motion to compel on the ground that they are inadmissible. Defendants have 
also moved to strike the "Background Information" segment of Dr. Verska's memorandum. Dr. 
Verska objects to Defendants' motion on the grounds that the Court has not been asked to 
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determine the admissibility of the documents or background infonnation; it has only been asked 
to determine the discoverability of information related to the peer review process and the 
decisions made involving Dr. Verska's reappointment. The documents and information were 
provided to enlighten the Court as to the wrongful conduct and inconsistencies that Dr. Verska 
was subjected to throughout his review by Defendants. This information is essential to provide a 
context for the Court in reaching a decision on the applicability of the peer review statutes. 
Defendants executed a Stipulation for Entry of Protective Order which will protect the 
confidentiality of the documents. The Court has yet to sign the protective order; therefore, the 
documents to which Defendants refer have not been technically filed, although a courtesy copy 
was provided to the Court's chambers for reference, anticipating that the protective order would 
be signed. Defendants were aware of this arrangement. Dr. Verska will agree to the 
"Background Information" being placed under protective seal and believes such action is 
contemplated in the Stipulation for Entry of Protective Order. Dr. Verska does not agree that the 
documents and background information should be stricken from the record. 
Because the parties have executed a stipulation for protective order sealing the 
confidential documents and information, Defendants' motion to strike must be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments and those contained in Dr. Verska's memorandum in 
support of his motion to compel, Dr. Verska's motion to compel should be granted in full and 
Defendants' cross motions must be denied in full. The Idaho Peer Review Statutes are 
inapplicable in the instant action and Dr. Verska is entitled to discover infOlmation related to the 
wrongful denial of his reappointment to the medical staff. 
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DEPUlY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D., and THE SPINE 
INSTITUTE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. ZIMMERMAN, 
M.D.; and DONALD FOX, M.D., 
Defendants. 
No. CV OC 0911804 
DEFENDANTS'REPLYIN 
SUPPORT OF CROSS- MOTIONS 
FOR (i) PROTECTIVE ORDER 
ON PEER REVIEW, and (ii) 
ORDER STRIKING PRIVILEGED 
PEER REVIEW RECORDS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The interpretation and application of Idaho's peer review privilege has been raised 
by both sides in competing cross-motions. Plaintiffs have moved to compel responses to 
specific discovery requests; the Defendants Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 
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Dr. Donald Fox and Christian Zimmerman seek a protective order enforcing Section 39-
1392b of the Idaho Code, and move to strike privileged peer review materials from the 
record. In opposition to Defendants' cross-motions, Dr. Verska "incorporate[s] by 
reference" his motion to compel as well as the argument in his "reply." Plaintiffs' Reply at 
14. Defendants make this brief reply in support of their cross-motions. 
II. REPLY ARGUMENT 
A. Idaho's Peer Review Laws are Not "Ambiguous," Nor Does The 
Application of Those Laws Produce an "Absurd Result" 
While acknowledging that statutes are generally to be applied as they are written, 
Plaintiffs argue that Idaho's peer review laws are either "ambiguous," or that applying the 
statutes according to their terms would produce an "absurd result." Neither argument 
withstands even passing scrutiny. 
The Idaho Legislature could not have been more clear or emphatic in the language 
used in Idaho Code § 39-1392b. Peer review records and related testimony are not 
discoverable and shall not be used "in any action of any kind in any court ... for any 
purpose whatsoever." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-1392b (2009). As recently stated by the 
Idaho Supreme Court: 
A statute is ambiguous when the language is capable of more 
than one reasonable interpretation. Porter v. Bd. a/Trustees, 
141 Idaho 11, 14, 105 P.3d 671, 674 (2004). However, a 
statute may not be deemed ambiguous merely because 
parties present differing interpretations to the court. Id. 
Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 208 P.3d 289, 293 (Idaho 2009). Reading 
the language of section 39-1392b to say that the peer review privilege applies only in 
"malpractice cases" is not reasonable, and Plaintiffs' bare plea for such an interpretation 
does not create an "ambiguity" where none fairly exists. 
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Nor does enforcement of the peer review privilege as written produce an "absurd 
result." As discussed and supported with abundant citations in Defendants' opening brief, 
improving the quality of healthcare by promoting both the free flow and use of relevant 
inforn1ation is the primary objective of the peer review privilege. If the busy doctors who 
give their time to participate in peer review proceedings or if the persons who provide 
inforn1ation in aid of that process are subject to deposition, document discovery, and 
eventually suit - like Dr. Fox, who has been sued by Dr. Verska for his role in the subject 
peer review proceedings - participation will evaporate. Peers will not provide critical 
information, and reviewing doctors will refuse to serve on committees. Peer review "will 
effectively terminate if [participating doctors] are subject to unlimited discovery 
processes." Yuma Reg'! Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 852 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1993). 
While Dr. Verska alleges a lack of due process, that does not give him license to 
conduct discovery concerning protected matters. There is nothing remarkable or absurd 
about this. A litigant can argue that this Court violated his or her rights, but that litigant 
generally cannot depose Your Honor or the court staff, nor is a litigant entitled to demand 
discovery of the Court's notes, drafts or other confidential information except in the most 
egregious of circumstances. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-340a(2); LeAR. 32(g)(l8) (am. 
& eff. Feb. 1, 2009). Similarly, a disappointed participant in an arbitration is generally not 
entitled to depose the arbitrator to substantiate an allegation of bias. Woods v. Saturn 
Distribution Corp., 78 F.3d 424, 430 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Although it may be difficult to 
prove actual bias without deposing the arbitrators, deposition of arbitrators [is] 'repeatedly 
condemned' by courts.") (citing OR. Sec., Inc. v. Prof,! Planning Assocs., Inc., 857 F.2d 
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742, 748 (11 th Cir. 1988». Parties regularly challenge due process without taking 
discovery as to why a tribunal did what it did. 
Here, the peer review laws are unambiguous. Applying them according to their 
terms promotes important societal goals and is entirely consistent with the legislation's 
legislative history. The tradeoff is that certain matters that would otherwise be 
discoverable or admissible are not, which, by definition, is the effect of any privilege, 
including the one created by the Idaho legislature that governs in this case. "Although it 
may be inequitable that information contained in privileged materials is available to only 
one side in a dispute, a determination that communications or materials are privileged is 
simply a choice to protect the communication and relationship against claims of competing 
interests. Any inequity in terms of access to information is the price the system pays to 
maintain the integrity of the privilege." Admiral Ins. Co. v. Us. Dist. Ct. of Ariz., 881 
F.2d 1486, 1494 (9th Cir. 1989) (refusing to recognize an "unavailability exception" to the 
attorney-client privilege) (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 171 (3d ed. 1984». 
B. Dr. Verska May Waive His Own Rights, But May Not Waive the 
Defendants' Peer Review Privilege 
At pages 9 to 11 of Plaintiffs' Response, Plaintiffs argue for the first time that the 
peer review privilege belongs to Dr. Verska, not Saint Alphonsus and the participants in 
the peer review process. Again, this is simply incorrect. Plaintiffs cite no authority for the 
proposition that the peer review privilege belongs exclusively to the physician and not the 
health care organization. To the contrary, Section 39-1392d of Idaho Code expressly 
provides: "All peer review records of a health care organization shall be the property of 
the health care organization concerned which obtains or compiles the same." (Emphasis 
added.) 
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Both the Idaho Code and Saint Alphonsus's Bylaws provide specific circumstances 
under which a health care organization may disclose otherwise confidential peer review 
records. Portions of Title 39 of the Code discuss when a hospital may use or provide such 
materials to others without waiving the peer review privilege, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 
39-1392d, 39-1392e(t) (when a physician makes a claim against the hospital); the 
legislature also knew how to state what a hospital was required to disclose. See id. § 39-
1392e(a) ("In the event of a claim or civil action against a physician ... any health care 
organization having information of the kind covered by section 39-1392b, Idaho Code, 
shall, when interrogated as hereinafter provided, advise any such claimant .... "; even 
then disclosure is limited to certain facts, not peer review records) (emphasis added). 
Similarly, Saint Alphonsus's Bylaws states that "[n]othing [in the Bylaws] will prevent 
limited disclosure" of confidential information "[ w ]here the Medical Staff Member about 
whom the information pertains consents .... " Article VII, Section 3. The disclosure and 
use of peer review information is permissive in cases such as this, not mandatory. 
C. The "Other Cases" Cited by Plaintiffs Are Inapposite to the 
Interpretation and Application of Idaho Law in This Case 
In what is largely a rehash of their original arguments, Plaintiffs cast an even wider 
net, seeking to find at least one decision that support their arguments concerning Idaho 
Code § 39-1392b. To this end, Plaintiffs cite Hayes v. Mercy Health Corp., 739 A.2d 114 
(Pa. 1999), and Cohlmia v. Ardent Health Services, LLC, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (N.D. 
Okla. 2006). Once again, Plaintiffs overreach in describing the cited decisions. 
Dr. Verska fails to cite the full language of the Pennsylvania peer review statute at 
issue in Hayes. That statute states that: 
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The proceedings and records of a review committee shall be 
held in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or 
introduction into evidence in any civil action against a 
professional health care provider arising out of the matters 
which are the subject of evaluation and review by such 
committee .... 
739 A.2d at 25 (quoting 63 P.S. § 425.4). The court found that this language meant that 
peer review protection applied in civil actions in which a provider was being sued because 
of events that were under review, but not challenges to the peer review process. Notably, 
the court found that the language above reflected "words of limitation; 'had the legislature 
intended the privilege to be absolute, it could have simply left these words out of the 
statute.'" ld. at 26 (quoting Sanderson v. Frank S. Bfyan, AlD., Ltd., 522 A.2d 1138, 1142 
(Pa. 1987». Of course, in Idaho, no such "words of limitation" or qualification appear: 
Idaho's peer review protection applies "in any action of any kind in any court ... for any 
purpose whatsoever." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-1392b. 
In reality, Hayes undercuts Plaintiffs' arguments. The Cohfmia case cited by 
Plaintiffs is nothing more than an application of the previously cited Shadur ruling that the 
state privilege law does not apply to a case involving federal antitrust claims. Despite their 
thorough search, Plaintiffs have failed to find a single authority that supports either their 
argument that Section 39-1392b includes the implicit exception they seek to create, or the 
contention that "public policy" invalidates Idaho's peer review privilege. 
D. A Protective Order Does Not Achieve the Protections Afforded by the 
Peer Review Privilege 
Near the end of their reply brief, Plaintiffs mention that the parties have agreed to a 
protective order that provides for the sealing of certain confidential materials. Plaintiffs' 
Reply at 14-15. The protective order is wholly unrelated to the peer review privilege, and 
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sealing is not an alternative to the more substantial protections afforded by the privilege. 
Indeed, before executing the stipulation requested by Plaintiffs, Defendants' counsel wrote 
as follows: 
Ray and Portia: 
The protective order looks OK for general purposes. We would ask that you add the 
following to the proposed order: 
* By stipulating to the terms of this protective order, Defendants are in no way 
waiving the protections afforded by Section 39-1392b of the Idaho Code and other 
law on peer review materials and testimony, rights and protections which are 
expressly asserted by Defendants in this proceeding. 
I don't want our willingness to enter into a protective order to be used to somehow argue 
against peer review protection. If you are agreeable to that language, could you add it and 
recirculate the proposed final of the order? 
See Appendix A. The language demanded by Defendants is found at paragraph 18 of the 
proposed order. Section 39-1392b provides that peer review records "shall not be directly 
or indirectly subject to ... discovery proceedings or be admitted as evidence ... for any 
purpose whatsoever." That includes the purposes for which PlaintifTs seek to use them in 
this matter, and they are properly stricken. See United States v. Asarco, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 
2d 1170, 1172 (D. Idaho 1998) (granting motion to strike privileged correspondence 
"inadvertently produced during discovery"), vacated on other grounds, 214 F .3d 1104 (9th 
Cir.2000). 
III. CONCLUSION 
Idaho's peer review privilege is found in a direct and plainly worded statute. The 
purpose of the privilege is to promote the greater good - namely the health and well-being 
of the citizens of Idaho. The legislature concluded that this public good trumps the 
financial interests of individual providers and, to a more limited extent, injured claimants. 
The Defendants - Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Dr. Fox and Dr. Zimmerman 
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are entitled to a protective order implementing Section 39-1392b of the Idaho Code, and 
request that such an order be entered forthwith. 
DA TED this 1 st day of February, 2010. 
Robert B. White 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 151 day of February, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' REPLY ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR PROTECTIVE 
ORDER AND ORDER STRIKING PEER REVIEW RECORDS, by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to each of the following: 
_ Hand Delivery Raymond D. Powers 
Powers Tolman, PLLC 
345 Bobwhite Court, Ste #150 
P.O. Box 9756 
X Facsimile (208) 577-5101 
_ Overnight Courier 
U.S. Mail 
Boise, ID 83707 
Attorneysfor Plaintiffs 
Robert B. White 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE 
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. 
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD 
FOX,M.D., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0911804 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon the parties' Stipulation for Entry of 
Protective Order, and the Court being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing 
therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the terms of the 
Stipulation for Entry of Protective Order entered into by the parties shall be, and hereby are, 
APPROVED. The Court enters this Protective Order and adopts the terms of the Stipulation. 
DATED this ~y of ~I'IJ.~, 2 ID. 
District Judge 
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Case No.: CV OC 0911804 
ORDER RE: MOTION TO 
COMPEL/PROTECTIVE ORDER 
This action arises from the decision of St. Alphonsus Hospital to deny Dr. Verska 
reappointment to its medical staff. The plaintiffs have moved to compel production of 
fEB 11 2010 
information relating to St. Alphonsus' decision and have moved that the Court overrule the peer 
review privilege and immunity objections the Hospital has asserted in response to the plaintiffs' 
requests. The Hospital has objected to producing information protected by the peer review 
privilege and has asserted immunity pursuant to I.C. § 39-1392c. 
The plaintiff, Joseph Verska M.D., is an orthopedic spine surgeon who has practiced in 
Idaho at The Spine Institute, a medical practice which he formed which provides surgical, 
rehabilitation and radiographic services for spine related conditions. Dr. Verska had privileges 
at St. Alphonsus from January 22, 1996 through July 1,2008. He filed this action against St. 
Alphonsus and the individually named physician defendants on June 23, 2009. In his 
Complaint, he alleges that he was subject to peer reviews by the Hospital beginning in 2004. He 
states that he cooperated with the peer review processes. He asserts that the peer review 
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processes, at least at the Ad Hoc Committee level, resulted in recommendations which were 
favorable to him. He asserts that positive recommendations were overridden, that confidential 
information was disclosed to third party, non-hospital personnel and to hospital personnel who 
were not involved in the peer review process, that a direct competitor with a conflict of interest 
served on one of the committees, and that his privileges were not renewed as of July 1, 2008 as a 
result of an unfair and slanted process. Although he did receive a hearing after his privileges 
were not renewed in which he did participate, and, although the fair hearing panel recommended 
his reinstatement, the Board of Trustees and St. Alphonsus' administration overrode the positive 
finding and continued to deny him privileges. He has asserted a number of causes of action-all 
of which arise from the allegedly tainted peer review process with the exception of allegations 
that Dr. Fox breached the confidentiality of the peer review process and disclosed information to 
people who were not entitled to it. 
In his discovery, he has requested information about the recommendations of the 
credentials committee, the handling of peer review issues and confidentiality, the identification 
and provision of all documents and information reviewed by the ad hoc committees, the 
information presented to the Board of Trustees, the criteria for selecting the members of the peer 
review committees. The defendants have moved for a protective order asserting that peer review 
materials are not subject to discovery pursuant to I.C. § 39-1392(b). Dr. Verska contends that 
neither I.e. § 39-1392b or I.C. § 39-1392c apply when the issue is discovery of information 
related to credentialing and reappointment of a physician. While Dr. Verska cites the policy 
behind the Idaho statutes and other statutory schemes in other states which permit discovery by 
physicians who are challenging peer review proceedings which have led to negative 
credentialing or reappointment decisions by hospitals, the plain language of the Idaho statutes is 
broad and clear. Idaho law does not contain an exception for physicians seeking discovery to 
challenge credentialing or reappointment. I.e. § 39-1392b provides: 
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Records confidential and privileged. 
Except as provided in section 39-1392e, Idaho Code, all peer review records shall be 
confidential and privileged, and shall not be directly or indirectly subject to subpoena or 
discovery proceedings or be admitted as evidence, nor shall testimony relating thereto be 
admitted in evidence, or in any action of any kind in any court or before any administrative 
body, agency or person for any purpose whatsoever. No order of censure, suspension or 
revocation of licensure, or of a certification in the case of emergency medical services 
personnel, or health care organization privilege of any physician licensed to practice medicine 
in Idaho shall be admissible in any civil proceeding seeking damages or other civil relief 
against the physician, emergency medical services personnel, or health care organization 
which may be a defendant in said cause .... 
I.e. § 39-1392e also contains a limited exception to the privilege against disclosure if a claim has 
been brought against a physician, hospital or other medical personnel concerning the health care 
delivered to a specific patient when disclosure is requested by the patient or the patient's 
representative. Immunity is also accorded to those who furnish information or provide opinions 
to any health care organization. LC. § 39-1392c: 
The furnishing of information or provision of opinions to any health care organization or the 
receiving and use of such information and opinions shall not subject any health care organization 
or other person to any liability or action for money damages or other legal or equitable relief. 
Custodians of such records and persons becoming aware of such data and opinions shall not 
disclose the same except as authorized by rules adopted by the board of medicine or as otherwise 
authorized by law. Any health care organization may receive such disclosures, subject to an 
obligation to preserve the confidential privileged character thereof and subject further to the 
requirement that such requests shall be made and such use shall be limited to aid the health care 
organization in conducting peer review. 
In Harrison v. Binnion, 147 Idaho 645, 214 P.3d 631 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court held that 
in a malpractice action brought against physicians and a hospital, the hospital did not have 
immunity from a cause of action for negligent credentialing. The Court did not address a 
hospital's liability for making a credentialingJreappointment decision when the action was 
brought by the physician nor did it address the broader statutory exceptions from the privilege, 
i.e., I.C. § 39-1392e. It simply held that LC. § 39-1392c did not grant immunity for credentialing 
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decisions and that the trial judge went beyond the statutory language in holding that there was 
such immunity. 
The case before the Court seeks information created as part of the peer review process. 
The "peer review process" is defined as "the collection, interpretation and analysis of data by a 
health care organization" to improve health care delivery or improve the quality of patient care 
and includes" credentialing, privileging or affiliating of health care providers as members of, or 
providers for, a health care organization." I.e. § 39-1392a (l1)(a). "Peer review records" are 
broadly defined as "all evidence of interviews, reports, statements, minutes, memoranda, notes, 
investigative graphs and compilations and the contents thereof, and all physical materials relating 
to peer review of any health care organization" with the exclusion of patient care records except 
when used as part of a peer review. I.e. § 39-1392a(12). I.e. § 39-1392b plainly exempts peer 
review records from discovery. The statute provides in pertinent part: 
Except as provided in section 39-1392e, Idaho Code, all peer review records shall 
be confidential and privileged, and shall not be directly or indirectly subject to subpoena 
or discovery proceedings or be admitted as evidence, nor shall testimony relating thereto 
be admitted in evidence, or in any action of any kind in any court or before any 
administrative body, agency or person for any purpose whatsoever. ... 
I.C. § 39-l392b. As noted previously, there is an exception for patient care records when 
requested by a patient in this section as well as in I.C. § 39-1392e which also provides a limited 
exception to the privilege and confidentiality requirements when a patient brings an action. 
Statutory interpretation is a question oflaw. Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841, 216 P.3d 
130 (2009) State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103, 175 P.3d 788, 792 (2008). Statutory 
interpretation begins with the literal words of the statute which must be given their plain, usual, 
and ordinary meaning. Id.; State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 5l3, 164 P.3d 790, 793 (2007). Ifa 
statute is unambiguous, then there is no resort to statutory construction and the statute's plain 
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meaning is applied. Callies v. 0 'Neal, supra. 147 Idaho at 847. Unlike Harrison v. Binnion, this 
Court is not extrapolating from the statute, the Court is relying on the express and plain language 
of the statute. 
I.e. § 39-1392b unambiguously protects all peer review records from discovery of any 
type and bars any testimony about those peer review records. Credentialing and privileging 
decisions are expressly defined as peer review activities. I.e. § 39-1392a(11). The statute is 
plain and unambiguous and is to be given its plain meaning. There can be no discovery of the 
peer review records nor can any witness be questioned about any information provided to the 
peer review committees nor the interpretation nor analysis of any evidence submitted as part of 
this process. The Court notes that the Complaint contains allegations that information was 
provided to unrelated third parties, obviously, the plaintiff may enquire about information 
provided outside of the peer review process. 
The motion to compel is denied. The motion for protective order is granted. 
It is so ordered. 
Dated this 11 th day of February, 20lO. 
ORDER-5 
~tLA.W 
Deborah A. Bail 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE 
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. 
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD 
FOX,M.D., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0911804 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
COME NOW, Plaintiffs JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and the SPINE INSTITUTE OF 
IDAHO, by and through their attorneys of record, POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC, and hereby 
allege the following as and for claims against Defendants in the above-captioned litigation. 
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JURISDICTION & PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff Joseph M. Verska, M.D. CDr. Verska") IS an Idaho resident and 
orthopedic spine surgeon, licensed and practicing in the State of Idaho. 
2. The Spine Institute of Idaho is a professional corporation conducting business in 
the State of Idaho. 
3. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("SARMC") is a non-profit corporation 
conducting business and providing medical services to the general public in the state of Idaho. 
4. Christian G. Zimmerman, M.D. is an Idaho resident licensed and practicing 
medicine in the State of Idaho. Dr. Zimmerman is a neurosurgeon whose specialty includes the 
practice of spine surgery. 
5. Donald Fox, M.D. is an Idaho resident licensed and practicing medicine in the 
State of Idaho. Dr. Fox's specialty is anesthesia. 
6. Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court under Idaho Code §S-404. The 
amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold of this Court. 
FACTS 
7. Dr. Verska created The Spine Institute of Idaho in April, 2001. The Spine 
Institute of Idaho provides services to the general public that include surgical, rehabilitation and 
radiographic services for spine related conditions. 
8. Dr. Verska applied for and was granted privileges at SARMC on January 22, 
1996. Since that time and until July 1, 2008, Dr. Verska's privileges were renewed at SARMC 
on a regular basis, without lapse. Every time Dr. Verska's privileges were renewed, he was 
presented by SARMC with a new set of Bylaws and Medical Staff Policies and Plans ("MSPP"). 
Dr. V erska and SARMC and its agents agreed to act and deal with one another in a consistent 
fashion by virtue of the Bylaws and MSPP. By virtue of their respective conduct and actions, 
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SARMC and Dr. Verska entered into a fiduciary relationship pursuant to SARMC's MSPP and 
Bylaws as a result of Dr. Verska being granted renewed privileges and continuously practicing 
medicine at SARMC. 
9. The actions and conduct of SARMC and Dr. Verska established duties and 
responsibilities between SARMC and Dr. Verska wherein both parties held reasonable 
expectations that each would act in good faith in fulfilling their respective responsibilities set 
forth in the SARMC MSPP and Bylaws. 
10. In January of 2004, SARMC initiated a review of Dr. Verska's practice. 
11. Commencing in 2004 and continuing thereafter, together SARMC, its agents, 
employees and Board Members, Dr. Zimmerman and Dr. Fox conspired to damage Dr. V erska' s 
professional reputation and his ability to practice spine surgery in Boise, Idaho. This effort 
continues on the date of the filing of this complaint. 
12. In 2004, SARMC approached Dr. Verska and asked him to provide on-call trauma 
spine services at SARMC. Dr. Verska agreed in an effort to assist SARMC manage the loss of 
trauma spine neurosurgeons created by the Hospital's dispute with the Neurosurgical Group. 
13. In March of 2005, the SARMC Medical Executive Committee ("MEC") 
appointed an Ad Hoc committee to conduct a peer review of certain aspects of Dr. Verska's 
practice. Dr. Verska cooperated in the peer review process. 
14. In January of 2006, the Ad Hoc Committee presented its findings to the MEC and 
made certain recommendations. Dr. Verska complied with the recommendations. 
15. In 2006, the Spine Medicine Institute ("SMI") was conceived and created by 
SARMC. It was at the time and remains the vision of SMI at SARMC to be the destination spine 
care program for the Northwest. SMI offers multidisciplinary management of back and neck 
pain, including medical evaluation, diagnostic imaging, pain management, physical therapy, 
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spine surgery, psychosocial care. SMI competes directly with the services offered by Dr. Verska 
and the Spine Institute of Idaho. 
16. Dr. Christian Zimmerman is held out by SARMC as a spine surgeon affiliated 
with SMI. Dr. Zimmerman is an employee of SARMC. The physicians affiliated with SMI are 
direct competitors of Dr. Verska and the Spine Institute of Idaho. 
17. Dr. Donald Fox was appointed Vice President and President Elect of the Medical 
Staff in February of 2005. 
18. In April of 2006, the SARMC Quality Care Committee modified the Ad Hoc 
Committee's earlier recommendation and the review of Dr. Verska' s practice continued. 
19. In January of 2007, the MEC voted to discontinue the ongoing peer review of 
Dr. Verska. Nevertheless, the Board of Trustees of SARMC, without justification, directed the 
MEC to continue its investigation of Dr. Verska. 
20. In October of 2007, the MEC, led by Dr. Fox as the President of the Medical 
Staff, voted to commission another Ad Hoc Committee to conduct another peer review. 
21. In November of 2007, the Ad Hoc Committee appointed by the MEC and 
consisting of Dr. Michael McMartin, Dr. Gertjan Mulder and Dr. Timothy Floyd, recommended 
another review of Dr. Verska's practice at SARMC. Dr. Floyd is a spine surgeon who was and is 
a direct competitor of Dr. Verska's. Dr. Floyd was and is affiliated with SMI. Dr. McMartin is a 
rehabilitation medicine specialist and former President of the Medical Staff at SARMC. 
Dr. McMartin's practice competes with services offered by the Spine Institute of Idaho. 
Dr. Mulder is a former president of the medical staff at SARMC. 
22. SARMC, its Board, Dr. Fox and the MEC knew that Dr. McMartin and Dr. Floyd 
had a conflict of interest acting as members of the Ad Hoc Committee conducting the peer 
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review of Dr. Verksa. Nevertheless, SARMC, through its agents, selected them to be members 
of the Committee conducting the peer review of Dr. V erska' scare. 
23. In November of 2007, the Ad Hoc Committee presented the MEC with its initial 
recommendations, which were approved; Dr. Verska complied with the requests for information 
from the Committee and cooperated in its review of his practice. 
24. On December 6, 2007, through a letter from Dr. Fox, Dr. Verska was notified of 
the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation and the continuing peer review as directed by the 
SARMC Board of Trustees. Members of the Ad Hoc Committee considered the process a peer 
review with no punitive or adverse consequences to Dr. Verska. 
25. From January through June of 2008, Dr. Verska submitted additional materials to 
the Ad Hoc Committee as it continued its peer review. During this same period of time, Dr. Fox 
breached confidentiality and disclosed privileged, confidential peer review information regarding 
the review to physicians outside of the peer review process, including Dr. Zimmerman. 
26. Dr. Fox breached confidentiality by disclosing confidential information to 
individuals outside of the process in violation of the Bylaws of SARMC and in breach of the 
responsibilities and duties attached to the position of President of the Medical Staff. This breach 
of confidentiality damaged Dr. Verska's professional reputation in the community. 
27. During the review process at SARMC, Dr. Zimmerman has disclosed confidential 
infonnation relative to Dr. Verska's practice to members of the medical community, employees 
and staff members at SARMC, SARMC administrators, including Dr. Robert Polk and former 
CEO, Sandra Bruce, health care insurers, pharmaceutical representatives and the general public 
in an effort to damage Dr. Verska's professional reputation, undermine Dr. Verska's medical 
practice and increase income generated by SMI. These representations and actions were 
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intended to damage Dr. Verska's professional reputation in the community and further the 
interests of SMI. 
28. In June of 2008, the Ad Hoc Committee, consisting of Dr. Mulder, Dr. Floyd and 
Dr. McMartin, made certain recommendations to the MEC. 
29. The recommendations set forth by the Ad Hoc Committee were intended by the 
Committee to constitute collegial intervention and be non-punitive as provided under Chapter 
VIII, Section 6 of the MSPP. Nowhere in the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation is there any 
indication that they intended their recommendation be punitive resulting in Dr. Verska's 
privileges not being renewed at SARMC. 
30. On June 25, 2008, Dr. Fox with the approval of the SARMC Board of Trustees 
presented information to the MEC regarding the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendations. 
Dr. Fox knowingly misrepresented and intentionally omitted presenting relevant infonnation and 
manipulated the recommendations and conclusions of the Ad Hoc Committee in an effort to 
exclude Dr. Verska from medical staff membership at SARMC. Dr. Fox was successful in this 
effort and the MEC voted to ignore key recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee resulting in 
Dr. Verska's privileges not being renewed on July 1,2008. 
31. On July 1,2008, SARMC refused to renew Dr. Verska's privileges. 
32. On July 9, 2008, Dr. Verska requested a hearing before a Fair Hearing Panel 
(,'FHP"). 
33. Under the language of the MSPP, Dr. Verska was entitled to a formal hearing to 
challenge an adverse action before his privileges could be adversely affected. SARMC failed to 
comply with the MSPP and its own Bylaws in this regard in its decision to not renew 
Dr. Verska's privileges on July 1, 2008, effectively removing Dr. Verska from the medical staff 
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with no opportunity for Dr. Verska to have a hearing to review and challenge the basis for the 
decision. 
34. The MSPP provided that a panel of three physicians be appointed to hear and take 
evidence from both parties. Under Chapter XII, Section 17 Burden of Proof, Fair Hearing Plan, 
the Hospital's MEC had the burden of initially presenting evidence in support of its 
recommendation. The burden then shifted to the physician. The section goes on to state that 
35. 
[T]he Hearing Panel will recommend against the Practitioner who 
requested the hearing unless it finds that said Practitioner has 
proved that the recommendation which prompted the hearing was 
unreasonable, not sustained by the evidence, or otherwise 
unfounded. 
In 2008, Dr. Zimmerman was offered employment by SARMC. His 
responsibilities as an employee of SARMC include recruitment of spine surgeons to SMI and 
efforts to increase the volume of patients and income generated by SMI. 
36. In late September, 2008, SARMC adopted a position before the FHP regarding 
Dr. Verska's competence and skill which misrepresented the conclusions and recommendations 
reached by the Ad Hoc Committee in June 2008. 
37. In September of 2008, SARMC through its agents, employees and 
representatives, disclosed confidential information to St. Luke's Regional Medical Center's 
agents and officers regarding Dr. Verska's status at SARMC and the confidential process that 
SARMC had engineered leading to Dr. Verska's privileges not being renewed. The disclosure 
violated the terms and conditions of the MSPP and Bylaws and misrepresented the facts and 
circumstances regarding Dr. Verska's competence to practice and be a member of the medical 
staff at SARMC. The disclosure was intended to damage the professional reputation of 
Dr. Verska and the Spine Institute of Idaho. 
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38. Between October 28,2008 and October 30,2008, the FHP appointed by SARMC 
heard evidence presented by SARMC and Dr. Verska on the issue of whether SARMC's 
decision to now renew Dr. Verska's privileges was unreasonable, not sustained by the evidence, 
or was otherwise unfounded. At the hearing both parties presented evidence, called witnesses, 
cross-examined witnesses, and presented written closing statements to the panel members. 
Dr. Verska presented evidence rebutting the position adopted and maintained by SARMC. 
39. In November of 2008, after considering the evidence and applying the burden of 
proof outlined in the MSPP, the FHP found that SARMC's position that Dr. Verska was not 
qualified to be on staff and the MEC decision to not renew Dr. Verska's privileges were not 
supported by the evidence, and were unfair and unreasonable. The FHP recommended that 
Dr. Verska have his privileges at SARMC reinstated immediately. 
40. Thereafter, Dr. Fox misrepresented the FHP's conclusions and recommendations 
in a meeting with the MEC. On December 15, 2008, the MEC chose to ignore the FHP and 
instead embraced the position first articulated in September, 2008 that Dr. Verska was not 
competent and qualified to be on the SARMC medical staff. 
41. The MEC did not seek the assistance or benefit of a spine surgeon to assist it in 
analyzing the recommendation of the FHP. Instead it relied upon advice, misrepresentations and 
intentional omissions of information provided by Dr. Fox. Dr. Fox in presenting the issues to the 
MEC mischaracterized the Fair Hearing process, the findings of the FHP, and the responsibilities 
of SARMC and the MEC under the terms of the MSPP. 
42. Dr. Verska appealed the misinformed and arbitrary recommendation of the MEC. 
The SARMC Board of Trustees, after hearing Dr. Verska's appeal, chose to ignore the FHP's 
recommendation, the terms of the MSPP and affirmed the unsupportable, arbitrary MEC 
directive that Dr. Verska was not qualified to be on its medical staff. 
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43. In July of 2009, Dr. Verska submitted his application for reappointment to 
the medical staff at St. Luke's Regional Medical Center (St. Luke's). As part of their 
credentialing process, St. Luke's requested that SARMC complete a "Confidential 
Affiliation Questionnaire" relative to Dr. Verska. 
44. SARMC was aware that Dr. Verska had signed the required documents for 
the confidential release of information and limited immunity at St. Luke's and at SARMC, 
giving his consent, pursuant to Article VII, Sec. 3.A.2 and 3.B of SARMC's Bylaws, to the 
exchange of information that St. Luke's had requested of SARMC. 
45. In a letter dated August 28, 2009, SARMC, through its legal counsel, notified 
Dr. Verska's legal counsel that given Dr. Verska's pending lawsuit and the allegations set 
forth therein, SARMC would not provide the information requested by St. Luke's. 
SARMC would be willing to "assess what additional information it may provide while 
maintaining peer review protection for the information," if Dr. Verska provided a "full 
release to SARMC and the individuals involved in the credentialing and peer review 
process." SARMC reiterated that if "Dr. Verska would like to pursue this further," he 
would need to execute a "full, unqualified release." 
46. SARMC's refusal to provide St. Luke's with the information it requested 
with regard to Dr. Verska has resulted in St. Luke's being unable to complete the process 
of reviewing Dr. Verska's application for reappointment of privileges to its medical staff. 
St. Luke's notified Dr. Verska through a letter to him dated October 28, 2009, that his 
application remained incomplete and it was unable to process it. 
47. SARMC's refusal to provide St. Luke's with the information it requested 
with regard to Dr. Verska has resulted in St. Luke's refusal to consider Dr. Verska's 
application for reappointment on the ground that Dr. Verska's application was incomplete 
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without the requested SARMC information. 
48. SARMC's refusal to provide St. Luke's with the information it requested 
with regard to Dr. Verska was unwarranted and was intended to damage Dr. Verska's 
professional reputation and interfere with his ability to practice medicine in the Boise 
community. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Civil Conspiracy 
49. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth 
in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
50. SARMC, Dr. Fox and Dr. Zimmerman, as well as with other unnamed co-
conspirators, who include physicians and hospital staff employed by or who are agents of 
SARMC and SMI, conspired with malice and intent to injure Plaintiffs' professional practice and 
reputation and; 
(a) engaged in a pattern of conduct pursuant to which they improperly 
removed Dr. Verska from the SARMC medical staff in bad faith, thus 
preventing Dr. Verska from pursuing his livelihood and practicing his 
specialty in the hospital; 
(b) fabricated and exaggerated claims against Dr. Verska regarding quality of 
care issues, his surgical skill and competence, used discriminatory criteria 
in quality of care determinations, and acted in secrecy to further their 
personal and corporate interests rather than those of the patients of 
SARMC; 
(c) subverted the mandated SARMC peer review process and SARMC's 
MSPP and Bylaws; 
(d) concealed the real anti-competitive motives for not renewing Dr. ocf6af 69 
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medical staff privileges; 
(e) caused Dr. Verska's privileges not to be renewed by SARMC by 
improperly influencing and manipulating SARMC Medical Executive 
Committee in bad faith; and 
(f) fabricated additional allegations against Dr. Verska during the pendency 
of and following the appeal process from his denial of medical staff 
privileges at SARMC in an attempt to further alter the record and give 
credibility to their arbitrary actions. 
51. SARMC and other unnamed co-conspirators, who include physicians and 
hospital staff employed by or who are agents of SARMC and SMI, conspired with malice 
and intent to injure Plaintiffs' professional practice and reputation in the community by 
refusing to provide information requested of it by St. Luke's with regard to Dr. Verska, 
even though Dr. Verska had consented to such disclosure, resulting in St. Luke's denial of 
Dr. Verska's application for reappointment due to it being incomplete. 
52. Such conduct has harmed and will continue to harm in the future, consumers of 
orthopedic neck and back care in Southwestern Idaho. 
53. The actions taken by Defendants SARMC, Dr. Fox and Dr. Zimmerman were 
intended to damage Dr. Verska and the Spine Institute of Idaho, Dr. Verska's reputation and 
career, as well as financially cripple his professional practice. 
54. As a direct and proximate result of the reckless, wrongful acts of Defendants, 
Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
55. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth 
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in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
56. SARMC failed to comply with its own Bylaws and MSPP when it did not inform 
Dr. Verska that his staff privileges were being reviewed under the Corrective Action plan of the 
MSPP, thereby breaching its duty of good faith and fair dealing with Dr. Verska. 
57. SARMC failed to comply with the MSPP and inappropriately manipulated the 
MSPP for the purpose of depriving Dr. Verska of the ability to practice at SARMC. 
58. As a result of SARMC's failure to comply with the MSPP, Dr. Verska did not 
have an opportunity to adequately defend himself in the peer review process. 
59. As a result of SARMC's failure to comply with the MSPP, SARMC unjustly and 
without good cause refused to grant Dr. Verska's application for renewal of his staff privileges 
and required him to fulfill a one year spine fellowship effectively removing him from the 
medical community for a period of one to two years, before it would even consider granting him 
staff privileges. 
60. Defendants SARMC and Dr. Fox breached the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing when it refused to grant Dr. Verska's application for renewal of his staff privileges only 
five days before his privileges were to lapse with no right to a hearing or due process. 
61. Defendants SARMC and Dr. Fox breached the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing by failing to discharge its responsibilities as outlined in the MSPP and as required by the 
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA). 
62. Defendant SARMC breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by 
failing to comply with its own Bylaws and MSPP when it refused to provide the 
information requested of it by St. Luke's with regard to Dr. Verska, even though Dr. 
Verska had consented to such disclosure. 
63. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants SARMC's and Dr. Fox's actions, 
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Plaintiffs have been damaged and are entitled to be compensated for those damages in an amount 
to be determined at trial. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Intentional and/or Negligent 
Interference with Economic Advantage 
64. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth 
in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
65. Dr. Verska has been a member of the Boise medical community for over fifteen 
(15) years and has established a wide patient base throughout Southern Idaho and is affiliated 
with a number of medical institutions in the community. Dr. Verska has invested substantial 
sums of money to establish continuing treatment relationships with patients, members of the 
medical community, colleagues, and institutions in the community. 
66. Defendants knew or should have known about the relationships established 
between Dr. Verska, his patients, physicians, and other institutions in the medical community. 
67. SARMC's refusal to grant Dr. Verska's application for renewal of staff privileges 
at SARMC was an intentional attempt to harm and undermine Dr. Verska's professional practice. 
SARMC inappropriate refusal to renew Dr. Verska's privileges amounts to dishonest, reckless, 
improper, and unfair acts to affirmatively damage Dr. Verska's reputation. 
68. SARMC's refusal to provide St. Luke's Regional Medical Center with the 
information it requested of SARMC with regard to Dr. Verska was an intentional attempt 
to harm and undermine Dr. Verska's professional practice. SARMC's inappropriate 
refusal to provide the information to St. Luke's amounts to bad faith and reckless conduct 
intended to affirmatively damage Dr. Verska's reputation. 
69. The reckless interference by Defendants with Dr. Verska's reputation and 
business will permanently damage the business relationships between Dr. Verska, his patients 
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and those medical institutions in the community that he is affiliated with. 
70. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' reckless actions, Plaintiffs have 
been damaged and are entitled to be compensated for those damages in an amount to be 
determined at trial. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Interference with Prospective 
Contractual Relations or Business Expectations 
71. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth 
in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
72. Dr. Verska has continuing professional and business relationships with other 
physicians and medical institutions who permit Dr. Verska to practice at their facilities. 
73. Defendants knew of these relationships between Dr. Verska and these institutions 
and acted recklessly in their actions. 
74. Defendants intentionally and wrongfully interfered with these relationships and 
business expectations by their bad faith actions outlined herein, including SARMC's refusal to 
provide information to St. Luke's regarding Dr. Verska, and as a direct and proximate result, 
Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount to be determined at trial. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Defamation Per Se, Libel Per Se, and Slander Per Se 
75. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth 
in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
76. Defendants have maliciously, willfully and intentionally defamed Plaintiffs by 
fabricating instances of misconduct, exaggerating and misrepresenting Dr. Verska's 
qualifications and abilities, and reporting such false and defamatory statements to members of 
the Medical Staff at SARMC, St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, members of the medical 
community, health care insurers and state and federal regulatory authorities, including but not 
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limited to, the Idaho State Board of Medicine and the Idaho State Board of Pharmacy, all in 
furtherance of its attempt to damage Dr. Verska's reputation and exclude Dr. Verska from 
competing in orthopedic spine care with SARMC, SMI, and Dr. Zimmerman. 
77. Defendants, by improperly refusing to grant Dr. Verska's application for renewal 
of staff privileges, and other defamatory conduct and statements set forth herein, knew that 
Dr. Verska would be compelled to disclose the outcome and recommendations of the SARMC 
committees in connection with applications for hospital medical staff privileges of other 
institutions in Southern Idaho where he held privileges or could have applied for privileges, 
malpractice insurance, membership in professional organizations, credentialing with health 
insurers and related purposes. 
78. Dr. Verska, in fact, has been compelled to disclose the outcome of the SARMC 
committee actions to malpractice insurers, licensing boards, state and federal regulatory 
agencies, health insurers and other healthcare institutions, and will be compelled to make further 
disclosures of this type for the remainder of his professional career. 
79. Defendants' reckless conduct and actions were performed with malice, ill will, 
personal spite, with knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or 
falsity, and for the purpose of injuring Dr. Verska's professional reputation, the reputation of the 
Spine Institute of Idaho and preventing competition from Dr. Verska and the Spine Institute of 
Idaho. 
80. By reason of the foregoing, Defendants have uttered and published false and 
defamatory statements about Dr. Verska in writing and, upon infonnation and belief, orally, with 
respect to Dr. Verska's conduct, skill level, competence, employment, career, and qualifications 
to practice medicine, and have compelled Dr. Verska to repeat Defendants' defamation to others 
in connection with his professional career, with the intent of steering business away from 
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Dr. Verska and to SARMC and SMI thereby limiting competition. 
81. Such statements constitute defamation per se, libel per se and/or slander per se. 
82. Plaintiffs have had their business reputation damaged. Plaintiffs have been and 
will continue to be damaged financially as a result of such defamatory statements, causing 
damage in an amount to be proven at trial. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Denial of Common Law Fair Procedure Rights 
83. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth 
in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
84. SARMC failed to comply with the MSPP when it allowed a peer review process 
to result in a denial of privileges without a hearing and due process. 
85. As a result of SARMC's failure to comply with the MSPP, Dr. Verska did not 
have an opportunity to adequately defend himself in the peer review process, which is a denial of 
his common law right to a fair procedure. 
86. The decision by SARMC to refuse to grant Dr. Verska' s application to renew his 
staff privileges without a hearing was without justification and not supported by any reasonable 
ground and constitutes a violation Dr. Verska's common law right to a fair procedure and due 
process. 
87. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiffs have been 
damaged and will continue to be damaged and are entitled to be compensated for those damages 
in an amount to be determined at trial. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Fiduciary Duties 
88. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth 
in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
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89. Dr. Verska trusted in and relied upon Defendant SARMC to follow the MSPP and 
assure that proper policies and procedures were implemented, established, and adhered to both 
by SARMC and those appointed by SARMC to serve on committees and in position of authority. 
This relationship of trust and confidence between Dr. Verska and SARMC established fiduciary 
duties on behalf of SARMC to act in good faith and with due regard to Dr. Verska's interests. 
90. SARMC breached said fiduciary duties by, inter alia, inducing Dr. Zimmerman, 
Dr. Fox and other unnamed parties, to conspire to damage Dr. Verska's professional reputation 
and wrongfully deny Dr. Verska's application for renewal of privileges. Defendants' conduct 
was reckless in this regard. 
91. SARMC breached said fiduciary duties by, inter alia, refusing to provide the 
information requested of it by St. Luke's with regard to Dr. Verska, even though Dr. 
Verska had consented to such disclosure. 
92. As a result of these breaches of fiduciary duties, Plaintiffs have been damaged and 
will continue to be damaged in an amount to be proved at trial. 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Violation of Due Process Rights 
93. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth 
in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
94. SARMC violated Dr. Verska's due process rights when they chose to ignore the 
findings and recommendation of the three neutral, objective panel members comprising the FHP 
and continued to rely on the unjustified, arbitrary decision of the MEC made in June of 2008. 
95. The FHP found that Dr. Verska had met his burden of proof as set forth in the 
Bylaws and determined that the decision by the MEC was unfair. The FHP's recommendation 
was based on substantial evidence and testimony by both parties. The FHP's recommendation to 
reinstate Dr. Verska's privileges immediately was reasonable in light of the evidence presented. 
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By ignoring the FHP recommendation, SARMC violated Dr. Verska's due process rights. 
96. The decision by the MEC and SARMC to repeatedly ignore the recommendations 
of internal committees and the FHP is patently unfair to Dr. Verska and violates his due process 
rights. 
97. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant SARMC's reckless actions, 
Plaintiffs have been damaged and will continue to be damaged and are entitled to be 
compensated for those damages in an amount to be determined at trial. 
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
98. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth 
in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
99. Defendants intentionally, willingly and/or negligently inflicted emotional distress 
upon Dr. Verska by acting in bad faith and unjustly refusing to renew Dr. Verska's privileges at 
SARMC. 
100. As a result of Defendants' reckless, extreme and outrageous conduct, Dr. Verska 
has suffered, and continues to suffer, severe emotional distress, including physical manifestations 
of that distress. 
101. Defendants' acts and/or omissions were intentional, reckless, willful, malicious, 
and/or grossly negligent. 
102. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful acts of SARMC, Plaintiffs have 
been damaged in an amount to be proven at trial. 
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Injunctive Relief 
103. Plaintiffs herein adopt and incorporate by reference all of the allegations set forth 
in the foregoing paragraphs and further allege: 
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104. Dr. Verska has a right to earn a living and has done so through the practice of 
medicine. He has been, and continues to be, greatly harmed due to his exclusion from the 
medical staff of SARMC. 
105. Based upon the improper refusal of SARMC to renew Dr. Verska's privileges, Dr. 
Verska seeks injunctive relief restoring his privileges and his ability to earn a living, to which he 
is entitled, pending the final outcome of the present action. 
106. Based upon the improper refusal of SARMC to provide information 
requested of it by St. Luke's, Dr. Verska seeks injunctive relief requiring SARMC to 
provide the information to St. Luke's in order for St. Luke's to complete the credentialing 
process with regard to Dr. Verska's application for reappointment to St. Luke's medical 
staff. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
Plaintiffs have been required to retain counsel to pursue this matter. Plaintiffs have 
retained the law firm of POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC, and have agreed to pay said attorneys a 
reasonable fee. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred 
in the prosecution of this matter pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and 
Idaho Code §12-121, or other applicable law. 
PRAYER 
Plaintiffs' claims for damages exceed the jurisdiction amount of this Court and include, 
but are not limited to loss of income due to Dr. Verska's inability to perform surgery at SARMC, 
damage to his reputation, interference with his past and present business and professional 
relations. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against the above-named Defendants 
as follows: 
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1. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages III an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
2. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
3. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
4. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Fourth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
5. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages III an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
6. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Sixth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
7. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Seventh Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
8. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Eighth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial; 
9. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Ninth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial; and 
10. Pursuant to Plaintiffs' Tenth Claim for Relief, they be awarded damages in an 
amount to be proven at trial. 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this complaint to include a cause of action for 
punitive damages, pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-1604. 
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury as to all issues so triable pursuant to Rule 38(b) 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and will not stipulate to a jury of less than 12 jurors. 
DATED this 3 day of March, 2010. 
POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC 
By 
Raymond D. Powers - Of the Firm 
Portia L. Rauer - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D., being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
That he is the plaintiff in the above-entitled action and that he has read the foregoing 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, knows the cont s there and believes the same to be true. 
Joseph M. Verska, M.D. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ~ day of March, 2010. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at ~aYl 
Commission expires 0'1/2...11/7..613 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of March, 2010, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, by 
the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Robert B. White 
Givens Pursley LLP 
601 W. Bannock Street 
PO Box 2720 
Boise,ID 83701-2720 
Fax: 388-1300 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Robert G. Homchick 
Brad Fisher 
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP 
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 
Seattle, WA 98101-3045 
Fax: (206) 757-7700 
Attorneys for Defendants 










Raymond D. Powers 
Portia L. Rauer 




Robert B. White (ISB #4438) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 W. Bannock Street 
PO Box 2720 




Robert G. Homchick 
Brad Fisher 
DA VIS WRIGHT TREMAINE, LLP 
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 
Seattle, W A 98101-3045 
Telephone: 206-757-8063 
Facsimile: 206-757-7063 
Attomeys for Defendants 
1 0 
J. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D., and THE SPINE 
INSTITUTE OF IDAHO, No. CV OC 0911804 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
PERMISSIVE APPEAL 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. ZIMMERMAN, 
M.D.; and DONALD FOX, M.D., 
Defendants. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In its Order re Motion to Compel/Protective Order dated February 11, 2010 (the 
DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL - 1 
813833 
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"Order"), the Court ruled that Idaho's peer review privilege is to be applied as wTitten, and 
that the statute precludes the discovery or use of peer review materials "in any action of 
any kind in any court ... for any purpose whatsoever." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-1392b. 
Plaintiffs now move the Court for an order granting them leave to bring a permissive 
appeal of this ruling to the Idaho Supreme Court under Idaho Appellate Rule 12. 
Plaintiffs overstate the significance of the ruling given the limited scope of judicial 
review that is provided by Miller v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 87 P.3d 934 
(Idaho 2004), but regardless, the Court's ruling is sound, and does not present either "a 
controlling question of law" or one "as to which there are substantial grounds for 
difference of opinion." The issue is not appropriately appealed in the middle of this case, 
and defendants Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Dr. Donald Fox and Dr. 
Christian Zimmerman respectfully request that the Court deny the motion so that the case 
can proceed expeditiously to a resolution under the existing case schedule. 
II. OPPOSITION ARGUMENT 
The fundamental failing in plaintiffs' motion is that application of the peer review 
privilege to the discovery sought in this case is simply not an issue on which there are 
substantial grounds for difference of opinion. Whatever the import of the ruling (which, 
unlike commonplace rulings on issues such as statutes of limitations, does /lot preclude 
plaintifJs from bringing their c1aimsl), the meaning of the peer review privilege statute is 
not fairly debatable. As stated by the Court, "I.C. § 39-1392b unambiguously protects all 
1 As such, defendants submit that the Court's ruling does not present a "controlling issue of 
law," which is an independent basis for denying plaintiffs' motion. See United States v. 
Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1959) (denying application for interlocutory review of 
ruling on privilege). 
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peer review records from discovery of any type and bars any testimony about those peer 
review records." Order at 5. 
The peer review privilege has been applied regularly in all sorts of different 
proceedings, including numerous District Court cases. In the rare instances in which the 
Idaho appellate courts have had occasion to comment on the privilege, they have affirmed 
that it precludes the discovery or use of peer review materials. As stated in Murphy v. 
Wood: 
In viewing the act as a whole, including this statement of 
purpose, we believe that the legislature intended to establish 
a broad privilege for the records and proceedings of hospital 
medical staff committees. The privilege extends to all 
discussions and proceedings by hospital staff committees, 
conducted for the purpose of research, discipline or medical 
study. Such confidentiality is in the public interest because it 
encourages a free exchange of medical information that will 
ultimately benefit the public in the form of improved medical 
care. We conclude that the Idaho statute was intended to 
provide broader protections of confidentiality, privilege and 
immunities than are afforded by mere peer review statutes. 
667 P.2d 859, 863 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983). Even Harrison v. Binnion, 214 P.3d 631, 635 
(Idaho 2009), the case plaintiffs cite as somehow impliedly rejecting the privilege, 
recognizes that "[t]he obvious purpose of the statute is to encourage the free exchange of 
information and opinions regarding peer review activities, which includes credentialing" 
by protecting the participants. 
The fact that there is no appellate decision expressly rejecting plaintiffs' arguments 
does not mean they are somehow meritorious; rather, the absence of reported case law in 
the 37 years since the peer review privilege was first codified instead reflects that the 
language used by the legislature is so direct that the issue is never litigated. And, in any 
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event, it is axiomatic that "just because a court is the first to rule on a particular question 
... does not mean that there is such a substantial difference of opinion as will support an 
interlocutory appeal." 4 AM. JUR. 2D, Appellate Review § 123 (2010) (footnotes omitted). 
At this juncture, a permissive appeal will do nothing more than delay this matter for 
many months, if not longer. The issue under Miller is whether Dr. Verska received due 
process, not whether the decision concerning Dr. Verska's privileges was subjectively 
"correct." If, as plaintiffs suggest, "it will be impossible for Dr. Verska to prove his claims 
against the Defendants" without the barred discovery, Motion at 5, then they are claims 
that should not have been filed in the first place. The defendants - who have been 
vvTongfully accused of all sorts of wrongdoing - are anxious to clear their names and bring 
this matter to a conclusion, and do not want further delay. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Idaho's peer review privilege is found in a direct and unambiguous statute. The 
application of such a statute does not present a suitable case for a permissive appeal under 
I.A.R. 12. As stated in Budell v. Todd, 665 P.2d 701,703 (1983), "[T]he Court intends by 
Rule 12 to create an appeal in the exceptional case and does not intend by the rule to 
broaden the appeals which may be taken as a matter of right under LA.R. 11. For these 
reasons, the Court has, over the six year experience of the use of Rule 12, accepted only a 
limited number of the applications for appeal by certification." This is not such an 
exceptional case, and defendants request that the case proceed on the merits. 
II 
II 
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DATED this 10th day of March, 2010. 
Robert B. White 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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COMES NOW Defendants Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center and Donald Fox, 
M.D. ("Defendants"), by and through their attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP and Davis 
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Wright Tremaine LLP, and Answering Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial ("Amended Complaint") on file herein, admit, deny, and allege as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND PARTIES 
1. Answering the allegations in paragraph 1 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants are 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore deny them. 
2. Answering the allegations in paragraph 2 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants are 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore deny them. 
3. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 3 of the Amended Complaint. 
4. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 4 of the Amended Complaint. 
5. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 5 of the Amended Complaint. 
6. Answering the allegations in paragraph 6 of the Amended Complaint, although 
Defendants believe the claims asserted against them are brought without basis in law or fact, they 
do not challenge venue or jurisdiction. 
FACTS 
7. Answering the allegations in paragraph 7 ofthe Amended Complaint, Defendants are 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore deny them. 
8. Answering the allegations in paragraph 8 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
admit that Dr. Verska was granted certain privileges at SARMC on or about January 22, 1996, 
that he had certain privileges after that time until July 1, 2008, and that his privileges were 
governed by certain Bylaws and Medical Staff Policies and Plans. Defendants deny that 
SARMC and Dr. Verska had a fiduciary relationship. Except as expressly admitted or denied, 
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Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or 
falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 8 of the Amended Complaint, and therefore 
deny them. 
9. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 9 of the Amended Complaint. 
10. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 10 of the Amended Complaint. 
11. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 11 of the Amended Complaint. 
12. Answering the allegations in paragraph 12 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
admit that SARMC asked Dr. Verska to provide certain on-call trauma services. Except as 
expressly admitted, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief 
as to the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 12 of the Amended Complaint, 
and therefore deny them. 
13. Answering the allegations in paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
admit that in 2005, the Medical Executive Committee (the "MEC") appointed a committee to 
review certain aspects of Dr. Verska's practice. Except as expressly admitted, Defendants are 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
remaining allegations in paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint, and therefore deny them. 
14. Answering the allegations in paragraph 14 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
admit that in January 2006, the committee reported certain findings to the MEC and made certain 
recommendations. Except as expressly admitted, Defendants are without knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in 
paragraph 14 of the Amended Complaint, and therefore deny them. 
15. Answering the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
admit that the SARMC offers mUltidisciplinary management of certain spine issues, and denies 
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that the SARMC or SMI competes directly with services offered by Dr. Verska. Except as 
expressly admitted or denied, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to 
form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the other allegations in paragraph 15 of the Amended 
Complaint, and therefore deny them 
16. Answering the allegations in paragraph 16 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
admit that Dr. Zimmerman is employed by SARMC, and that he is identified, among other 
things, as a spine surgeon. Except as expressly admitted or denied, Defendants are without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the other 
allegations in paragraph 16 of the Amended Complaint, and therefore deny them 
17. Answering the allegations in paragraph 17 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
admit that Dr. Fox was elected as President Elect of the MEC in February 2005, and denies the 
remaining allegations. 
18. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 18 of the Amended Complaint. 
19. Answering the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
admit that the MEC voted to discontinue the review of Dr. Verska's practice and that the 
SARMC Board of Trustees elected to continue the investigation. Except as expressly admitted, 
Defendants deny the remaining allegations in paragraph 19 of the Amended Complaint. 
20. Answering the allegations in paragraph 20 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
admit that MEC elected to commission a committee to review certain aspects of Dr. Verska's 
practice. Except as expressly admitted, Defendants are without knowledge or information 
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 20 of 
the Amended Complaint, and therefore deny them. 
21. Answering the allegations in paragraph 21 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
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admit that a committee comprised of Dr. McMartin, Dr. Floyd and Dr. Mulder made certain 
recommendations, that Dr. Floyd is a spine surgeon, that Dr. Floyd has been a participant in 
meetings and other activities of the Spine Medicine Institute, that Dr. McMartin is a 
rehabilitation medicine specialist and former President of the Medical Staff at SARMC, and that 
Dr. Mulder is a former President of the Medical Staff at SARMC. Except as expressly admitted, 
Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 21 of the Amended Complaint. 
22. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 22 of the Complaint. 
23. Answering the allegations in paragraph 23 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
admit that the committee presented initial recommendations to the MEC. Except as expressly 
admitted or denied, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief 
as to the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 23 of the Amended Complaint, 
and therefore deny them. 
24. Answering the allegations in paragraph 24 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
admit that Dr. Verska received a letter from Dr. Fox on or about December 6, 2007. Except as 
expressly admitted, Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief 
as to the truth or falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 24 of the Amended Complaint, 
and therefore deny them. 
25. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 25 of the Amended Complaint. 
26. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 26 of the Amended Complaint. 
27. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 27 of the Amended Complaint. 
28. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 28 of the Amended Complaint. 
29. Answering the allegations in paragraph 29 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
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allegations, and therefore deny them. 
30. Answering the allegations in paragraph 30 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
admit that Dr. Fox met with the MEC on or about June 25, 2008, and deny the remaining 
allegations. 
31. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 31 of the Amended Complaint. 
32. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 32 of the Amended Complaint. 
33. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 33 of the Amended Complaint. 
34. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 34 of the Amended Complaint. 
35. Answering the allegations in paragraph 35 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
admit that Dr. Zimmerman was offered employment by SARMC in 2008, and deny the 
remaining allegations therein. 
36. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 36 of the Amended Complaint. 
37. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 37 of the Amended Complaint. 
38. Answering the allegations in paragraph 38 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
admit that a hearing took place between October 28 and 30, 2008, and denies that Dr. Verska 
presented evidence rebutting SARMC's position. Except as expressly admitted or denied, 
Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or 
falsity of the remaining allegations in paragraph 38 of the Amended Complaint, and therefore 
deny them .. 
39. Answering the allegations in paragraph 39 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
admit that the panel made recommendations that differed from those of SARMC, and deny the 
remaining allegations. 
40. Answering the allegations in paragraph 40 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
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admit that the MEC disagreed with the recommendations of the panel, and deny the remaining 
allegations. 
41. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 41 of the Amended Complaint. 
42. Answering the allegations in paragraph 42 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
admit that Dr. Verska appealed to the Board of Trustees and that the appeal was rejected. Expect 
as admitted, Defendants deny the remaining allegations in paragraph 42 of the Amended 
Complaint. 
43. Answering the allegations in paragraph 43 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore deny them. 
44. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 44 of the Amended Complaint. 
45. Answering the allegation in paragraph 45 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
admit that Saint Alphonsus's counsel sent a letter on August 28, 2009, and aver that the 
document speaks for itself. Except as admitted, Defendants deny the remaining allegations 
contained in paragraph 45 of the Amended Complaint. 
46. Answering the allegations in paragraph 46 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore deny them. 
47. Answering the allegations in paragraph 47 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore deny them. 
48. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 48 of the Amended Complaint. 
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Civil Conspiracy 
49. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 48 of the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
50. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 50 of the Amended Complaint, and 
each of its subparagraphs (a)-(t). 
51. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 51 of the Amended Complaint. 
52. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 52 of the Amended Complaint. 
53. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 53 of the Amended Complaint. 
54. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 54 of the Amended Complaint. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
55. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 54 of the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
56. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 56 of the Amended Complaint. 
57. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 57 of the Amended Complaint. 
58. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 58 of the Amended Complaint. 
59. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 59 of the Amended Complaint. 
60. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 60 ofthe Amended Complaint. 
61. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 61 of the Amended Complaint. 
62. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 62 of the Amended Complaint. 
63. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 63 of the Amended Complaint. 
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Intentional and/or Negligent 
Interference with Economic Advantage 
64. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 63 of the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
65. Answering the allegations in paragraph 65 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore deny them. 
66. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 66 of the Amended Complaint. 
67. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 67 of the Amended Complaint. 
68. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 68 of the Amended Complaint. 
69. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 69 of the Amended Complaint. 
70. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 70 of the Amended Complaint. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Interference with Prospective 
Contractual Relations or Business Expectations 
71. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 70 of the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
72. Answering the allegations in paragraph 72 of the Amended Complaint, Defendants 
are without knowledge or infomlation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore deny them. 
73. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 73 of the Amended Complaint. 
74. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 74 of the Amended Complaint. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Defamation Per Se, Libel Per Se, and Slander Per Se 
75. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 74 of the Amended 
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Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
76. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 76 of the Amended Complaint. 
77. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 77 of the Amended Complaint. 
78. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 78 of the Amended Complaint. 
79. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 79 of the Amended Complaint. 
80. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 80 of the Amended Complaint. 
81. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 81 of the Amended Complaint. 
82. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 82 of the Amended Complaint. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Denial of Common Law Fair Procedure Rights 
83. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 82 of the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
84. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 84 of the Amended Complaint. 
85. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 85 of the Amended Complaint. 
86. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 86 of the Amended Complaint. 
87. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 87 of the Amended Complaint. 
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Fiduciary Duties 
88. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 87 of the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
89. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 89 of the Amended Complaint. 
90. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 90 of the Amended Complaint. 
91. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 91 of the Amended Complaint. 
92. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 92 of the Amended Complaint. 
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EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Violation of Due Process Rights 
93. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 92 of the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
94. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 94 of the Amended Complaint. 
95. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 95 of the Amended Complaint. 
96. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 96 of the Amended Complaint. 
97. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 97 of the Amended Complaint. 
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
98. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 97 of the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
99. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 99 ofthe Amended Complaint. 
100. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 100 of the Amended Complaint. 
101 . Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 101 of the Amended Complaint. 
102. Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 102 of the Amended Complaint. 
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Injunctive Relief 
103. Defendants incorporate their response to paragraphs 1 through 102 of the 
Amended Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
104. Answering the allegations in paragraph 104 of the Amended Complaint, 
Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or 
falsity of the allegations, and therefore denies them. 
105. Answering the allegations in paragraph 105 of the Amended Complaint, 
Defendants deny the Dr. Verska is entitled to the requested relief, and deny any other allegations 
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contained therein. 
106. Defendant denies that Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief sought in paragraph 106 
of the Amended Complaint 
107. Answering the unnumbered paragraphs at pages 19-21 of the Amended 
Complaint, Defendants deny that plaintiffs are entitled to any of the relief requested. 
108. Any allegations in the Amended Complaint that are not admitted or otherwise 
addressed above are hereby denied. 
109. Without assuming any burden that is properly borne by Plaintiffs, Defendants 
reserve the right to assert the following as defenses to Plaintiffs' claims: 
DEFENSES 
110. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, and each of the counts asserted against 
Defendants, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendants. 
111. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, and each of the counts asserted against 
Defendants, was made without good cause, and without any basis in law or fact. 
112. Defendants are immune from the claims asserted by plaintiff under federal and 
state law. Specifically, and without limitation, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 
1986, 42 U.S.C. §11101, et. seq., and Idaho Code §§ 39-1392c, provide Defendants with 
immunity from the claims asserted by plaintiff in this action. 
113. Damages suffered by Plaintiffs, if any, were caused by the Plaintiffs' own fault or 
negligence. 
114. Defendants are not the proximate cause of any damage suffered by Plaintiffs. 
115. Communications by Defendants concerning Verska, if any, were privileged. 
116. Communications by Defendants concerning Verska, if any, were true. 
117. Defendants' conduct is privileged under both state and federal law. 
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118. Plaintiffs have unclean hands. 
119. Damages suffered by Plaintiffs, if any, were caused by or contributed to by the 
superseding and unexpected acts and conduct of other persons and entities. 
120. Plaintiffs' alleged injuries and/or damages may be the result of actions or inaction 
of other persons or entities over whom Defendants have no control and no responsibility. To the 
extent the evidence reveals the same, plaintiffs' recovery, if any, must be proportionately 
reduced and/or barred. 
121. Defendants reserve the right to assert additional defenses based upon further 
investigation and discovery. 
PRAYER 
Wherefore, Defendants pray for judgment against Plaintiffs as follows: 
1. For judgment in their favor on all counts of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint; 
2. For an award of costs and attorneys' fees to the full extent permitted by law, 
including Idaho Code § 12-121; and 
3. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just in the premises. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendants hereby demand a trial by a jury of not less than twelve (12) on all issues so 
triable pursuant to LR.C.P. 38(b). 
DATED this 16th day of March, 2010. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
Robert B. White 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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DEFENDANT CHRISTIAN G. 
ZIMMERMAN, M.D. 'S ANSWER TO 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW Defendant Christian G. Zimmerman, M.D. ("Defendant"), by and through 
his attorneys of record, Givens Pursley LLP and Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, and Answering 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("Amended Complaint") on file 
herein, admits, denies, and alleges as follows: 
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JURISDICTION AND PARTIES 
I. Answering the allegations in paragraph 1 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
2. Answering the allegations in paragraph 2 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
3. Answering the allegations in paragraph 3 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
4. Defendant admits the allegations in paragraph 4 of the Amended Complaint. 
5. Answering the allegations in paragraph 5 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
6. Answering the allegations in paragraph 6 of the Amended Complaint, although 
Defendant believes the claims asserted against him are frivolous and are brought without basis in 
law or fact, he does not challenge venue or jurisdiction. 
FACTS 
7. Answering the allegations in paragraph 7 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
8. Answering the allegations in paragraph 8 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
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9. Answering the allegations in paragraph 9 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
10. Answering the allegations in paragraph 10 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
11. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 11 of the Amended Complaint. 
12. Answering the allegations in paragraph 12 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or infom1ation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
13. Answering the allegations in paragraph 13 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
14. Answering the allegations in paragraph 14 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
15. Answering the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant 
admits that SARMC offers multidisciplinary management of certain spine issues, and denies that 
SARMC or SMI competes directly with services offered by Dr. Verska. Except as expressly 
admitted or denied, Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as 
to the truth or falsity of the other allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint, and therefore 
denies them 
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16. Answering the allegations in paragraph 16 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant 
admits that he is employed by SARMC, and that he is identified, among other things, as a spine 
surgeon. Except as expressly admitted or denied, Defendant is without knowledge or 
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the other allegations in 
paragraph 16 of the Amended Complaint, and therefore denies them 
17. Answering the allegations in paragraph 17 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
18. Answering the allegations in paragraph 18 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or infonnation sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
19. Answering the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
20. Answering the allegations in paragraph 20 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
21. Answering the allegations in paragraph 21 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant 
admits that Dr. Floyd is a spine surgeon. Except as expressly admitted, Defendant is without 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the other 
allegations in paragraph 21 of the Amended Complaint, and therefore denies them. 
22. Answering the allegations in paragraph 22 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
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allegations, and therefore denies them. 
23. Answering the allegations in paragraph 23 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
24. Answering the allegations in paragraph 24 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
25. Answering the allegations in paragraph 25 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of falsity of Dr. 
Verska's peer review process in January through June of 2008 and therefore denies them. 
Defendant denies the remaining allegations in paragraph 25 of the Amended Complaint. 
26. Answering the allegations in paragraph 26 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
27. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 27 of the Amended Complaint. 
28. Answering the allegations in paragraph 28 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
29. Answering the allegations in paragraph 29 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
30. Answering the allegations in paragraph 30 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
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allegations, and therefore denies them. 
31. Answering the allegations in paragraph 31 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
32. Answering the allegations in paragraph 32 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
33. Answering the allegations in paragraph 33 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
34. Answering the allegations in paragraph 34 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
35. Answering the allegations in paragraph 35 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant 
admits that he was offered employment by SARMC, and denies the remaining allegations 
therein. 
36. Answering the allegations in paragraph 36 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them .. 
37. Answering the allegations in paragraph 37 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant 
denies the allegations to the extent they are directed to him, and is otherwise without knowledge 
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the allegations, and therefore 
denies them. 
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38. Answering the allegations in paragraph 38 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
39. Answering the allegations in paragraph 39 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
40. Answering the allegations in paragraph 40 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
41. Answering the allegations in paragraph 41 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
42. Answering the allegations in paragraph 42 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
43. Answering the allegations in paragraph 43 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
44. Answering the allegations in paragraph 44 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
45. Answering theallegations in paragraph 45 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
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allegations, and therefore denies them. 
46. Answering the allegations in paragraph 46 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
47. Answering the allegations in paragraph 47 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
48. Answering the allegations in paragraph 48 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
Civil Conspiracy 
49. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 48 of the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
50. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 50 of the Amended Complaint, and 
each of its subparagraphs (a)-(t). 
51. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 51 of the Amended Complaint. 
52. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 52 of the Amended Complaint. 
53. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 53 of the Amended Complaint. 
54. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 54 of the Amended Complaint. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
55. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 54 of the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
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56. Answering the allegations in paragraph 56 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
57. Answering the allegations in paragraph 57 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
58. Answering the allegations in paragraph 58 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
59. Answering the allegations in paragraph 59 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
60. Answering the allegations in paragraph 60 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
61. Answering the allegations in paragraph 61 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
62. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 62 of the Amended Complaint. 
63. Answering the allegations in paragraph 63 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
Intentional and/or Negligent 
Interference with Economic Advantage 
64. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 63 of the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
65. Answering the allegations in paragraph 65 of the Amended Complaint, Detendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore deny them. 
66. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 66 of the Amended Complaint. 
67. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 67 of the Amended Complaint. 
68. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 68 of the Amended Complaint. 
69. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 69 of the Amended Complaint. 
70. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 70 of the Amended Complaint. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Interference with Prospective 
Contractual Relations or Business Expectations 
71. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 70 of the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
72. Answering the allegations in paragraph 72 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore deny them. 
73. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 73 of the Amended Complaint. 
74. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 74 of the Amended Complaint. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Defamation Per Se, Libel Per Se, and Slander Per Se 
75. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 74 of the Amended 
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Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
76. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 76 of the Amended Complaint. 
77. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 77 of the Amended Complaint. 
78. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 78 of the Amended Complaint. 
79. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 79 of the Amended Complaint. 
80. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 80 of the Amended Complaint. 
81. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 81 of the Amended Complaint. 
82. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 82 of the Amended Complaint. 
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Denial of Common Law Fair Procedure Rights 
83. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 82 of the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
84. Answering the allegations in paragraph 84 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
85. Answering the allegations in paragraph 85 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
86. Answering the allegations in paragraph 86 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
87. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 87 of the Amended Complaint. 
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SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Breach of Fiduciary Duties 
88. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 87 of the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
89. Answering the allegations in paragraph 89 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
90. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 90 of the Amended Complaint. 
9 I. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 91 of the Amended Complaint. 
92. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 92 of the Amended Complaint. 
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Violation of Due Process Rights 
93. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs through 92 of the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
94. Answering the allegations in paragraph 94 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
95. Answering the allegations in paragraph 95 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
96. Answering the allegations in paragraph 96 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
97. Answering the allegations in paragraph 97 of the Amended Complaint, Defendant is 
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without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity of the 
allegations, and therefore denies them. 
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
98. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 97 of the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
99. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 99 of the Amended Complaint. 
100. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 100 of the Amended Complaint. 
101. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 10 1 of the Amended Com plaint. 
102. Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph 102 of the Amended Complaint. 
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
Injunctive Relief 
103. Defendant incorporates his response to paragraphs 1 through 102 of the Amended 
Complaint as if set forth fully herein. 
104. Answering the allegations III paragraph 104 of the Amended Complaint, 
Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or 
falsity of the allegations, and therefore denies them. 
105. Answering the allegations in paragraph 105 of the Amended Complaint, 
Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or 
falsity of the allegations, and therefore denies them. 
106. Defendant denies that Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief sought in paragraph 106 
of the Amended Complaint. 
107. Answering the unnumbered paragraphs at pages 19-21 of the Amended 
Complaint, Defendants denies that plaintiffs are entitled to any of the relief requested. 




108. Any allegations in the Amended Complaint that are not admitted or otherwise 
addressed above are hereby denied. 
109. Without assuming any burden that is properly borne by Plaintiffs, Defendant 
reserves the right to assert the following as defenses to Plaintiffs' claims: 
DEFENSES 
110. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, and each of the counts asserted against 
Defendant, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Defendant. 
III. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, and each of the counts asserted against 
Defendant, was made without good cause, without any basis in law or fact, frivolously, 
unreasonably, and without foundation. 
112. Damages suffered by Plaintiffs, if any, were caused by the Plaintiffs' own fault or 
negligence. 
113. Defendant is not the proximate cause of any damage suffered by Plaintiffs. 
114. Communications by Defendant concerning Verska, if any, were privileged. 
115. Communications by Defendant concerning Verska, ifany, were true. 
116. Defendant's conduct is privileged under both state and federal law. 
117. Defendant is immune from the claims asserted by plaintiffs under federal and 
state law. Specifically, and without limitation, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 
1986,42 U.S.C. §11101, el seq., and Idaho Code § 39-1392c, provide Defendant with immunity 
from the claims asserted by plaintiffs in this action. 
118. Plaintiffs have unclean hands. 
119. Damages suffered by Plaintiffs, if any, were caused by or contributed to by the 
superseding and unexpected acts and conduct of other persons and entities. 
DKFENDANT CHRISTIAN G. ZIMMERMAN, M.D.'S ANSWER TO AMENDED 
COMPLAINT - 14 
817364 
000215 
120. Plaintiffs' alleged injuries and/or damages may be the result of actions or inaction 
of other persons or entities over whom Defendant has no control and no responsibility. To the 
extent the evidence reveals the same, plaintiffs' recovery, if any, must be proportionately 
reduced and/or barred. 
121. Defendant reserves the right to assert additional defenses based upon further 
investigation and discovery. 
PRAYER 
Wherefore, Defendant prays for jUdgment against Plaintiffs as follows: 
1. For judgment in his favor on all counts of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint; 
2. For a finding that the claims against Defendant were brought frivolously, 
unreasonably, and without foundation; 
3. For an award of costs and attorneys' fees to the full extent permitted by law, 
including Idaho Code § 12-121 and other law; and 
4. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just in the premises. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Defendant hereby demands a trial by a jury of not less than twelve (12) on all issues so 
triable pursuant to LR.C.P. 38(b). 
DATED this 16th day of March, 2010. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
/I. 
Robert B. White 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of March. 2010, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Raymond D. Powers 
Powers Tolman, PLLC 
345 Bobwhite Court, Ste # 150 
P.O. Box 9756 
Boise, ID 83707 
Attorneysjor Plaintiffs 
(2. ~J 
_ Hand Delivery 
:i- Facsimile (208) 577-5101 
_ Overnight Courier 
U.S. Mail 
Robert B. White 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE 
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. 
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD 
FOX,M.D., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0911804 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE 
APPEAL 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court for hearing on the 17th day of March, 
2010, upon the Plaintiffs' Motion for Permissive Appeal, and after considering the memoranda 
filed by the parties, having heard oral argument and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion for Permissive Appeal, pursuant to 
Rule 12, LA.R., is granted, allowing Plaintiffs to pursue interlocutory appeal of this Court's 
February 11, 2010 decision, which denied Plaintiffs' "Motion to Compel Production of 
Information Relevant to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center's Wrongful Denial of Dr. 
Verska's Reappointment." 
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ORDERED this __ day of March, 2010. 
BY __ ~L-~ ______ ~~~ __________ ___ 
DEBORAH A. BAIL 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the .2Jih'l day of March, 2010, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE 
APPEAL, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Raymond D. Powers 
Portia L. Rauer 
POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC 
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 150 
Boise, ID 83706 
Fax No.: 577-5101 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Robert B. White 
Givens Pursley LLP 
601 W. Bannock Street 
PO Box 2720 
Boise,ID 83701-2720 
Fax: 388-1300 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Robert G. Homchick 
Brad Fisher 
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP 
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 
Seattle, WA 98101-3045 
Fax: (206) 757-7700 
Attorneys for Defendants 












Deputy Clerk of the Court 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL - 2 
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Raymond D. Powers 
ISB #2737; rdp@powerstolman.com 
Portia L. Rauer 
ISB #7233; plr@powerstolman.com 
POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC 
345 Bobwhite Court, Suite 150 
Post Office Box 9756 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
Telephone: (208) 577-5100 
Facsimile: (208) 577-5101 
W;\17\17-002\Notice of Appeal.doex 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE 
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. 
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD 
FOX,M.D., 
DefendantslRes pondents. 
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Case No. CV OC 0911804 




TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTSIRESPONDENTS SAINT ALPHONSUS 
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, CHRISTIAN G. ZIMMERMAN, M.D., AND 
DONALD FOX, M.D., THEIR ATTORNEYS, ROBERT B. WHITE OF GIVENS 
PURSLEY, LLP, 601 W. BANNOCK STREET, BOISE, ID 83702, ROBERT G. 
HOMCHICK AND BRAD FISHER OF DA VIS WRIGHT TREMAINE, LLP, 1201 
THIRD AVENUE, SUITE 2200, SEATTLE, WA 98101-3045, AND THE CLERK OF THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, pursuant to Rule 17, of the Idaho Appellate Rules, that: 
1. The above-named appellants, JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE SPINE 
INSTITUTE OF IDAHO, appeal against the above-named respondents to the Idaho Supreme 
Court from the: 
a. Order Re: Motion to CompellProtective Order entered February 11,2010, 
by the Honorable Deborah A. Bail. 
2. The appellants have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court pursuant to 
Rule 12(a), I.A.R., and as set forth in the Idaho Supreme Court's Order Granting Motion for 
Permissive Appeal, entered on May 17,2010. 
3. The following is a preliminary statement of the issues which appellants intend to 
assert on appeal. This list of issues shall not prevent the appellants from asserting other issues on 
appeal: 
a. Whether Idaho Code § 39-1392b can be expanded beyond its wording to 
prevent a physician from discovering information, pursuant to Rules 30, 33, 34, and 36, Idaho R. 
Civ. P, related to a healthcare organization's credentialinglprivileging decision to deny the 
physician reappointment to its medical staff, when it is the physician who is seeking the 
information to challenge the organization's decision. 
b. Whether Idaho Code § 39-1392c can be expanded beyond its wording to grant a 
healthcare organization immunity from liability for a credentialinglprivileging decision denying 
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a physician reappointment to its medical staff, when it is the physician who is challenging the 
organization's decision. 
4. A protective order was ~ entered on February 5, 2010, to protect sensitive 
information designated as confidential by the party seeking the protection. 
5. Appellants request that the reporter prepare a partial transcript, pursuant to Rule 
2S(b), I.AR., to include only the hearing on appellants' Motion to Compel Production of 
Information Related to SARMC's Wrongful Denial of Dr. Verska's Reappointment held on 
February 3, 2010. 
6. Appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28(b)(l), I.AR.: 
a. Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Information Related to 
SARMC's Wrongful Denial of Dr. Verska's Reappointment filed December 28,2009; 
b. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of 
Information Related to SARMC's Wrongful Denial of Dr. Verska's Reappointment filed 
December 28,2009; 
c. Affidavit of Raymond D. Powers in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Compel Production of Information Related to SARMC's Wrongful Denial of Dr. Verska's 
Reappointment, filed February 9, 2010; 
d. Appendix in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of 
Information Related to SARMC's Wrongful Denial of Dr. Verska' s Reappointment, filed 
December 28, 2009; 
e. Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and Response to 
Defendants' Cross-Motions for (i) Protective Order on Peer Review, and (ii) Order Striking 
Privileged Peer Review Records, filed January 27,2010. 
000222 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
f. Protective Order with a copy of the Stipulation for Entry of Protective 
Order attached, filed February 5, 2010; and 
g. Order Re: Motion to CompeVProtective Order, entered February 11, 
2010. 
7. The undersigned hereby certifies: 
a. That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter; 
b. That appellants have paid the estimated fee of $97.50 to Susan Gambee, 
Court Reporter, for preparation of the reporter's transcript; 
c. That the estimated fee for the clerk's record is $100.00 and has been paid 
in addition to the filing fee of $101.00 to Ada County Clerk of the Court; and 
d. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to Rule 20, I.A.R. 
DATED this day of June, 2010. 
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POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC 
,. i I( 
Raymond D. Powers - Of the Firm 
Portia L. Rauer - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
000223 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ii' I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of June, 2010, I caused to be served a true copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEA ,by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
each of the following: 
Robert B. White 
Givens Pursley LLP 
601 W. Bannock Street 
PO Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Fax: 388-1300 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents 
Robert G. Homchick 
Brad Fisher 
Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP 
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 
Seattle, WA 98101-3045 
Fax: (206) 757-7700 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents 
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Raymond D. Powers 
Portia L. Rauer 
000224 
ORIG1NA 
Robert B. White (lSB #4438) 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 W. Bannock Street 
PO Box 2720 




Robert G. Homchick 
Brad Fisher 
DA VIS WRIGHT TREMAINE, LLP 
1201 Third Avenue, Suite 2200 
Seattle, WA 98101-3045 
Telephone: 206-757-8063 
Facsimile: 206-757-7063 
Attorneys for Defendants 
NO. ___ ,",,"":::~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D., and THE SPINE 
INSTITUTE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. ZIMMERMAN, 
M.D.; and DONALD FOX, M.D., 
Defendants. 
No. CV OC 0911804 
DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL RECORDS TO 
BE INCLUDED IN THE 
CLERK'S RECORD ON 
APPEAL AND/OR 
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANTS/PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, RAYMOND D. POWERS, COURT REPORTER SUSAN 
GAMBEE AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that Defendants/Respondents, in the above entitled 
DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS TO BE INCLUDED IN TI;IJ!<.. 0225 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL AND/OR TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL - 1 ,.., U 
893950 
proceeding hereby request, pursuant to Rule 19 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, the inclusion 
of the following material in the Clerk's Record in addition to that required to be included 
by the Idaho Appellate Rules and the Notice of Appeal: 
A. Clerk's Record: 
1. Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and Cross-Motions 
for (i) Protective Order on Peer Review, and (ii) Order Striking Privileged 
Peer Review Records filed on 01120110. 
2. Defendants' Reply in Support of Cross-Motions for (i) Protective Order on 
Peer Review and (ii) Order Striking Privileged Peer Review Record filed on 
02/01110. 
3. Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Permissive Appeal filed on 
3110110. 
4. Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Permissive Appeal lodged on 3/2411 O. 
B. Reporter's transcript: 
1. Hearing transcript for Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Compel and Cross-Motions for (i) Protective Order on Peer Review, and (ii) 
Order Striking Privileged Peer Review Records hearing held on 02/0311 O. 
2. Hearing transcript for Motion for Permissive Appeal hearing held on 
03117110. 
I certify that a copy of this request for additional transcripts has been served on the 
court reporter, Susan Gambee at 200 W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho, of who a transcript is 
requested and that the estimated number of additional pages being requested is 26 pages. 
I further certify that a copy of this request for additional records has been served 
DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS TO BE INCLUDED IN TlIJ'A 0226 
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upon the clerk of the district court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this 18th day of June, 2010. 
Rob~It . Wnite 
/ / 






CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 18th day of June, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL RECORDS TO 
BE INCLUDED IN THE CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL AND/OR TRANSCRIPT ON 
APPEAL, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Raymond D. Powers 
Powers Tolman, PLLC 
345 Bobwhite Court, Ste #150 
P.O. Box 9756 
Boise, ID 83707 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
_ Hand Delivery 
\~simile (208) 577-5101 
_ Overnight Courier 
U.S. Mail 
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TO: Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
451 West State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
(208) 334-2616 
AUG 1 7 2010 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
x Docket No . 37574-2010 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs . 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, et aI" 
Defendants - Respondents . 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT OF 55 PAGES LODGED 
Appealed from the District Court of the 
FOURTH Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho , in and for the County of ADA, 
Deborah A . Bail, District Court Judge. 
This transcript contains hearing held on: 
2/3/10 & 3/17/10 
DATE : June 22, 2010 
,. " 
Susan G. Gambe'e, Court Reporter 
Official Court Reporter, 
Judge Deborah Bail 
Ada County Courthouse 
Idaho Certified Shorthand Reporter No. 18 
Registered Merit Reporter 
00228 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE 
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. 
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD 
FOX,M.D., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Supreme Court Case No. 37574 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court ofthe Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as 
CONFIDENTIAL EXHIBITS to the Record: 
1. Affidavit of Rayrnond D. Powers in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production 
of Inforrnation Releated to SARMC'S Wrongful Denial of Dr. Verska's Reappointment, 
filed February 9,2010. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 11 th day of August, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE 
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. 
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD 
FOX,M.D., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Supreme Court Case No. 37574 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
RAYMOND D. POWERS 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Date of Service: _______ _ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ROBERT B. WHITE 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOSEPH M. VERSKA, M.D. and THE 
SPINE INSTITUTE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER; CHRISTIAN G. 
ZIMMERMAN, M.D.; and DONALD 
FOX,M.D., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Supreme Court Case No. 37574 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
4th day of June, 2010. 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
By ______________ _ 
Deputy Clerk 
0023f 
